Keynote Presentation to Networking and Security Research Center (NSRC) Industry Day 2012 Robert A. Kehlet Basic and Applied Sciences J9 Research and Development Defense Threat Reduction Agency 26 April 2012 Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTRA History Counterproliferation Non-Proliferation WMD Threat Reduction Today Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Secretary of Defense Director, DTRA Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs DTRA BASIC RESEARCH 2

DTRA safeguards the United States and its Allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and mitigate its effects. Nuclear Weapons... difficult to acquire, devastating in use Chemical Weapons... cheap and easy to make... casualties not widespread Biological Weapons …. not difficult to find/use … attacks not quickly recognized, … casualties propagate with time Radiological Devices... dangerous to assemble with high contamination impact … low lethality High-Yield Explosives... easily available materials with many ways to deliver … point targets WMDTHREATS Providing Solutions Across the Full Spectrum of Combating WMD DTRA Mission 3

4 RD-BA Directorate Focus Foster farsighted, high payoff research focused on the unique challenges to prevent, reduce, eliminate, defeat and mitigate threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Attract next-generation workforce Advance the fundamental knowledge and understanding in the sciences Promote university research to support WMD threat reduction Facilitate transition of research results to higher levels of S&T maturation 4

Impact: Near real-time support for pre-event predictions, damage assessments and strategies to remediate the effects of WMD attack (e.g. cascading failure, change in demand) Motivation and Long-Term Objectives Motivation: A WMD event will have a large geographic impact simultaneously across multiple networks causing cascading failures and decreased capacity across networks with shifting demand Objectives: Expand understanding and identify methods/strategies for the response, resilience, and recovery of interconnected networks to the extreme environments associated with WMD effects DTRA Niche: Extreme conditions over a wide area simultaneously affecting multiple networks Cascading failures across infra-structure networks “Hardening” and mitigation strategies from impacts of WMD use Current Practice: Network structure and dynamics are fairly well understood Early research into adaptive recovery of networks whose structure has changed Little to no capability to predict, prioritize or manage changed demand for remaining infrastructure capacity Physical Networks & Network Theory 5

One potential WMD Environment A high altitude nuclear weapon burst can produce an “electromagnetic shock wave” covering a significant portion of the United States Such geographically-large “insults” simultaneously affect networks, their interconnections, and may induce cascading failure 6

Physical Networks & Network Theory Physical Networks & NetworkTheory Algorithms to Extract State of Network Network Dynamics with Respect to Multiple Failures Adaptability to cascading Failures & Interdependencies New Theories for Adaptive Recovery Failure Reporting and Robustness Rapid Analysis of Dynamics Recovery Strategies and Optimized Survivability Modern Technical Network Behaviors Analysis of technical networks Under multiple failures Robust Network Design Strategies to Counter Multiple Failures 7

Challenges & Barriers: Field is relatively nascent, little research in the DTRA niche exists Changing research focus to include cascading and interdependent networks Limited DTRA mission niche Opportunities: Research on analyzing the robustness of interdependent networks Research on topology categorization for interdependent systems of networks Bio-inspired resilient network design Objectives: Identify factors for network robustness of interdependent networks Discover theory and create algorithms for WMD damage assessment Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network 8

Physical Networks & Theory Algorithms to Extract State of Network 9

Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures Challenges & Barriers: Fundamental models for dynamic topologies are needed Real networks are interdependent Opportunities: Rapid analysis algorithms could contribute to containment and remediation of major damage Objectives: Identify behavior of networks including changes in network topologies over time 10

Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures A failed node A subsequent failed node A node within the impact radius, but not affected by the failure 11

Physical Networks & Theory Network Dynamics - Multiple Failures 12

Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive Recovery Challenges & Barriers: Lack of fundamental mathematical representations for network dynamics with changing topologies Inability to process massive data sets for data-to-decision close to real time Understanding of human cognition for autonomous systems Opportunities: Mathematical methods for burst robustness and rapid analysis of cascading failures Strategies for network repairing and resource reallocation via topology, logic structures and multilayer network dynamics New theories to speed up data-to-decision process Objectives: Develop mathematical based strategies and techniques for identifying stopping cascading failures, repairing damaged networks, and ultimately for adaptive recovery from WMD attacks. 13

Physical Networks & Theory New Theories for Adaptive Recovery 14

15 Physical Networks and Theory Modern Technical Network Behaviors Challenges & Barriers: Abundance of network data available, but few characteristic events Validation of theory Opportunities: Predict and prioritize changed demand and identify optimal strategies for allocation of remaining capacity under varying attack scenarios Objectives: Characterize impact of changed demands on networks due to WMD attack Characterize Modern-technical feedback of networks and its impact 15

Physical Networks and Theory Modern Technical Network Behaviors 16

Basic Research Awards DC MA 9 University Grants (includes 6 industry) NJ MD 6 CT RI DOE National Laboratory Awards 2 DOD Laboratory Awards RD-BA FY Grants as of 11 Aug

Mathematical constructs beyond graph representations to capture geometric and dynamical characteristics Create revolutionary (continuous) dynamical models which could capture/characterize temporally and spatially changing properties after a WMD event Identify functional relationships and dynamical changes among the network layers after a WMD event Physical Networks and Theory Future Directions 18

Summary DTRA has DoD’s only basic research investment that is 100% focused on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) DTRA is dedicated to long-term university-centric basic research to CWMD Support training of next generation workforce University engagement is critical to our success 250+ research teams at 100+ universities & laboratories conduct quality research for CWMD Your participation is WELCOME!! We invite ideas, peer reviewers, research partnerships & collaboration Information and links to solicitations at: 19

Questions?? 20