Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1979.

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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1979

2 Outline Introduction of expected utility theory Critiques of expected utility theory Prospect theory:  Value function  Weight function  Applications Discussion

3 Introduction of Expected Utility Theory Some Definitions:  A prospect (x 1,p 1 ;…;x n,p n ) is a contract that yields outcome x i with probability p i, where p 1 +p 2 +…+p n =1.  Use (x,p) to denote the prospect (x,p;0,1-p) that yields x with probability p and 0 with probability 1-p.  The (riskless) prospect that yields x with certainty is denoted by (x).

4 Introduction of Expected Utility Theory Tenets of expected utility theory: 1.Expectation: U(x 1,p 1 ;…;x n,p n )=p 1 u(x 1 )+…+p n u(x n ). -Implying the independence axiom 2.Asset Integration: (x 1,p 1 ;…;x n ;p n ) is acceptable at asset position w iff U(w+x 1,p 1 ;…;w+x n,p n )>u(w) - the domain of the utility function is final states rather than gains and losses. 3.Risk Aversion: u is concave (u’’<0)

5 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Certainty, Probability, and Possibility Certainty Effect People overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable. Problem 1: Choose between A: 2500 with probability.33B: 2400 with certainty 2400 with probability.66 0 with probability.01 N=72[18] [82]* Problem 2: Choose between C: 2500 with probability.33D: 2400 with probability.34 0 with probability.67 0 with probability.66 N=72[83]* [17]

6 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Certainty, Probability, and Possibility The pattern of preferences violates expected utility theory. According to the theory, with u(0)=0, the first preference implies u(2400)>.33u(2500)+.66u(2400) or.34u(2400)>.33u(2500) while the second preference implies the reverse inequality.

7 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Certainty, Probability, and Possibility Problem 3: A: (4000,.80),orB: (3000). N=95[20] [80]* Problem 4: C: (4000,.20),orD: (3000,.25). N=95[65]* [35] The choice of B implies u(3000)/u(4000)>4/5, whereas the choice of C implies the reverse inequality. Reducing the probability of winning from 1.0 to.25 has a greater effect than the reduction from.8 to.2.

8 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Certainty, Probability, and Possibility Problem 5: A: 50% chance to win a three-orB: A one-week tour of week tour of England, England, with certainty. France, and Italy; N=72[22] [78]* Problem 6: A: 5% chance to win a three-orD: 10% chance to win a one- week tour of England, week tour of England France, and Italy; N=72[67]* [33]*

9 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Certainty, Probability, and Possibility The Certainty effect is not the only type of violation of the substitution axiom. Problem 7: A: (6000,.45),orB: (3000,.90). N=66[14] [86]* Problem 8: C: (6000,.001),orB: (3000,.002). N=66[73]* [27] In Problem 7, most people choose the prospect where winning is more probable. In the situation where winning is possible but not probable (Problem 8), most people choose the prospect that offers the larger gain.

10 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — The Reflection Effect Preferences Between Positive and Negative Prospects Positive prospects Negative prospects Problem3: (4000,.80) (-3000) N=95 [20] [80]* N=95 [92]* [8] Problem4: (4000,.20)>(3000,.25) Problem 4’: (-4000,.20)<(-3000,.25) N=95 [65]* [35] N=95 [42] [58] Problem7: (3000,.90)>(6000,.45) Problem 7’: (-3000,.90)<(-6000,.45) N=66 [86]* [14] N=66 [8] [92]* Problem8: (3000,.002)<(6000,.001) Problem 8’: (-3000,.002)<(-6000,.001) N=66 [27] [73]* N=66 [70]* [30]

11 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — The Reflection Effect The reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the preference order. Reflection effect implies that risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied by risk seeking in the negative domain. Both preferences between the positive prospects and between the corresponding negative prospects violate the expectation utility theory. The reflection effect eliminates aversion for uncertainty or variability as an explanation of the certainty effect.

12 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Probabilistic Insurance Problem 9: Suppose you consider the possibility of insuring some property against damage, e.g., fire or theft. After examining the risks and the premium you find that you have no clear preference between the options of purchasing insurance or leaving the property uninsured. It is then called to you attention that the insurance company offers a new program called probabilistic insurance. In this program you pay half of the regular premium. In case of damage, there is a 50% chance that you pay the other half of the premium and the insurance company covers all the losses; and there is a 50% chance that you get back your insurance payment and suffer all the losses. Recall that the premium for full coverage is such that you find this insurance barely worth its cost. Under these circumstances, would you purchase probabilistic insurance: Yes,No. N=95[20][80]*

13 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Probabilistic Insurance The problem can be depicted as: w: current asset; y: premium; x: loss; p: probability of loss x; 1 > r > 0. 1-p p r 1-r w-yr w-y w-x

14 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Probabilistic Insurance According to expected principle, if one is indifferent between (w-x,p;w,1-p) and (w-y), then one should prefer probabilistic insurance (w-x,(1-r)p;w-y,rp;w-ry,1-p) Proof: pu(w-x)+(1-p)u(w)=u(w-y) implies (1-r)pu(w-x)+rpu(w-y)+(1-p)u(w-ry)>u(w-y) Without loss of generality, we can set u(w-x)=0 and u(w)=1. Hence, u(w-y)=1-p, and we wish to show that rp(1-p)+(1-p)u(w-ry)>1-poru(w-ry)>1-rp which holds if and only if u is concave.

15 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Probabilistic Insurance Insights: Probabilistic insurance is inconsistent with the concavity hypothesis suggested by expected utility theory. Probabilistic insurance is generally unattractive. Reducing the probability of a loss from p to p/2 is less valuable than reducing the probability of that loss from p/2 to 0.

16 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Isolation Effect People often disregard components that the alternatives share when making choice. A pair of prospects can be decomposed into common and distinctive components in more than one way, and different decompositions sometimes lead to different preferences. We refer to this phenomenon as the isolation effect. Problem 10. Problem 4. 3/4 1/4 1/5 4/ /4 1/ /5 4/5 N=141[78]* [22] N=95[35] [65]*

17 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Isolation Effect Problem 11: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given You are now asked to choose between A: (1000,.50),andB: (500). N=70[16] [84]* Problem 12: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given You are now asked to choose between A: (-1000,.50),andB: (-500). N=68[69]* [31] It implies that the carriers of value or utility are changes of wealth, rather than final asset positions that include current wealth.

18 Violation of Expected Utility Theory — Isolation Effect Lives Saved vs. Lives Lost (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the program are as follows:... Which of the two programs would you favor? If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%) If program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. (28% If program C is adopted 400 people will die. (22%) If program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (78%)

19 Prospect Theory Prospect theory is an alternative account of individual decision making under risk to expected utility theory. It distinguishes two phases in the choice process: Editing Phase: a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects, which often yields a simpler representation of these prospects. Many anomalies of preference result from the editing of prospects. Evaluation Phase: the edited prospects are evaluated the prospect of highest value is chosen.

20 Prospect Theory — Editing Phase Coding. People normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point, rather than as final states of wealth or welfare. Combination. Prospects can sometimes be simplified by combining the probabilities associated with identical outcomes. e.g., (200,.25; 200,.25) is reduced to (200,.50)

21 Prospect Theory — Editing Phase Segregation. Some prospects contain a riskless component that is segregated from the risky component in the editing phase. e.g., (300,.80; 200,.20) ↔ sure gain of 200 and the risky prospect (100,.80) Cancellation. The essence of the isolation effects is the discarding of components that are shared by the offered prospects (e.g., Problem 10). Another type of cancellation involves the discarding of common constituents, i.e., outcome-probability pairs. e.g., choice between (200,.20; 100,.50; -50,.30) and (200,.20; 150,.50; -100,.30) can be reduced to a choice between (100,.50; -50,.30) and (150,.50; -100,.30).

22 Prospect Theory — Editing Phase The basic equation of the theory describes the manner in whichπand v are combined to determine the overall value of regular prospects.  If (x,p;y,q) is a regular prospect (i.e., either p+q<1, or x≥0≥y, or x≤0 ≤y), then V(x,p;y,q)=π(p)v(x)+ π(q)v(y) Where v(0)=0; π(0)=0, and π(1)=1  If p+q=1 and either x>y>0 or x<y<0, then V(x,p;y,q)=v(y)+π(p)[v(x)-v(y)]

23 Prospect Theory ─ Value Function Value Function of Prospect Theory  Defined on gains and losses - Reference dependence  Concave in gains (v’’(x) 0) and convex (v’’(x)>0, for x<0) in losses - Concavity entails risk aversion - Convexity entails risk seeking  Steeper for losses than for gains -Loss aversion

24 Prospect Theory ─ Value Function Problem 13: (6000,.25),or(4000,.25; 2000,.25). N=68[18] [82]* Problem 13’: (-6000,.25),or(-4000,.25; -2000,.25). N=64[70]* [30] Applying equation 1 yields π(.25)v(6000)<π(.25)[v(4000)+v(2000)]and π(.25)v(-6000)>π(.25)[v(-4000)+v(-2000)]. Hence, v(6000) v(-4000)+v(-2000)

25 GAINSLOSSES VALUE A hypothetical value function

26 Prospect Theory ─ Weight Function Weight Function of Prospect Theory  Decision weights measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.  It is usually to express decision weights as a function of stated probability. In general, however, the decision weight attached to an event could be influenced by other factors, e.g., ambiguity.  Naturally,πis an increasing function of p, withπ(0)=0 and π(1)=1.

27 Prospect Theory ─ Weight Function For small values of p, π is a subadditive function of p, i.e., π(rp)>rπ(p) for 0<r<1. e.g., Problem8, (6000,.001) is preferred to (3000,.002) implies π(.001)∕π(.002)>v(3000)∕v(6000)>1/2 by the concavity of v.

28 Prospect Theory ─ Weight Function Very low probabilities are generally over- weighted, i.e.,π(p)>p for small p. Problem 14:(5000,.001)or(5) N=72[72]*[28] Problem 14’:(-5000,.001)or(-5) N=72[17][83]* Problem 14 implies π(.001)>v(5)/v(5000)>.001, so does Problem 14’.

29 Prospect Theory ─ Weight Function Subcertainty: For all 0<p<1, π(p)+π(1-p)<1. Applying equation (1) to the prevalent preferences in Problem 1 and 2 Yields, respectively, v(2400)>π(.66)v(2400)+π(.33)v(2500),i.e., [1-π(.66)] v(2400)>π(.33)v(2500)and π(.33)v(2500)+π(.34)v(2400);hence, 1-π(.66)>π(.34),or π(.66)+π(.34)<1

30 Prospect Theory ─ Weight Function Subproportionality: If (x,p) is equivalent to (y, pq) then (x,pr) is not preferred to (y,pqr), 0<p,q,r≤1. By equation (1), π(p)v(x)=π(pq)v(y) implies π(pr)v(x)=π(pqr)v(y); hence, π(pq) ∕ π(p) ≤π(pqr) ∕ π(pr) Subproportionality together with the overweighting of small probabilities imply thatπ is subadditive over that range.

Figure. A hypothetical weighting Function STATED PROBABILITY: p DECISION WEIGHT: π(p)