Sandia National Laboratories NISAC’s core partners are Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL Los Alamos National Laboratory is operated by the University of California for the United States Department of Energy under contract W-7405 ENG-36. Simulation and Analysis of Cascading Failure in Critical Infrastructure Robert Glass 1, Walt Beyeler 1, Kimmo Soram ä ki 2, Morten Bech 3 and Jeffrey Arnold 3 1 Sandia National Laboratories 2 European Central Bank 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories log(Size) log(Frequency) “Big” events are not rare in many such systems Earthquakes: Guthenburg-Richter Wars, Epidemics, Cities Power Blackouts Telecom outages “heavy tail” region Extinctions, Forest fires Traffic jams, Stock crashes First Stylized Fact: Multi-component Systems often have power-laws & “heavy tails”

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Dissipation Temperature Correlation TcTc External Drive What keeps a non-equilibrium system at a phase boundary? Equilibrium systems: Power Law - Critical behavior – Phase transitions e.g., Magnets & the Curie point

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Drive 1987 Bak, Tang, Wiesenfeld’s “Sand-pile” or “Cascade” Model Cascade from Local Rules RelaxationLattice “Self-Organized Criticality” power-laws fractals in space and time

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Illustrations of natural and constructed network systems from Strogatz [2001]. Food Web New York state’s Power Grid MolecularInteraction Second Stylized Fact: Networks are Ubiquitous

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories tolerant to random failure Properties: vulnerable to informed attack… Hierarchical with “King-pin” nodes Special properties of the “Scale-free” network Power-law degree distribution

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Network Nodes Links Other Networks Drive Dissipation Actors Adapt & Rewire PolyNet Built in Repast Tailored Interaction Rules Our Conceptual Approach: Rules ON Networks for Bottoms up Simulation of Infrastructures

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Stylized Physical Infrastructure Applications: High Voltage Electric Power Grids Payment and Banking Systems Epidemics Self-organized Terrorist/Extremist groups Stylized Social Applications: Social/Report Network Evolution Where we are headed: Combined Physical-Human “Infrastructure” Systems Information Networks Crisis and recovery from WMD & Bio attacks Physical + SCADA + Market + Policy Forcing Development & Applications Abstract Studies

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories BTW sand-pile on varied topology Fish-net or Donut Scale-free time size log(size) log(freq) Random sinks Sand-pile rules and drive 10,000 nodes

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Cascading Blackouts Fish-net or Donut Scale-free Sources, sinks, relay stations, 400 nodes time size Scale-free time size Fish-net DC circuit analogy, load, safety factors Random transactions between sources and sinks

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Trading Day 0 Opening balance adapts to control risk 0 Pay Training Period Cascading Period Balance Time Balance 0 Time Cascading Liquidity Loss within Payment Systems banks payments

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Cascading Liquidity in Scale-free Network Patterned Transactions time bank defaults Random removal vs Attack of the Highest Degree node time liquidity

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories 13 Everyone me Nuclear Family me Classes (There are 6 of these) me Extended Family me Teen Extra me Cascading Infectious Diseases Kids Teens Adults Seniors Agent classes Infectivity Mortality Immunity Etc. Class Specific Parameters Teen Laura Glass’s Groups Links & Frequency Parameters can change when Symptomatic

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories 14 Without Immunity With Immunity & Mortality Behavioral Changes when Symptomatic Agent differentiation Influenza Epidemic in Structured Village of 10,000: Increasing Realism Structure: Heterogeneous Network + Like with Like

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories Flu Epidemic Mitigation: Vaccination Strategies Kids & Teens! Current policy Seniors only (yellow) <60% required Network Structure + Physics of Transmission Process Allows Effective Mitigation Design

Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories General Remarks: Developmental directions Generalization/Abstraction Detailed applications with Domain experts Concepts from Complexity Science are valuable and allow a simulation approach for critical infrastructures that is flexible and has wide ranging applications Focus on POLICY Tools/Insight for Rapid deployment Encapsulation/Integration -NABLE -BOF simulator