Finding Vulnerable Network Gadgets in the Internet Topology Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly.

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Presentation transcript:

Finding Vulnerable Network Gadgets in the Internet Topology Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly Author: Nir Amar Supervisor: Dr. Gabi Nakibly

Background  The Internet – composed of some 50,000 autonomous systems (AS).  An AS is a collection of networks and routers which are administered by a single authority, i.e., an ISP, a large corporation or a university.  The routing between the different ASes is done using a protocol called BGP.  The Internet – composed of some 50,000 autonomous systems (AS).  An AS is a collection of networks and routers which are administered by a single authority, i.e., an ISP, a large corporation or a university.  The routing between the different ASes is done using a protocol called BGP.

BGP and Relationships

Import, Routing and Export policies  Upon receiving a route update for a given set of subnets, needs to decide whether to accept this update (Import policy)  If the update is accepted, need to decide whether to use the proposed route. (routing policy)  If the this path is chosen for routing, need to determine whether to propagate the update to the neighboring As’s. ( export policies)  Upon receiving a route update for a given set of subnets, needs to decide whether to accept this update (Import policy)  If the update is accepted, need to decide whether to use the proposed route. (routing policy)  If the this path is chosen for routing, need to determine whether to propagate the update to the neighboring As’s. ( export policies)

How Secure are Secure Interdomain Routing Protocols?  Authors  Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira, Peter Hummon and Jennifer Rexford.  Intuition – Shortest Path, Export All  Counter-Intuitive Attacks  Attract More by Announcing Longer Paths  Attract More by Exporting to Less Neighbors  Authors  Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira, Peter Hummon and Jennifer Rexford.  Intuition – Shortest Path, Export All  Counter-Intuitive Attacks  Attract More by Announcing Longer Paths  Attract More by Exporting to Less Neighbors

Goal

Attacking BGP  BGP Attacks Classification  Attraction – Attract traffic  Interception – eavesdrop or tamper with traffic before forwarding it on to the legitimate destination.  Quantifying the impact of attacks  Attraction – Shortest Path, Export All  Interception – Shortest Path, Export All, with Connectivity.  BGP Attacks Classification  Attraction – Attract traffic  Interception – eavesdrop or tamper with traffic before forwarding it on to the legitimate destination.  Quantifying the impact of attacks  Attraction – Shortest Path, Export All  Interception – Shortest Path, Export All, with Connectivity. Middle Dst Src

Overall Sequence User parameters: Topology and Attack Simulate BGP using the SW model Assert (Non-deterministic Attack < Intuitive Attack) ExpiSat Counter intuitive attack

Findings and Results

Topology Generation  Time and Memory Consuming  Two non-deterministic decisions:  How many As'es are in the topology  What is the relation between each As'es pair?  Time and Memory Consuming  Two non-deterministic decisions:  How many As'es are in the topology  What is the relation between each As'es pair?  Characteristics for Reducing Topologies Size

Topology Generation – Example Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc

Interception Attack – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc

Interception Attack – Counter – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc

Attack Generation – Interception Attack On Non-Deterministic Topology

Attraction Attack – Intuitive Cdcdcsdcdsc dscdscdsc

Note The topology and the attack creation are un-related!  The user can decide that he have a special topology that he want to find a counter- intuitive attack on it. The software allows such thing to happen.  Same for the case that the user have a specific attack (for example – shortest-path- export-all attack) that he would like to test it on several topologies. The topology and the attack creation are un-related!  The user can decide that he have a special topology that he want to find a counter- intuitive attack on it. The software allows such thing to happen.  Same for the case that the user have a specific attack (for example – shortest-path- export-all attack) that he would like to test it on several topologies.

Conclusion Generating non deterministic attacks. Find gadgets and Appropriate "smart / counter-intuitive" attacks using Software Verification tool Generating non deterministic topologies Succeeded to generate topologies (up to size 5-6) in my memory constraints,

The End.