Defying the Laws of Physics- Risks & Exposures for Financial Institutions Raymond DeCarlo- Moderator AIG - National Union R. Damian Brew Marsh FINPRO Dr. Frederick C. Dunbar NERA Economic Consulting David Kistenbroker Katten Muchin Zavis Thomas Wilkinson Cozen O'Connor

Frederick C. Dunbar, Ph.D. Senior Vice President 19th Annual PLUS International Conference Hosted by the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) Chicago, Illinois November 10, 2006 Defying the Laws of Physics— Risks & Exposures for Financial Institutions FOR COLOR PRINTING: Under “File, Print,” first choose color printer, then “Properties, TekColor” tab, choose “Office Color, sRGB Display.” FOR B&W PRINTING: Choose B&W printer, but do not highlight Grayscale nor Pure B&W option—choose “Color.” For best B&W contrast with color background, convert file to a PDF.

3 Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions through 2006 Year Number of Filings Notes and Sources: filings are projected based upon actual data through July 15, Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data.

Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions OtherLadderingAnalystMarket TimingContingent Commission 2000 through 2006 (Projected) Number of Filings Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Year

5 16 Federal Filings by Year of Class Action Lawsuits Involving Financial Institutions OtherInsuranceMutual FundBankInvestment Bank and Underwriter Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data through 2006 Year Number of Filings

6 Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Banks Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/ through 2006 Year Number of Filings

7 Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Insurance Companies Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/ through 2006 Year Number of Filings

8 Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Mutual Funds Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/ through 2006 Year Number of Filings

Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Investment Banks and Underwriters Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/ through 2006 Year Number of Filings

10 Filings by Circuit of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions Excluding Laddering Cases Circuit OtherUnderwriter Named Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006. DC Total for 2000 through 2006 Number of Filings

11 Filings by Circuit of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions Notes and Sources: 1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006. DC For 2005 and 2006 Number of Filings Circuit

12 Dismissal Rates by Circuit Within Two Years of Filing June 15, 1999–June 15, % 1.3%.06%.09% 5%.03%.07%.08% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% DC Circuit Dismissal Rate

13 $9.05 $9.88 $10.66 $8.84 $14.03 $12.53 $8.73 $42.38 $23.22 $18.58 $11.78 $43.79 $7.83 $13.44 $ $ $0 $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $ Average Settlement Value Settlement Value ($MM) Year

14 Median Settlement Value $3.83 $4.15 $4.90 $4.53 $4.60 $4.78 $5.00 $6.80 $4.63 $5.00 $5.81 $16.00 $4.00 $6.04 $7.50 $39.90 $0 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $ Year Settlement Value ($MM)

,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5, % 4.73% 6.07% 9.22% 5.21% 7.63% 4.32% 7.85% 5.79% 4.27% 3.86% 2.93% 5.69% 2.71% 3.94% 10.37% % 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Median Investor Losses Median Ratio of Settlement to Investor Losses (%) Investor Losses and Settlements

Contact Us Frederick C. Dunbar, Ph.D. Senior Vice President NERA—New York © Copyright 2006 National Economic Research Associates, Inc. All rights reserved.

19 th Annual Plus International Conference Primary Liability for Secondary Actors David H. Kistenbroker Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP 525 West Monroe Street Suite 1900 Chicago, Illinois

18 Primary Liability for Secondary Actors  Civil liability for banks, issuers, broker-dealers and other “secondary” actors. –Primary liability under the evolving theory of “scheme” liability.  Liability under SEC enforcement provisions –Primary liability under securities laws –Secondary liability under traditional theories of aiding and abetting and “causing” primary violations. –Liability under the USA Patriot Act

19 Primary Liability for Secondary Actors  Civil liability under § 10b for financial institutions and other secondary actors –Traditional Rule 10b-5 claim requires a material misstatement or omission –“Speaker” faces primary liability for a primary violation  Historically, financial institutions faced only secondary liability –aiding and abetting the fraudulent statements of others

20 Primary Liability for Secondary Actors  Central Bank of Denver (1994) –No private action for aiding and abetting –A financial institution may still face potential liability as a “primary violator” The Battle Line: Primary liability versus non-actionable secondary actions –Courts have utilized three tests “Bright Line” test – secondary actor must directly or indirectly make fraudulent statement: Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP (2d Cir. 1998) “Substantial Participation” test – significant role in preparing fraudulent statements: In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig. (9 th Cir. 1994)

21 Primary Liability for Secondary Actors  “Creation of Misrepresentation” test –First advocated by SEC in 1998 in amicus brief in Klein v. Boyd (3d Cir. 1998) –Focus is on secondary actors’ conduct rather than actual misstatements –Relies on 10(b)-5(a) and (c) “device, scheme or artifice to defraud” –First adopted in In Re Enron Corp. (2002) Lawyers drafted/approved false SEC filings intimate involvement with transactions supported allegation they “created” the misstatements

22 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  “Scheme” liability and the courts  Appellate courts reject “scheme” liability: –8 th Circuit – In re Charter Communications, Inc. –9th Circuit – In re Homestore.com, Inc. Third party vendors/arm’s length transactions – no other role Primary defendants failed to properly account for transactions No misstatements, “deceptive” device or “manipulative” conduct

23 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  District courts mixed on “scheme” liability –In re Dynegy (S.D. Texas 2004) - claim rejected Bank set up, executed two loans disguised as investment and cash flow No role in accounting/reporting transactions No allegations deceptive acts “coincided with sales of Dynegy securities.” –Quaak v. Dexia, S.A. (D.Mass 2005) – claim survives Bank financed “sham” entities used to record fictitious revenue “Substantial participation” -- bank a ‘primary architect’ of the scheme. Plaintiff subsequently filed amended complaint alleging direct liability; First Circuit vacated leave to appeal

24 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  District courts mixed on “scheme” liability –In re Parmalat (SDNY 2005) – mixed outcome Sham versus legitimate transactions –The securitization and factoring of duplicate invoices for same goods was “deceptive device” –Loans disguised as investments; deception resulted from company’s description, therefore Citigroup/BoA’s conduct not actionable – No showing of reliance required in actionable transaction – no direct reliance is needed

25 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  District courts mixed on “scheme” liability –In re Mutual Fund Investment Litig. (D. Md. 2005) – mixed outcome Broker-dealers facilitated market-timed transactions No liability for knowingly financing or clearing late trading Liability for providing after-hours trading system, disabling time-stamp function

26 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  Line between primary and secondary liability remains undefined –Legitimacy of underlying transaction Transaction has true business purpose Fraud is in accounting/reporting –Direct or substantial participation in deceptive acts “substantial participation” in Quaak “orchestrating” in Mutual Fund Litig. –SEC Liability for “aiding and abetting” remains

27 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  31 C.F.R Implements § 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act –Final rule took effect on June 9, 2003, although broker-dealers had until October 1, 2003, to implement –The rules seek to protect the U.S. financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing. –Parallel rules exist for banks under § and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers under §

28 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  Requires Customer Identification Program (CIP) that, at a minimum, includes: –Identity verification procedures –Recordkeeping –Comparison with government lists –Customer notice –Reliance on another financial institution

29 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  On May 22, 2006, the SEC announced its first-ever enforcement action under the USA PATRIOT Act –Action was brought against Crowell, Weedon, a broker- dealer. From 10/03 to 4/04, Crowell opened approximately 2,900 accounts. In verifying customer’s identities, Crowell relied on its registered reps’ attestations that they had personal knowledge of the customers opening the accounts The practice not documented in the firm’s written customer identification program (CIP). Rather, the CIP stated the firm would verify the identity of new customers using certain non-documentary and documentary procedures, such as public data base searches and reviewing government issued identification.

30 Developments in Secondary Actor Liability  Violation –By failing to accurately document its CIP, Crowell violated the record-keeping and record retention requirements under the rule. –Crowell consented to the issuance of an order that it cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 17a-8 thereunder.