Law 552 - Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake National Society of Prof. Engineers v. U.S. (1978) Base Facts: National Association of Engineers precluded.

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Presentation transcript:

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake National Society of Prof. Engineers v. U.S. (1978) Base Facts: National Association of Engineers precluded members from discussing or negotiating fees before securing client. Rationale was that fee considerations would compromise quality and safety, contrary to best interests of the public. What similarities with Chicago Board of Trade and Appalachian Coal? Could this rule be pro-competitive? Are price wars among professionals good for the public? Are they professional? What was issue for court?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting (1979) Base Facts: ASCAP and BMI secured nonexclusive licenses from composers and artists and then master licensed to users. CBS claimed master licenses controlled and fixed prices and were per se illegal. Ct of Appeals held per se illegal. What was underlying purpose of master license? What impact on market? Who gets hurt by this restraint? What was issue for court?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. (1980) Base Facts: Beer sellers agreed to eliminate all credit terms for distributors in market. Forced pre-pay or COD. District Ct held no per se violation. Ninth Cir. agreed, finding that all cash may promote competition by eliminating a barrier to entry (credit terms) What was purpose of eliminating credit terms? Did restrain limit competitors in any way? Who was hurt by this restrain? What if restrain standardized only a cost component, such as freight?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society (1982) Base Facts: Agreement among competing physicians to set the maximum fees that may be claimed for services rendered to patients covered by certain insurance plans. Services accounted for 70% of services in market. What if someone other than doctors set fees? Who was hurt by this arrangement? Are maximum price restraint different than minimum price restraint?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake NCAA v. University of Oklahoma (1984) Base Facts: NCAA prevented member schools from having more than 6 TV games (4 National TV) every two years through contracts with television networks. Purpose of rule is to promote live audience attendance. U. of Oklahoma and Georgia challenged limits. What was purpose of rule? Who was hurt by the rule? Should presence of regulatory association make a difference? How does this compare with Chicago Trade and Appalacian Coal?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Assoc. (1990) Base Facts: Boycott by D.C. trial lawyers who demanded higher fees before taking court appointed assignments. Rates were raised and FTC sued for violation of FTC act. Appellate Ct. remanded on grounds that it was “expressive boycott” and FTC should have inquired into market power and First Amendment freedoms. What is “expressive” boycott? Did lawyers have market power? What if select individual lawyers refused assignments until fees raised? When are there too many?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake California Dental Assoc. v. FTC (1999) Base Facts: California Dental Assoc. included 75% of all Cal. Dentists. Rules (1) prohibited across the board discounts, (2) prohibited promotional statements about cheap or reasonable prices, (3) prohibited claims about quality or superior services, (4) discouraged solicitations, and (5) imposed disclosure requirements for advertising discounts. FTC held price constrains illegal per se and non-price constrains illegal after quick look under Sherman 1 because of market power. Ct. of Appeals affirmed after quick look. What is purpose of quick look? What was purpose of restrictions? What effect – anti or pro competitive? Who was hurt by restrains? Are less restrictive restraints possible?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Matter of Polygram Holdings, Inc. (FYC 2003) Why did Polygram and Warner Bros. agree to not advertise and discount ’90 and ’94 recordings? When did FTC say per se analysis applicable? Note: Advertising “performs indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free market. Why was argument relative to future ventures defective?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Parker v. Brown (1943) Basic Facts: California regulated raisin producers so as to restrict competition among growers and maintain prices. Why did Brown, a raisin grower, sue? Why was State involvement so important? Do states have the power to exempt any business from the reaches of the Antitrust laws? Did the fact that most of the raisins produced in Cal are shipped out of state make a difference? Should it make a difference? Compare to thrust of the FAIA of 1982 re: exports? What if the Parker v. Brown issue arose in Italy?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Eastern Railroad President’s Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight (1961) Basic Facts: Competing railroads jointed to convince Pennsylvania Governor to veto legislation that would have allowed truckers to compete for large loads. What was railroads’ bottom line purpose? Was it a good, legitimate purpose or just political greed? What if railroads had made agreement with truckers? How important was the means here?

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Allied Tube & Conduit Corp v. Indian Head Inc. (1988) Basic Facts: National Fire Protection Ass. refused to approve use of plastic electric conduit. Steel conduit interests stacked political process in Association to prevent plastic approval. Jury awarded $3.8 million damages under Sherman claim. Dist. Ct. entered judgment NOV on theory that Noerr- Pennington applied because association was “akin” to legislature. What impact did Association have on state and local fire codes? How did Allied Tube differ from Noerr case? Compare the actions and purposes of steel players with those of railroads in Noerr.

Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Group Boycotts Issue: Do group boycotts of businesses violate Sherman 1 if the purpose of the boycott is to force legislative change? What if the boycotts are organized and promoted by competitors of those being hurt? Does the nature of the desired legislation make a difference?