CASE 1 A transporter (1) is invented that records all the information about the atoms which compose your body, disassembles those atoms and beams them and the “blueprint” to a remote receiver which reassembles the atoms in exactly the same way they were assembled before. Is the reassembled person you? Assuming the reliability of the transporter (it’s far safer than traveling by car and many friends and acquaintances have used it) would you use the transporter?

CASE 2 A more efficient transporter (2) is invented that doesn’t require beaming the atoms. At each transporter site there is a stockpile of all the kinds of atoms that bodies are composed of. The transporter simply records all the information about the atoms that compose your body, and sends the information to a remote transporter site where a body is assembled according to the “blueprint” using the same kinds of atoms. The transporter can’t record your blueprint without disassembling your atoms, and a stockpile of atoms is needed at each site, so the atoms that that composed your body when you entered the transporter are stored and used to compose others coming to that site. Is the newly assembled person at the remote site you? Assuming the reliability of the transporter, would you use it, or would the process kill you and create a new person (or maybe a zombie)? If your answer to the first of these questions is no, consider the fact that this is what really happens to your body, but slowly and stepwise. Does that make a difference?

CASE 3 A still more efficient transporter (3) is invented that doesn’t require the disassembly of your atoms in order to record all the necessary information. The transporter site where you are is closing down for lack of business, so they don’t need to keep their stock of atoms up. So they’re making a special offer—be transported to another site, but continue living here as well. If you enter the transporter would you survive? Would both be you? (If you thought the newly assembled person in 2 was you—and we typically do think that slowly and stepwise newly assembled persons are ourselves—then can we help but think that both of these persons are you?)

Survival and identity

If all of your mind, understood as all of you psychological features (beliefs, memories, hopes, loves, character traits, fears, ect.), were put into two bodies, would you survive?

Survival and identity If all of your mind, understood as all of you psychological features (beliefs, memories, hopes, loves, character traits, fears, ect.), were put into two bodies, would you survive? Yes, although you would be identical with neither.

Survival and identity If all of your mind, understood as all of you psychological features (beliefs, memories, hopes, loves, character traits, fears, ect.), were put into two bodies, would you survive? Yes, although you would be identical with neither. Survival does not require identity

Things that seem to require identity with a past or future person don’t (memory, intention, responsibility)

Memories

Things that seem to require identity with a past or future person don’t (memory, intention, responsibility) Memories The boat(s) that won the America’s Cup

Things that seem to require identity with a past or future person don’t (memory, intention, responsibility) Memories The boat(s) that won the America’s Cup Which Germany lost the First World War?

Things that seem to require identity with a past or future person don’t (memory, intention, responsibility) Memories The boat(s) that won the America’s Cup Which Germany lost the first world war? The same event can be part of two things’ histories

Things that seem to require identity with a past or future person don’t (memory, intention, responsibility) Memories The boat(s) that won the America’s Cup Which Germany lost the first world war? The same event can be part of two things’ histories The same would be true of the memories of the two people that resulted from division. Neither would be identical with the pre-division person, but each would remember what she did as her memories.

Point 1 -- You can survive without being identical with a future person.

Point 2 -- Things that seem to require personal identity-- memory, intention, responsibility--do not.

Point 1 -- You can survive without being identical with a future person. Point 2 -- Things that seem to require personal identity-- memory, intention, responsibility-- do not. Point 3 -- Survival is a matter of degree

Point 1 -- You can survive without being identical with a future person. Point 2 -- Things that seem to require personal identity-- memory, intention, responsibility--do not. Point 3 -- Survival is a matter of degree--fusion

Survival is a matter of degree If two people become one person, some things will have to give. The new person will be different, yet the two previous people will have survived--to a degree.

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival?

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? Abe’s boat

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? Abe’s boat: let A, B, C, D, E, A’, B’, C’, D’, E’ be components of an object time 1time 2time 3time 4time 5time 6 AA’A’A’A’A’ BBB’ B’ B’ B’ CCCC’C’C’ DDDDD’D’ EEEEEE’

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? Abe’s boat: let A, B, C, D, E, A’, B’, C’, D’, E’ be components of an object time 1time 2time 3time 4time 5time 6 AA’A’A’A’A’ BBB’ B’ B’ B’ CCCC’C’C’ DDDDD’D’ EEEEEE’ The boat at time 1 and 2 are closely connected; they share many components.

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? Abe’s boat: let A, B, C, D, E, A’, B’, C’, D’, E’ be components of an object time 1time 2time 3time 4time 5time 6 AA’A’A’A’A’ BBB’ B’ B’ B’ CCCC’C’C’ DDDDD’D’ EEEEEE’ The boat at time 1 and 2 are closely connected; they share many components. The boat at time 1 and 5 are connected, but just; they share only one component.

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? Abe’s boat: let A, B, C, D, E, A’, B’, C’, D’, E’ be components of an object time 1time 2time 3time 4time 5time 6 AA’A’A’A’A’ BBB’ B’ B’ B’ CCCC’C’C’ DDDDD’D’ EEEEEE’ The boat at time 1 and 2 are closely connected; they share many components. The boat at time 1 and 5 are connected, but just; they share only one component. The boat at time 1 and 6 are not connected; they are continuous.

Survival is a matter of degree How can we make sense of degrees of survival? I survive as long as I am psychologically connected to future persons. Psychologically connected persons are past selves or future selves, or (for convenience) me (as long as we don’t mean by that identical selves). Psychologically continuous persons who are no longer connected are ancestral selves or descendent selves.

Why should we care?

It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized.

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience.

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection.

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value?

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational:

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational: Physician

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational: Physician, Psychologist

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational: Physician, Psychologist, Pastor

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational: Physician, Psychologist, Pastor, Lawyer

Why should we care? It is good intellectual exercise to reveal deeply embedded assumptions and discover that they can be scrutinized. A new way of thinking may help make sense of our own experience. There may be implications for our religious beliefs, perhaps challenging--the soul--perhaps helpful--the resurrection. Practical value? Vocational: Physician, Psychologist, Pastor, Lawyer Personal: Family members with memory loss