1 Maximizing individual or common profit? Maximizing individual profit Games theory Economy Maximizing common profit Economic psychology - 63% of trust to anonymous partner (McCabe, 2003) Evoutionarily developed tendency - Smith (2003) - Maintaining by sanction (Fehr, Fischbacher, 2004)

2 Maximizing individual or common profit? Individual differences Gender Age Personality types Circumstancial factors Decision’s situation Relationship between participants Game’s rules

3 Maximizing individual or common profit? Personal level of tendency to pro-social behaviour Factors connected with decision’s situation Is the impact „from outside” possible? - Social history effect (Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe, 1995) - Social norms influence → Is it possible to change people’s pro-social ten- denency by activating appropriate social norms? → Are we able to modify this tendency through external, adequate training?

4 MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL OR COMMON PROFIT - regular or changeable preferences in economic games? Anna Hełka & Tomasz Zaleskiewicz Centre for the Researchon Economic Behaviour Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities IAREP/SABE 2008 ROME

5 External impact on cooperation level in trust games Helka & Zaleskiewicz results (2006): Players’ willingness to cooperate may be increased or decreased by the training of cooperation/competition Only declaration - no real money decision (underage subjects) New study’s aim: To confirm the effect of training’s impact on behaviour in a game with the real rewards, depending on the end of the training (gain or loss).

6 Hipothesis 1. The behaviour in decision games can be influenced by the previous participation in a successful training of social and individual behaviour, which activates a proper norm. 2. In economic games the training ending with loss has greater influence than the one ending with gain. 1. People learn from successes as well as from failures. 2. Failure and loss are felt more deeply, remembered longer, so are feared and avoided (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979). 3. The unsuccessful training will induce to the behaviours opposite to those suggested by the training. * Gender impact control

7 Method Participants: 57 women and 69 men of different occupations, age 19-50, neither psychologists nor psychology students. Procedure: Participants were randomly assigned to 5 experimental conditions

8 Diagram of experiment

9 Social training based on the "Jigsaw of classroom" (Aronson, 1979) 4-5-men groups chose one of two candidates for the sales director. Every person got only some part of the information, so to make a choice they had to exchange the information. Task activated the cooperation norm in the subjects' minds. After decision the subjects received a feedback whether their choice was in accordance with the experts' choice. If it was, they were given an attractive reward; if it was not, they were informed, that due to an incorrect group decision they were not going to be rewarded.

10 Individual training Simple speed computer game. - Player has to click on the letter ‘s’ or ‘k’, depending which appeared on the screen. - The letters appeared several dozen times in a random order. The subjects were informed that they compete with randomly sampled person from another room. The winner was to receive an attractive reward, the looser would be left with nothing. The information about the result of the game was confidential (only for the player)

11 Training’s final In both trainings, depending on the condition, subjects got the information about gain or loss, regardless of their real results. The gain group received an attractive prize in kind. This manipulation was put straight at the end of the experiment. The control condition did not take part in any training.

12 Final payoffs: Person1= (10-X) + Y Person2 = 3X – Y The dependent variable was measured as: - the sum of money sent to Player2 - the sum and percentage of money sent back to Player1. 1Euro = 3,3 PLN Second stage 2 computer trust games (Smith, 2003)

13 Results (group comparision) Group effect for ‘Money sent back from Player 2 to Player 1’ (F(4,121)=2,214, p=0,072)

14 Results (gender differences 1) Differences among women: - control vs coop. loss (mean difference=-2,97, p=0,05), - coop. suc. vs coop. loss (mean dif.=-2,61, p=0,07), - coop. loss vs comp. suc. (mean dif.=3,67, p=0,02). Other differences: - W control vs M comp. loss (mean dif.=-2,06, p=0,09), W vs M comp. suc. (mean dif.=2,30, p=0,09), M comp. loss vs W comp. suc.(mean dif.=-2,75, p=0,03)

15 Results (gender differences 2) Differences among women: - comp. suc.vs coop.loss (mean dif.=2,95, p=0,03) Differences among men: - comp. vs coop. suc.(mean dif.=2,36, p=0,03) - comp.suc.vs loss (mean dif.=-4,35, p=0,06) Other differences: - M control vs W coop.loss (mean dif.=-4,80, p=0,1), - M coop.vs W comp. suc. (mean dif.=5,70, p=0,03) W coop.loss vs M comp. suc. (mean dif.=6,1, p=0,03), W comp. suc. vs M comp. loss (mean dif.=-4,82, p=0,05)

16 Results (gender differences 3) Differences among men: - cooperation with success vs with lost (mean dif.=0,19, p=0,1) - cooperation vs competition with loss (mean dif.=-0,18, p=0,1) Other differences: - M coop. vs W comp.suc. (mean dif.=0,25, p=0,05), - W comp. suc.vs M comp. loss (mean dif.=-0,24, p=0,05).

17 Group mix gender statistical differences concerning money transfer to Player2 [chi2(18,126)=30,008, p=0,037] Results - equal or not money transfer (group and gender comparison )

18 Conclusions The tendency to social or individual behaviour can be influenced by the training outside of the economic game. This effect manifests differently in men and women. Women behave more socially, after group task with loss, not gain final, Women achieved an individual success are less prosocial, but even then women do not behave completely egoistic. Men performing Player2 cooperate more after a group task with gain final and an individual loss (no effect as Player1).

19 Conclusions Almost 1/3 of the subjects sent an anonymous person half of gained sum (at least as much money as they got). These standard according to Smith (2003) seem to be superior to the others and less prone to the outside influence. Further studies’ aims: Confirmation of the training's influence effect and finding its mechanism Searching for the explanation of gender differences

20 Thank you for your kind attention Anna Hełka & Tomasz Zaleskiewicz from the Centre for the Research on Economic Behaviour Warsaw School of Social Scienes and Humanities IAREP/SABE 2008 ROME With any questions mail to: