Ussif Rashid Sumaila ( Jackie Alder Heather Keith Fisheries Economics Research Unit Sea Around Us Project Fisheries Centre University of British Columbia The cost of being apprehended fishing illegally OECD IUU Fishing Workshop, April 19-20, 2004

Global picture of IUU incidence

Key elements of cost Detection likelihood; –depends on enforcement & regulation; Amount of fine; Cost of avoidance; –depends on regulations & budget allocated to activity; Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society. Detection likelihood; –depends on enforcement & regulation; Amount of fine; Cost of avoidance; –depends on regulations & budget allocated to activity; Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society.

Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers

Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in IUU activity Vessel / Gear Country Arresting Country FisheryExpected Revenue (USD) Expected Penalty (USD) Total Cost (USD) Total Cost / Expected revenue Deterrence fine when Ø=0.2 Spain (longline)AustraliaPatagonian toothfish Russia (pots)JapanCrab Mexico (bottom trawler) MexicoShrimp China (bottom trawler) RussiaAlaska pollack Norway (longline) MauritiusPatagonian toothfish

Case 1: Namibian fisheries … from ‘IUU Fishing Paradise’ … to ‘IUU Fishing Hell’ –IUU fishing before independence –IUU fishing after independence … from ‘IUU Fishing Paradise’ … to ‘IUU Fishing Hell’ –IUU fishing before independence –IUU fishing after independence

Case 2: Patagonian toothfish … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing; … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver. … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing; … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver.

Case 3: Northwestern Australia … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing; –despite a high probability of getting caught and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger; –the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits. … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing; –despite a high probability of getting caught and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger; –the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits.

Summary results IUU fishing is widespread spatially; … but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere. Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. –Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence IUU fishing is widespread spatially; … but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere. Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. –Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence

Summary results … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent; Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing. … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent; Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing.

Summary results From case studies –Namibia it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly; –Patagonian toothfish when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity; –Northern Australian when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem. From case studies –Namibia it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly; –Patagonian toothfish when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity; –Northern Australian when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem.

Way forward Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: –Further develop world incidence maps; –Expand the empirical work presented in table 1; More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots; Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor. Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: –Further develop world incidence maps; –Expand the empirical work presented in table 1; More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots; Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor.

Thanks for your attention