Cullen Jennings Certificate Directory for SIP.

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Presentation transcript:

Cullen Jennings Certificate Directory for SIP

SIP Security depends on S/MIME with user certificates Encryption of SDP (and keys for SRTP) Refer Identity Request History End to Middle? Middle to End? This requires Certificates in the UA’s SIP Security & SMIME

Traditional “PKI” certs (like Verisign) Problem: Enrollment difficulty and yearly fee to CA Private CA certs Problem: Only work if all callers have this CA as a trust anchor. Self signed certs Problem: Need a directory to store certs and vouch for them Certificates

Way for UAC to locate the directory use domain from AOR Way for the UAC to authenticate the directory use traditional PKI Way to fetch certs HTTPS, LDAPS, other Way to store certs HTTPS, LDAPS, Sacred Way for directory to authenticate the UAS reuse SIP credential (Digest shared secret) Way for the UAC to authenticate the directory use traditional PKI Certificate Directory UACUAS Server 3 12

Wrote a draft using the HTTPS options draft-jennings-sipping-certs version done before last IETF Several security people have looked at it They believe it works and can be reasonably secure Provides certificates with minimal cost Introduces an extra TLS connection setup to calls with no cached certificate Requires each domain to run an e- commerce style web server Is only as trustable as the server is trustable Does the WG want to solve this problem? Proposal