OP Approach: 3Phase OP Build, Clear & Hold. 1 st. WAS & Stability, CLOSE- BUILD while understanding OE, influence Principales and Isolate & Protect Population in centers and deny ENY access. 2 nd. CAM & OFF, DEEP - CLEAR while visualizing and directing – clear ENY LOG bases & capability, recruiting. 3 rd. WAS & DEF, SECURITY – HOLD while describing ideas to Principales, POP, HNSF, Defeat ENY support & rifles & Enable local HN GOV to rule and achieve end state. End state: Safe and secure S. Luzon OE w/ legit HN GOV & transition capable to HNSF. Conditions (P/M): Stateside pressure to end the war (P);deceleration of M law & GO 100 (M). COG: Principales influence POP(O), Rifles & Ammo (T) Decisive Points: Use of Principales to allow Isolation of POP, DEST of ENY LOG and Rifles/Ammo Basing: major POP centers LOO/LOE: Small unit patrols; isolate barrios OP Reach: Southern Luzon, no issues – to man troops on FOBs and Monsoons can slow/limit reach. Tempo: Slow to understand/BUILD, fast to CLEAR, slow to HOLD and defeat ENY. Simultaneity/Depth: Bell was able to maintain tempo while simultaneously executing a pacification campaign Phasing/Transitions: Build, Clear, Hold. Culmination: Soldiers (manpower) prevented Bell from culminating. Disease and monsoon – could force slow Risk: Health of soldiers; time to successfully complete the pacification campaign, % of troops on FOBS. Theorist Synthesis: Govern ungoverned space; control the population; integration of positive and negative feedback into barrios. Trinquier, Clausewitz, Kalvais, Galula. EOA 7: Philippines , General Franklin Bell’s Elements of Operational Ar t in Southern Luzon Timeline: Third Separate Brigade Pacification Campaign in Southern Luzon Before 30 November Sumner was in charge of the OE and was unable to separate the insurgents from the locals and had many inccidnets. 1 December April 1902: Pacification Campaign in Southwest Luzon 1-25 December – Bell met this the majority of Principales and discussed his ideas, and solicited their opinions and support for his operations. 1 January 1902: Counter-guerrilla operations begin 16 April 1902: Malvar surrendered 6 May 1902: Malvar issued last manifesto 23 June 1902: Batangas province transferred from military to civilian government 4 July 1902: President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed Philippine Insurgency has ended. Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines

OP Approach: INDIRECT APPROACH PROBLEM STATEMENT: HOW DO I: 1. Defeat the Insurgent forces 2. Pacify the Population 3. Establish a Legitimate Government 4. Provide a safe and secure environment IOT: Promote Economic and Civil Security from local to national level government. DURATION: approx. 7 months or UTC GIVEN: US Volunteers & regulars 5-7,500 AGAINST: armed and experienced insurgency IN CONSIDERATION TO: 1. Disease ridden area 2. Cultural & Language Barriers 3. Mature and complex Insurgent Networks 4. Varied and difficult terrain. 5. Limited infrastructure and road networks 6. Political pressure (local and US) 7. Continuing reorganization of US forces by LDRS EOA 7: Philippines , General Franklin Bell’s Elements of Operational Ar t in Southern Luzon TENENTS OF ULO for this OPERATION: Flexibility – Local CDRS seize & retain initiative and use HNSF & Local ROL to win Adaptability – CDRs understand OE/problem and are able to shift / keep initiative. Integration – HNSF & Principales and Navy-blockade, POL/MIL Lethality – when Attacked – kill as many as you can, Reduce # of rifles/ammo Depth – blockade & CAM attacks to limit and destroy ENY bases Synchronization – No Safe areas/NGAs – Support local LDRS – Influence POP – Deny ENY access Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines ENY OBJS: Lengthen war, maintain control of the cities through the principales, Avoid major tactical engagements with the US Army, Maintain their recruitment of locals to support their cause.