Identification of Bot Commands By Run-time Execution Monitoring Younghee Park, Douglas S. Reeves North Carolina State University ACSAC 2009 1.

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Identification of Bot Commands By Run-time Execution Monitoring Younghee Park, Douglas S. Reeves North Carolina State University ACSAC

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 2

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 3

About Botnets A major source of network threats – DDoS, spam, identity theft, click frauds A variety of protocols – IRC, HTTP, peer-to-peer Botnets is estimated to be in the millions of hosts 4

BotTee Monitoring and analyzing bot execution to identify the bot commands that are being executed. Bot commands with the same purpose that is highly correlated, across all types of bots. Bot commands can be accurately identified during execution. 5

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 6

System architecture for BotTee 7

Bot behavior classification through bot commands 8

Hooking API calls These bots invoke Windows functions through the API provided to applications. When each API call is intercepted, the time is also recorded. To hook only a limited set of Windows API calls. Approximately 300 commonly-used API functions from 50 real bot instances. 153 APIs were in file kernel32.dll ; the rest were found in user32.dll, advapi32.dll, ws2_32.dll ( Wsock32.dll ), etc. 9

Bot Command Identifier What sequence of system calls may correspond to a bot command? recv and send Repeated consecutive occurrences of the same API call in a trace are eliminated. γ = 2 – AAABCCAAAADDDA → AABCCAADDA Semantic unit ‘synflood’ – socket, TLSGetValue, InterlockedDecrement, ioctlsocket, connect, WaitForSingleObject, etc. 10

Correlation Engine This engine is used to create command templates, and to match captured system call traces to these templates. – Longest common subsequence algorithm (LCS), and statistical correlation Define θ1 as P(ρi,j > δ) | H1) 11

Common API Call Trace The CACTs for each command include important APIs for identifying the execution of the bot command. These are termed the featured APIs. CACT of ‘dns’ with the length 30. – recv, TlsGetValue, GetLocalTime, GetUserDefaultLCID, WideCharToMultiByte, GetTimeFormatA, GetConsoleMode, WriteConsoleA, WriteFile, inet_addr,..., GetTickCount, InterlockedExchange, CloseHandle, gethostbynam, inet_ntoa, send, 12

A Real-time Semantic Behavior Matcher Semantic unit is compared to all of the templates of bot commands. A candidate template must be identified. Computing the correlation of Semantic unit’s timing vector with each timing vector in the template. Additional information can be recorded about the arguments of API calls that are hooked. 13

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 14

Implementation and Experiments Prototype of BotTee – Used the Deviare API for intercepting Windows API calls on the fly. A botnet in a private network was deployed. Among 167 available bot source codes, there were 103 variants – Agobot, Spybot, Sdbot, and Jrbot 15

Performance Overhead of Hooking 16

Correlation Results 17

Identification of Specific Bot Commands 18

False Identification If CACTs are not distinctive enough to differentiate bots from non-bot programs. 19

Detection Rate with API Call Injection Attack Injection for obfuscation purposes may be intended to obfuscate timing analysis and correlation as well. 20

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 21

DISCUSSION The more accurately that botnet-driven network threats can be identified. BotTee can specify victims targeted by active botnets and infer the overall behaviors of the active botnets. The hooking technique allows potentially malicious bot commands to be replaced by more benign actions, or to be thwarted. 22

OUTLINE 1.INTRODUCTION 2.THE PROPOSED METHOD 3.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.DISCUSSION 5.CONCLUSION 23

CONCLUSION A method for identifying the high-level commands being executed by a bot, in real time. Comparison of the resulting traces with a previously-captured set of bot command templates. This held true even for commands executed by bots from other bot families. 24