Shapira v. Union National Bank & DQS E13-E15

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon religious faith of beneficiary v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon religious faith of beneficiary v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith –Belief v. Conduct (Marriage in 1974) –Administrability

ADMINISTRABILITY To Pigpen, so long as the kitchens and bathrooms are always kept very clean. To Schroeder, so long as he never plays any work by Beethoven on the piano.

ADMINISTRABILITY To Lucy so long as she remains a member of the Society of Friends To Linus, so long as he remains a good Catholic

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon divorce v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Gift conditioned upon divorce v. Gift conditioned upon marriage to person of particular faith –Ct: Latter not sufficient to encourage fake M & divorce –Grantee can’t avoid condition by saying “I will act in bad faith”

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Conditional gift with “gift over” to third party v. Conditional gift without “gift over”

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Conditional gift with “gift over” to third party v. Conditional gift without “gift over” Comprehensive plan v. “In Terrorem” condition

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Forcing a marriage as condition of completed gift v. withholding gift until marriage made

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Forcing a marriage as condition of completed gift v. withholding gift until marriage made –Remedy: Injunction v. Forfeiting Gift –Like case involving divorce settlement requirement that child be raised in partic. faith: won’t impose contempt/crim sanctions for not following religion

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Quaker men (Maddox) v. Jewish women (Shapira)

SHAPIRA: DISTINCTIONS Quaker men (Maddox) v. Jewish women(Shapira) –Too Few Available Partners (e.g., you must marry one of the Bronte Sisters)

DQE14.Was the Maddox opinion cited in Shapira correct to rule that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners?

DQE14.Was the Maddox opinion cited in Shapira correct to rule that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners? Too much restriction on grantee v. Grantor’s rights

DQE14.Maddox rules that these kinds of conditions are unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners. How few partners must there be to meet the test?

DQE14.Maddox: unacceptable where there is a sufficiently “small number of eligible” partners. If you were living in a state with that test, how would you prove it was met?

DQE15: Should a court enforce conditions that limit or mandate religious behavior for the grantee?

RULES THAT FURTHER ALIENABILITY

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law Abolished in many jurisdictions

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Remainder or executory interest in grantor’s heirs treated as future interest in grantor Today usually a rule of construction, not a rule of law Abolished in many jurisdictions NOTE: Grantor must be alive at time of grant for DWT to apply

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE Example: While alive, Oscar conveys: “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.”

Doctrine of Worthier Title Example: While alive, Oscar conveys: “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion If A dies, and no destructability, O has fee simple on exec. limitation & heirs have springing executory interest.

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” As written: Agnes has life estate O’s heirs have contingent remainder O has reversion If A dies, and no destructability, O has fee simple on exec. limitation & heirs have springing executory interest. NOT VERY MARKETABLE!!

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” Effect of Doctrine: Agnes has life estate Remainder in O’s heirs treated as “remainder” in O = reversion.

DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE O “to Agnes for life, then to my heirs.” Effect of Doctrine: Agnes has life estate Remainder in O’s heirs treated as “remainder” in O = reversion. If A dies, O has fee simple absolute

(P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy?

(P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs?

(P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Other?

(P): Sleepy “to Happy for life, then to the heirs of Sleepy." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion Effect of Doctrine of Worthier Title?

(P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S." As Written: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion Effect of Doctrine of Worthier Title: Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion

(P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect As Written? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder Sleepy: Reversion

(P): S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect As Written? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder  Bashful: Vested Remainder Sleepy: Reversion  Nothing (Divests)

(P) : S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect if Doctrine Applies? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion

(P) : S “to H for life, then to the heirs of S.” Sleepy dies, devising all to ANA. Intestacy statute would give S’s property to Bashful if no will. Effect if Doctrine Applies? Happy: Life Estate Sleepy: Reversion  ANA: reversion

RULE OF CONSTRUCTION INTERPRET GRANT ACCORDING TO RULE UNLESS EVIDENCE OF GRANTOR’S INTENT TO THE CONTRARY

Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction GEORGE LEAVES BUSH-ACRE: “TO JEB FOR LIFE, THEN TO JEB’S CHILDREN FOR THEIR LIVES, THEN TO MY HEIRS”

Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction “TO JEB FOR LIFE, THEN TO JEB’S CHILDREN FOR THEIR LIVES, THEN TO MY HEIRS” We presume George would have wanted to regain complete control of Bush-Acre had he thought he would still be alive after Jeb & children all gone.

Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction George leaves Bush-acre “to Jeb for life, then to Jeb’s children for their lives, then to my heirs. It is my wish that the Doctrine of Worthier Title not apply to this grant”

RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE IF-- One Instrument –Creates Life Estate in A –Plus Remainder in A’s Heirs –Both Equitable or Both Legal Remainder in A’s heirs  Remainder in A

RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE RULE OF LAW, NOT RULE OF CONSTRUCTION

RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE RULE OF LAW, NOT RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ELIMINATED BY STATUTE IN MOST STATES

(Q)a: Will "to Grace for life, then to Grace's children and their heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

(Q)a: Will "to Grace for life, then to Grace's children and their heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? None. Remainder is in “children” not heirs.

(Q)b: Johnny “to Jay for life, then to Jay's heirs if Jay survives David." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

(Q)b: Johnny “to Jay for life, then to Jay's heirs if Jay survives David." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? To Jay for life, then to Jay, if Jay survives David.

(Q)c: Cher "to Chastity for 100 years if she so long live, then to Chastity's heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

(Q)c: Cher "to Chastity for 100 years if she so long live, then to Chastity's heirs." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? None. Chastity has term of years determinable, not life estate.

(Q)d: Bill "to Chelsea for life." Bill subsequently devises the reversion to Chelsea's heirs. Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

(Q)d: Bill "to Chelsea for life." Bill subsequently devises the reversion to Chelsea's heirs. Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? N one. Not done in one instrument.

(Q)e: Al "to Tipper for life, then to Tipper's heirs. I intend that the rule in Shelley's Case shall not apply." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case?

(Q)e: Al "to Tipper for life, then to Tipper's heirs. I intend that the rule in Shelley's Case shall not apply." Effect of the Rule in Shelley’s Case? Rule applies. Rule of Law, not construction.

(Q)e: Al "to T for life, then to T's heirs. I intend that the rule … shall not apply." Rule applies. “To Tipper for life, then to Tipper”  into fee simple absolute.

“ At Common Law ” v. “ Today ”

Doctrine of Worthier Title “ At Common Law ” v. “ Today ” Applied everywhere as Rule of Law Eliminated in some states; Rule of Construction in others

Rule in Shelley’s Case “ At Common Law ” v. “ Today ” Applied everywhere as Rule of Law Eliminated in most states

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. If Cheryl graduates from law school during Andrew’s life estate, does she divest Andrew’s interest or just Brian’s?

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Common law presumption: If ambiguous, interest won’t divest life estate

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Now generally treated as a question of grantor’s intent.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl has graduated from law school, then to Cheryl.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl has graduated from law school, then to Cheryl. Verb Tenses suggest immediate for first; at end of life estate for second.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Andrew is 16; Cheryl is 46.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Cheryl graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. Andrew is 16; Cheryl is 46. Seems unlikely Cheryl will survive Andrew, so this suggests immediate divestment.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Andrew graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Brian graduates from law school, then to Cheryl.

TIMING AMBIGUITY To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Andrew graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. To Andrew for life, then to Brian, but if Brian graduates from law school, then to Cheryl. No clear reason to punish Andrew for Brian’s life choices.

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.”: Ambiguities? R alive or dead? M’s interest intended to cut off life estate? Condition void? Today or “At Common Law”? Application of D of Worthier Title?

(R) AMBIGUITIES R alive or dead? M’s interest intended to cut off life estate? Condition void? Today or “At Common Law”? Application of D of Worthier Title?

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” R alive, “to my heirs” = contingent remainder R dead, “To my heirs” = vested remainder subject to divestment.

(R) AMBIGUITIES R alive or dead? M’s interest intended to cut off life estate? Condition void? Today or “At Common Law”? Application of D of Worthier Title?

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” M’s interest cut off life estate? –punishes S for early marriage –discourages fortune hunters –maybe concern w Stacy support for Marni –no “then to Marni” –BUT: could have placed right after life estate –Could check for other facts

(R) AMBIGUITIES R alive or dead? M’s interest intended to cut off life estate? Condition void? Today or “At Common Law”? Application of D of Worthier Title?

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” Partial Restraint on Marriage –Probably OK if only effects remainder (no harm to S) –Check S’s age Not much effect if S is 33 Bigger deal if S is 17 –If void, pencil out interest to M

(R) AMBIGUITIES R alive or dead? M’s interest intended to cut off life estate? Condition void? Today or “At Common Law”? Application of D of Worthier Title?

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” At Common Law: M’s interest presumed to be in Life Estate Today: M’s interest presumed to be in fee

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” At Common Law: Doctrine of Worthier Title is rule of law; if R alive, remainder in R’s heirs  reversion in R Today: Doctrine of Worthier Title either eliminated or Rule of Construction. If the latter, remainder in R’s heirs  reversion in R unless evidence that grantor intended otherwise.

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” Example: Condition void, Renee alive, today, no DWT: –S: Life Estate –R’s Heirs: Contingent Remainder –R: Reversion –M: Nothing

(R) Renee conveys “to Stacy for life, then to my heirs, but should Stacy marry before she turns 35, to Marni.” Example: Condition valid, cuts off life estate, Renee dead, today: –S: Life Estate on Executory Limitation –R’s Heirs: Vested Remainder in f.s. subj to divestment –M: Shifting Executory Interest (in f.s.)

(S) Xaviera “to Betsy if it continues to be used as a house of prostitution, but if not, my heirs can take it.” Xaviera died, survived by no children or spouse, but by her mother, Yvonne. Xaviera’s will gave all property to Phil. Betsy later closed the existing brothel and replaced it with an ad agency.

(S) Xaviera “to B if it continues to be used as a house of prostitution, but if not, my heirs can take it.” B later closed the existing brothel and replaced it with an ad agency. Ambiguities? Condition Valid/Effect of Invalidity Heirs take automatically v. must act Effect of Doctrine of Worthier Title? Ad agency violate grant?

(S) X “to B if it continues to be used as a house of prostitution, but if not, my heirs can take it.” X died, survived [only] by her mother, Y. X’s will gave all property to P. B replaces brothel with ad agency Not Ambiguities Common Law v. Today (Ad Agency) Who is X’s heir: Y not P

(U) Rob: “to C for his support and benefit so long as the property is not used for commercial purposes, then to my nephew J and his heirs if J reaches the age of 35.” C on land writes novels & does deals on phone. C dies; J is not 35 (VERY HARD!!)

(U) Rob: “to C for his support and benefit so long as the property is not used for commercial purposes, then to my nephew J and his heirs if J reaches the age of 35.” AMBIGUITIES? Life Estate or Fee? Condition Violated by Writing/Deal-Making? When Does J’s Interest Take Effect? Destructability Apply?

Note: No Ambiguity re Today v. Common Law C writes novels & does deals on phone.

FINAL TEST NOTES Lot of Repetition or Alteration of Old Qs Double-Check Room Arrive Early Bring Grading # & Pencils Read Carefully –Positives & Negatives –Changes from Old Qs Arguments Supporting –Must be correct –Must logically support position