Nuclear Politics in South Asia

Presentation Overview  History of Nuclear Weapons Programs ( )  Post-1998 Developments  Similarities  Discussion Issues  Suggested Readings  Q&A

Nuclear Weapons Development: s India  1948 – AEC created, Homi Bhabha strongly supports creating a self-sufficient nuclear infrastructure  Building the nuclear infrastructure and creating a large pool of trained personnel  China’s development of nuclear weapons is acknowledged in internal discussions  Political establishment against nuclear weapons Pakistan  1956 – Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) created  Late 1950s – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for Fuel and Natural Resources, advocates the development of nuclear weapons

1960s India  1960s – increased nuclear assistance from foreign countries  Disastrous border war with China shifts opinion gradually in favor of nuclear weapons  1964 – China’s nuclear test further strengthens the pro-bomb lobby.  1965 – SNEPP initiated, Indo- Pak war (China’s support for Pakistan & U.S. refusal to supply arms)  1966 – SNEPP halted  Late 1967 – new effort to develop nuclear explosives initiated  – India opposes the NPT Pakistan  Pakistan acquires and begins operating Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR)  Mid-1960s – Bhutto’s request for building nuclear weapons is rejected by Gen. Ayub Khan  – Pakistan takes notice of India’s reaction to China’s nuclear test  1965 – Indo-Pak war (U.S. refusal to supply arms)  Late 1960s - Bhutto writes Myth of Independence in which he advocates the development of nuclear weapons.

1970s India  1971 – Indo-Pak war  1972 – Approval given for fabricating a nuclear explosive  1974 – India tests a nuclear explosive, dubbed as a PNE. Exact yield is still unclear (between 4 – 12 kilotons)  Post 1974 – further development of nuclear weapons is slowed down (halted??) Pakistan  1971 – Indo-Pak war  January 1972 – Bhutto convenes a meeting of scientists and announces the decision to develop nuclear weapons  – Pakistan tries to acquire reprocessing plants from France, but U.S. intervenes  1974 – A.Q. Khan, working in the Netherlands, offers his assistance  1975 – Pakistan starts acquiring equipment for uranium enrichment and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle  Pakistan shifts from a plutonium based nuclear arsenal to HEU based arsenal

1980s India  Early to mid 1980s – nuclear weapons development proceeds in fits and starts design is improved  1982 – Additional nuclear tests planned but cancelled  1983 – India sanctions the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP)  – Operation Brasstacks, first nuclear crisis Pakistan  Pakistan steadily makes progress in its nuclear weapons program (enrichment facility operational, cold tests conducted, nuclear test- site built)  U.S. ignores Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program due to the Afghan war  1987 – Op. Brasstacks, A.Q. Khan delivers an implicit nuclear threat to an Indian journalist. Officially, a Pakistani minister delivers a similar nuclear threat  Late 1980s – Pakistan begins development of ballistic missiles

1990s India  1990 – crisis over Kashmir (second nuclear crisis)  1995 – NPT extended indefinitely  1995 – India prepares for nuclear test(s) but cancels after U.S. discovers test(s) preparations  1996 – CTBT opens for signature  May 1998 – India conducts 5 nuclear tests Pakistan  1990 – crisis over Kashmir (second nuclear crisis)  Pakistan acquires ballistic missile technology from North Korea  April 1998 – Pakistan tests the Ghauri ballistic missile  May 1998 – Pakistan conducts 6 nuclear tests

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia  Indian nuclear tests: May 11 and 13, 1998  Diplomatic efforts to stop Pakistani tests  Pakistan nuclear tests: May 28 & 30, 1998  Immediate economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan

Post-1998 Developments India  Formulates a nuclear doctrine – adopts a no-first use posture and a triad based on a minimum and survivable deterrent force  Constitutes a tri-service Strategic Rocket Command to manage land-based nuclear missiles  Creates a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to manage nuclear forces  1999 – Kargil conflict  2002 – Increased tensions Pakistan  Creates a National Command Authority to manage nuclear forces  Formulates a nuclear doctrine, rejects no-first use of nuclear weapons. Official doctrine not released  1999 – Kargil conflict  2002 – Increased tensions

Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Systems ( Source: Arms Control Today) SystemStatusRange/PayloadSource Hatf-1Operational km/500 kgDomestic Production Hatf-2Tested/Development190 km/500 kgDomestic/China Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)Tested/Development280 km/500 kgDomestic/China Tarmuk Development 300 km/800 kg Domestic/China Haider-1Development350 km/? kgDomestic Production Shaheen-1Tested/Development750 km/500 kgDomestic/China Ghauri-1 (Nodong-1)Tested/Development1,300+ km/700 kgDomestic/N. Korea Ghauri-2Tested/Development2,300 km/700 kgDomestic/N. Korea Shaheen-2Development2,500 km/1,000 kgDomestic/China Ghauri-3 Engine Tested/Development 3,000 km/? kgDomestic/N. Korea

India’s Ballistic Missile Systems ( Source: Arms Control Today) SystemStatusRange/PayloadSource Prithvi-1Operational150 km/1,000 kgDomestic Production Prithvi-2Operational250 km/500 kgDomestic Production Dhanush/ Prithvi-3Tested/Development350 km/1,000 kgDomestic Production Agni-1 variantTested/Development725 km/~1,000 kgDomestic Production Agni-1Tested/Prototype Only1,500 km/1,000 kgDomestic Production Agni-2Serial Production2,000 km/1,000 kgDomestic Production Agni-3Development3,000-5,500 km/? kgDomestic Production SuryaDevelopment5,500+ km/2,000 kgDomestic/Russia Sagarika (SLBM)Development350 km/500 kgDomestic/Russia

Indian Background  Tension with China  1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE)  Today: ~ nuclear weapons  Goal: regional stability

Pakistani Background  Nuclear weapons capability by  Today: ~ nuclear weapons  Goals: overcoming conventional inferiority,  keeping regional balance of power

Nuclear Hopes and Fears  Pakistan Army: better able to negotiate with India?  Fears of radical Islamic elements within Pakistan Army  Fear of nukes falling into terrorist hands

Similarities  Decision-making on nuclear weapons is highly personalized  Significant foreign assistance  Due to export controls, both the countries operated clandestine networks to procure nuclear equipment and materials  Scientific establishment given high degree of autonomy  Both the countries have not signed the NPT and the CTBT  Symbolism associated with nuclear weapons  Anti-nuclear movement is not well developed  Institutionalization of nuclear forces is less advanced

Discussion Issues  Nuclear Stability Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Nuclear Command & Control  Trajectory of Weaponization Number of nuclear weapons – definite numbers not available Delivery systems  Second-tier Proliferation  Integrating India and Pakistan into the Nonproliferation regime  U.S. Nonproliferation policy toward S. Asia