UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Secure Authentication System for Public WLAN Roaming Ana Sanz Merino, Yasuhiko.

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Secure Authentication System for Public WLAN Roaming Ana Sanz Merino, Yasuhiko Matsunaga, Manish Shah, Takashi Suzuki, Randy H. Katz Presented by Dustin Christmann April 20, 2009

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Outline Introduction Current Approaches Single Sign-On Confederation Model Authentication Flow Adaption Framework Policy Engine Securing Web-Based Authentication Evaluation Conclusion

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Introduction WLAN hotspots becoming ubiquitous Most WLAN hotspot providers small and can’t provide enough coverage Needed: An inter-network WLAN roaming infrastructure

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Introduction Similar problem to cellular roaming Main differences: –Cellular equipment contains identification tied to provider GSM/UMTS (AT&T and T-Mobile): Contained in SIM card CDMA (Sprint, Verizon, Alltel): Contained in phone firmware –Both GSM/UMTS and CDMA protocols include inter- system authentication protocols

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Current Approaches Link layer authentication IEEE 802.1X standard Shared session key between user and network Provides for encryption of packets, as well as authentication Certificate-based Not suitable for most public WLAN networks

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering A brief aside about 802.1X Port-based authentication Three parts: –Supplicant: wireless user –Authenticator: base station –Authentication server Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Implemented in i standard

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering 802.1X Architecture

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering RADIUS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Liberty

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Extensible Authentication Protocol Not an authentication mechanism, but a framework Provides common functions and mechanism negotiation Mechanisms called “methods” in EAP Around 40 methods defined in various RFCs

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering So what’s i? Amendment to Specifies security mechanisms for networks Ratified in 2004 Addresses the weaknesses of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA): subset of i WPA2 full implementation WEP and WPA use RC4, WPA2 uses AES

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering i Four-Way Handshake

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Current Approaches Web-based authentication and network layer access control Based on IP packet filtering Web server acts as RADIUS client Prone to theft of service by MAC spoofing Microsoft CHOICE network

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Single Sign-On Confederation Model Users are authenticated by trusted identity providers Service providers can have roaming agreements with one or several identity providers

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Single Sign-On Confederation Model Assumptions: The user terminal can validate the certificates of the service provider’s and identity provider’s authentication servers. There are static trust relationships between the user and the identity provider, and between the service provider and the identity provider. The user can authenticate the service provider’s authentication server via the identity provider’s authentication server, and vice versa.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Roaming Model

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Authentication Negotiation Protocol Need: Way for service providers to communicate authentication capabilities Way for users to select identity provider Solution: Authentication Negotiation Protocol XML web-based protocol Web browser not needed Thin client

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Authentication Flow Adaption Sequence

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Authentication Flow Adaption Architecture

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Authentication Methods User info Password Identity Provider Group List of identity providers Charging information Authentication methods Service Provider Name Confirmation Method Key Authentication Capabilities Statement Includes timestamp ANP Example Charging Option Interval Unit price Time Unit User info Service ID Service Service description

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Policy Engine Selects appropriate SSO scheme Minimize user intervention for sign-on process Protects user authentication information Not entirely necessary, but very helpful

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Policy Engine Example in paper: –Independent module –Takes XML file as input

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Securing Web-Based Authentication Current web-based authentication approaches are vulnerable: –Theft of service via spoofing –Eavesdropping –Message alteration –Denial of service

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Securing Web-Based Authentication Problem: Neither layer 2 authentication nor web- based authentication is ideal: –IEEE 802.1X authentication is more secure, but requires a preshared secret –Web-based authentication more suitable for one-time use, but insecure

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Securing Web-Based Authentication Solution: Hybrid approach Initial link establishment via X guest authentication Web-based authentication after that

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Evaluation

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Authentication client latency Proxy-based (RADIUS)Redirect-based (Liberty) LocalRemoteLocalRemote Web authentication Policy engine Authentication Capabilities Announcement Link layer (802.1X) authentication Total

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Web-based Authentication Latency Proxy-based (RADIUS)Redirect-based (Liberty) LocalRemoteLocalRemote Web authentication Firewall redirection Link layer (802.1X) authentication Total

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA Department of Computer Science and Engineering Conclusions This paper should have been three papers with more detail in each –Single sign-on authentication –Policy engine –Web-based authentication Good way of enabling WLAN roaming by decoupling identity management from service provider