based on Chapter 4: Steve Dowrick and J. Bradford DeLong, Globalization and Convergence
Convergence: a static approach globalization/market integration vs convergence today we experience economic globalization … … yet we do not clearly see convergence outside OECD countries how to spread convergence? In search for the “secret ingredient”
Convergence: a static approach the failing predictions of neo-classical models the raw reality of facts: divergence during 20th century growth and convergence: a matter of point of view absolute vs relative terms
Convergence: a static approach Convergence Club: comparative approach factors defining membership: a) GDP per capita/per worker b) industrial development (structural change) joining in the “club” (but leaving it as well): life membership is not granted first results: free-trade as a pre-condition to enter the club
Historical trends of convergence the birth of the Convergence Club ( ) industrialization: the trigger and the best indicator around 1850 a small group follows UK: Belgium and USA North East Coast States
Historical trends of convergence the first era of globalization ( ) main features: second IR and transport Revolution the club expands to Western offshoots Western Europe Japan
Historical trends of convergence extended interwar years ( ) apparent paradox: a phase of increasing convergence during a period of market dis-integration new members: Soviet Union majority of S. America possibly: some African colonies
Historical trends of convergence the second era of globalization ( ) an expansion in the size of convergence club: OECD countries fill the gap (golden age) East Asian Tigers (1960s-1970s) Finally China and India (1980s) but also drop-outs
Historical trends of convergence but also drop-outs: Former Soviet-Union big parts of S.America all African economies it is an unexpected trend … and suspect number one are economic policies
Historical trends of convergence History unveils a compex pattern in the relation between market integration and convergence: The effects of globalization can be selective ( ) The relation can be in inverse proportion ( ) The geography of convergence can change over time ( )
Supporting convergence studying divergence to support convergence conditional convergence neo-classic economists: the world is converging (Robert Barro)
Supporting convergence the paradox: Mozambique converging to USA? self-evident findings: “bad” demography and education “bad” institutions low investments actual divergence vs conditional convergence
Supporting convergence likely blockages to convergence: - poverty trap - lack of education and human capital, inability in absorbing technology - inefficiency of labour
Supporting convergence: openness another ingredient in the “mixer”: globalization-openness-convergence Sachs and Warner’s indicators: (1) tariff rates over 40%; (2) NTBs on 40% of imports or above; (3) socialist economy; (4) state monopoly on main exports; (5) black market
Supporting convergence: openness Sachs and Warner’s findings ( ): strong convergence among open economies in terms of income (GDP per capita) no convergence among closed economies in terms GDP per capita 2.5% year growth if one country opens
Analytical study of convergence First analytical examination for the period on a sample: 109 countries GDP per capita countries grouped on average income test: variance measures dispersion = divergence
Analytical study of convergence results (tab. 4.1): divergence occurrs in each group except for the richest 19 countries main cause is the failure of the poorest to match the growth of the richer countries
Analytical study of convergence Second analytical examination for the period on a sample: 96 countries convergence interacting with: (1) openness; (2) + income; (3) + investments; (4) + population testing the impact of openness on convergence with regressions
Analytical study of convergence results (tab. 4.4): (1) openness lifts per capita GDP (cp. fig. 4.5) (2) openness tends to be more important for poor countries (3) investment rates and demography matter
Analytical study of convergence results (tab. 4.4): (4) openness less important (cp. fig. 4.6) (5) openness less beneficial for poor countries than previous interval (6) investment rates and demography matter more than before (7) education begins to matter in this interval
Analytical study of convergence period, overall results: (1) divergence rather than convergence, especially for low income economies (2) openness is correlated to economic growth but not always to convergence
Supporting convergence Factors of divergence: low income; low investments; lack of education; population increase.
Historical trends of convergence: a conclusion No evidence of a direct relation globalization/convergence Opennes does not seem to be the one solution for the “great divide” Pre-industrial “traps” main blockades to convergence for poorest countries A good news: the picture changes if we consider world population