Lesson 5: ANSI/ANS standards. Organizations  American National Standards Institute (ANSI)  Promulgation of standards  Nation’s point guard for international.

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Presentation transcript:

Lesson 5: ANSI/ANS standards

Organizations  American National Standards Institute (ANSI)  Promulgation of standards  Nation’s point guard for international standardization (ISO)  ANS  American Nuclear Society  Joint numbers with ANSI

ANS-8 standards   ANS-8.1: Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors   ANS-8.3: Criticality Accident Alarm System   ANS-8.5: Use of Borosilicate-Glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber in Solutions of Fissile Material

ANS-8 standards (cont’d)   ANS-8.6: Safety in Conducting Subcritical Neutron-Multiplication Measurements In Situ   ANS-8.7: Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile Materials   ANS-8.9: Nuclear Criticality Safety Criteria for Steel-Pipe Intersections Containing Aqueous Solutions of Fissile Materials   ANS-8.10: Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations With Shielding and Confinement

ANS-8 standards (cont’d)   ANS-8.12: Nuclear Criticality Control and Safety of Plutonium-Uranium Fuel Mixtures Outside Reactors   ANS-8.14: Use of Soluble Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors   ANS-8.15: Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements

ANS-8 standards (cont’d )   ANS-8.17: Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors   ANS-8.19: Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety   ANS-8.20: Nuclear Criticality Safety Training   ANS-8.21: Use of Fixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors

ANS-8 standards (cont’d)   ANS-8.22: Nuclear Criticality Safety Based on Limiting and Controlling Moderators   ANS-8.23: Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response   ANS-8.24: Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations   ANS-8.26 Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification Program

ANS-8.1: Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors   Granddaddy of them all   All others are just extensions of this one   Mixture of philosophy, rules, and data   So important we will give it special emphasis

ANS-8.3: Criticality Accident Alarm System   Establishes need and rules for an alarm system to detect criticality events   Definitions:

ANS-8.3: Criticality Accident Alarm System   Rules:

ANS-8.3: Criticality Accident Alarm System   Rules: (cont’d)

ANS-8.3: Criticality Accident Alarm System   Rules: (cont’d)

ANS-8.10: Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations With Shielding and Confinement   Establishes the reduced requirements of a system that is shielded.   Rules:

ANS-8.10: Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations With Shielding and Confinement   Rules: (cont’d)

ANS-8.15: Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements

ANS-8.20: Nuclear Criticality Safety Training   Scope:   Rules:   Description of content provided in standard

ANS-8.24: Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations   Establishes the minimum requirements to use a calculational method to determine subcriticality   Definitions:

ANS-8.24: Validation of Neutron Transport Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations   Definitions: (cont’d)

ANS-8.26 Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification Program   Establishes criteria for training crit safety engineers   Definitions:

ANS-8.26 Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Qualification Program   Definitions: (cont’d)

Structure of ANSI/ANS Introduction: Paragraph of basic need 2. Scope: What it is used for, NOT used for 3. Definitions:  Limitations  Shall, should, may  Glossary of terms Area of applicability Area of applicability Areal density Areal density Bias Bias Calculational method Calculational method

Structure of ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Practices  Administrative practices  Technical practices  Validation of a calculational method 5. Single-parameter limits for fissile nuclides  Uniform aqueous solutions  Aqueous mixtures  Metallic units  Oxides 6. Multiparameter control 7. References

Principles from ANSI/ANS-8.1  Applicable to operations with fissionable material outside nuclear reactors [1]  “Shall” vs. “Should” vs. “May” [3.2]  Need for analysis: “Before a new operation with fissionable material is begun, or before an existing operation is changed, it shall be determined that the entire process will be subcritical under both normal and crdible abnormal conditions” [4.1.2]  “Nuclear criticality safety is achieved by controlling one or more parameters of the system within subcritical limits and by allowances for process contingencies.” [4.2]

ANSI/ANS-8.1 (cont’d)  “All controlled parameters and their limits shall be specified” [4.2.1]  “Double contingency principle. Process designs should incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible.” [4.2.2]  No single mishap - regardless of probability - can result in criticality  Criticality requires two unlikely, independent, concurrent changes [flooding, number]  Requires common sense regarding “unlikely” [1 in 100 years]. Site specific

ANSI/ANS-8.1 (cont’d)  Preference order [4.2.3 & 4.2.4]  Geometry  Neutron absorber [credit taken]  Administrative (procedural)  Subcritical limit [3.3 & 4.2.5]  “Limiting value assigned to a controlled parameter under specified conditions”: single-parameter vs. multi-parameter  Assures that subcriticality maintained  “Subcritical limits shall be established on bases derived from experiments, with adequate allowance for uncertainties in the data.”

ANSI/ANS-8.1 (cont’d)  Validation of methods (and data)  Establishment of bias: “Bias shall be established by correlating the results of critical and exponential experiments with results obtained for these same systems by the calculational method being validated.” [4.3.1]  Bias uncertainties: “The uncertainty in the bias shall contain allowances for uncertainties in the experimental conditions, for lack of accuracy and precision in the calculational method and for extension of the area (or areas) of applicability.” [4.3.3]  Verification: “If the method involves a computer program, checks shall be performed to confirm that the mathematical operations are performed as intended.” [4.3.4]

Administrative practices  Safety responsibility and criteria established by management  Process analysis including effects of credible abnormal conditions  Written procedure  Controlled movement of material  Prompt reporting  Frequent independent operational reviews  Emergency procedures/training

Single and multiple-parameter limits  The standard includes limits that can be used  Example: Table 1, “Single parameter limits for uniform aqueous solutions of fissile nuclides:  Rows: Mass, cylinder diameter, slab thickness, solution volume, concentration of fissile nuclide, H/U ratio, areal density  Columns: 233 UO 2 F 2, 233 UO 2 (NO3) 2, 235 UO 2 F 2, 235 UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2, 239 Pu (NO 3 ) 4  Other single: U235 enrichment limits, Metal limits (mass, enrichment, diameter, thickness)  Multiple parameter limits: Mass vs enrichment, Volume vs. enrichment, Radius vs. enrichment

Single and multiple-parameter limits