National Communications System Briefing Template Hurricane Isabel: Government-Industry Partnership in Planning, Response and recovery CAPT J. Katharine Burton, USN Assistant Deputy Manager, NCS (703)

NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: Hurricane Isabe NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: Hurricane Isabel  Advance hurricane path information assisted both Government and Industry preparation actions:  Review preparation checklists  Confirm emergency operations staffing availability  Confirm Industry and Government contact information  Establish reporting procedures (changed during event due to FEMA and DHS HSOC schedules)  Industry prepositioned assets (e.g., teams, generators, alternate fuel supplies) and re-routed traffic around impacted areas  Response coordination followed NCC Telecom-ISAC model for Government-industry cooperative effort  NCC Telecom-ISAC industry reps provided status updates / requests to NCC Operations Center  NCS Emergency Operations Team and Watch at NCC coordinated Government and industry requests for info and assistance  NCS EOT staffed ESF02 desk at DHS/FEMA; deployed personnel to Region III & IV Ops Centers, DFOs in North Carolina and Virginia

Examples of NCC Coordination  Request from industry for Government assistance:  Coordinate permission to temporarily house industry disaster recovery technicians on local military bases if hotels in Virginia disaster areas were not available.  Request was granted, but need did not occurr  Government request for industry assistance: Communications support to disaster area:  Deployment of a satellite van to Richmond, VA area to provide emergency telecommunication service. The processed approximately 425 calls from an estimated 175 users and remained operational until 6 pm Sept 23  Stand-by of a self-contained communications trailer in Knoxville, TN  Telecom hotel in Baltimore experienced a commercial power failure during the evening of Sept 22, and had issues with refueling the generators.  ESF #2 contacted ESF #12 (Energy) to highlight the issue with Baltimore Gas and Electric (BGE) and facilitate restoration by 3 AM

NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: Hurricane Isabel  Some telecom-specific issues:  Personnel restricted from access to sites on backup or battery power  Lack of coordination between individual power companies’ restoration plans and notification to Telecom providers hampered efficient deployment of technicians  Telecom lacked a priority input to Power restoration, which is handled at the local level  Reporting issues:  The Government has taken lessons learned and is developing processes to:  Best Coordinate Timing of Reporting For Various Organizations  Consolidate Information Required  Enhanced processes will provide maximum operational and response results for Government and Industry.

Isabel Infrastructure Impacts  Telecom industry was well prepared before landfall; infrastructure showed little disruption or damage  Telecom emergency teams performed damage assessments and emergency restoration; continued to deploy backup generators and emergency personnel  Recovery efforts continued for the days following landfall. One provider indicated that 75% of reported damage was repaired by Friday, Sept 19  Downed trees and equipment failures due to flooding also caused damage  Reports included 235 downed utility poles and 258 downed cables  Most problems due to loss of electric power  Reports of up to 76% of customers in VA, 50% in D.C. and MD losing power  Overall, telecom faired well, with most providers switching to backup power generation to keep facilities operational. Backup power was adequate for sustaining services for most of the heavily impacted regions  By Sept 22, the number of impacted customers quickly declining. One provider reported that 12K customers had been without service, but that number had been reduced to less than 4K by Sept 23  To aid restoration efforts, providers deployed generators and technicians from other regions to impacted areas of Virginia

Isabel Infrastructure Impacts (2 Isabel Infrastructure Impacts (2)  Despite adequate preparation and prompt recovery efforts, some customers were without telecom service for an extended period  North Carolina’s Outer Banks had severe infrastructure damage and major telecom outages; power out for nearly two weeks in some areas, causing telecom backup power systems to fail.  Due to prolonged power outages, spotty wireless coverage and intermittent landline telephone service occurred in such areas.

Sample Wireless Provider Impact Report Sample Wireless Provider Impact Reports Wireless Provider A 19 Sept  Sites on alt power include DE 1, MD 17, VA 42, NC 18, PA 16, NJ 5  No network problems or controls in effect 22 Sept  Sites out of service include NC 0, PA 1 (0.1%), Balt/Wash 38 (6.4%), NY 0, New Eng 0 Wireless Provider B 19 Sept  Sites on alt power include 1 switch, 4 POPs, 173 cell sites (4%)  Down 762 cell sites (19%) 2 Oct  POP on generator  145 sites on alt power  170 sites down (14%) Wireless Provider C  146 cell sites out (20-25%) largely VA Wireless Provider D  Focus on DC/Balt region for generator deployment Alt power = battery or generator

Wireline Provider A 19 Sept  759 Remote tandems on alt power  66 poles down  Repair log x4 normal 20 Sept  Central offices on alt power 119 VA, 34 MD, 34 DE & PA Wireline Provider B 21 Sept  Sites on alt power MD 7, VA 17, NJ 1, DE 1, NC 5, PA 2  600K+ calls blocked 2 Oct  POP on generator  145 sites on alt power  170 sites down (14%)  No network controls or issues Wireline Provider C 19 Sept  Sites on alt power 98 2 Oct  Sites on alt power 45 Focus is VA and MD Wireline Provider D 18 Sept  19 Central Offices on alt power  66 digital loop carriers (DLCs) on battery with 8 failed 20 Sept  Central Offices on alt power = 0  DLC sites on alt power = 0 Sample Wireline Provider Impact Reports