1 User’s perspectives on the management of Elements Important for Safety (EIS) AMMW - CERN Anne Funken, Marc Tavlet / BE-ASR-SU

2 EIS = Elément Important pour la Sûreté/Sécurité ~ Equipment or Element Important for Safety EIS & Access Safety Systems Quality assurance for the Access Safety Systems ; IEC Legal aspect Quality assurance for EIS (CMMS or AMM) Demo of the Layout DataBase Summary and conclusion Outline

3 The Beam Facilities at CERN

4 Equipment Important for Safety (EIS) AMMW - CERN Three categories: EIS-Beam ; to protect people from the hazards generated by the beam (circulating or injected beams) EIS-Machine ; to protect people from other hazards generated by the operation of the machine, such as RF power, HV, vacuum… EIS-Access ; to prevent people entering into the machine : access doors, sas, (movable) shielding walls… (Access control system is not a safety system.) Any other safety systems such as fire detection, water detection, transmission of alarms, automatic fire-fighting systems… are excluded here.

5 Typical examples of EIS-M AMMW - CERN Deflecting Magnets, may be fail-safe or not Kicker magnets, septa magnets beam-stoppers can withstand few beam shots e.g. vacuum valves, MTV screens, TBSE Beam-dump can withstand continuous beams e.g. TED

6 EIS & Access Safety Systems AMMW - CERN All EIS are instrumented and connected to an Access Safety System (ASS) EIS are part of “safety chains” Essential function of an ASS = ensure the following: If Beam (“Beam Mode”)  No people permitted If People (Access Mode”)  No beam possible  High reliability and availability of the ASS required Including intrusion cases !

7 Quality assurance for ASS AMMW - CERN IEC : “Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems (E/E/PE)” addresses the hazard & risk analysis  functions of E/E/PE safety system the design and realisation of the instrumented (E/E/PE) system, the operation of the system, including ancillary equipment (e.g. cables, compressed air piping…), maintenance of these systems; must rely on systematic techniques (procedures), verification and validation.

8 ( Quality assurance & Legal aspect concerning ASS and EIS ) AMMW - CERN According to the Tripartite agreement signed between CERN and its host states, the quality insurance related to the management of ASS and EIS is assessed by the official bodies of the CERN host states: Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) and Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) for France Office Fédéral de la Santé Publique (OFSP) for Switzerland

9 Quality assurance for EIS (1) AMMW - CERN Clear identification of EIS in database in situ Written procedure for EIS repair and maintenance, by the groups in charge (accessible from Layout Database) +Written maintenance reports Written procedure for functional verification, by the group in charge of the ASS +Written test reports of the safety-chains Written procedure for validation, by the BE-DSO (process in BPMN)

10 Quality assurance for EIS (2) AMMW - CERN Identification of EIS by “functional position” in the Layout Database related to the slot where the asset is indeed installed according to safety chains

11 Quality assurance for EIS (2) AMMW - CERN Layout Database = entry point to  MTF : link between the slot (functional position) and the real piece of equipment (asset) which is installed to date  Infor EAM : data about specific asset and maintenance  NormaWeb : DB about “warm” magnets  Any other DB specific to equipment group  Maintenance documents in EDMS Tag :

12 Demo of the Layout DataBase AMMW - CERN ayout/default.aspx?version =study&navigator=eis&id= &name

13 Summary and conclusion (1) AMMW - CERN Operation of the accelerators  beam hazards (radiation)  other high-level hazards The Access Safety System must guarantee the separation of the personnel from the hazards (= technical collective protection). EIS are part of the ASS and are automatically operated and checked by the Access Safety System. ASS and EIS need to be highly available and reliable.

14 Summary and conclusion (2) AMMW - CERN High availability and reliability rely on proper design  norms & qualified personnel proper building & implementation  qualified material & qualified personnel proper maintenance  documentation & qualified personnel proper functional checks  procedures & qualified personnel proper validation  procedures & authority For quality insurance and legal compliance all of these needs to be documented. An CMMS or AMM tool is essential in this respect.

15 Optional additional slides / IEC AMMW - CERN Thank you

16 Quality assurance for ASS (1) AMMW - CERN IEC : “Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems (E/E/PE)” : Basic functional safety standard applicable to all kinds of industry. Functional safety includes the “Equipment Under Control” (~ EIS) their control system, other technology safety-related system, other external risk reduction systems.

17 Quality assurance for ASS (3) AMMW - CERN IEC usually implies Redundancy of communication, both ways (control and check of EIS status) Avoid common mode of failure (independent EIS based on different technologies) Test or auto-test of the system (this includes preventive maintenance)

18 ( The risk seen by IEC ) AMMW - CERN Reminder: Risk = likelihood * severity of undesirable event [ In many beam facilities, the severity may be very high = death! ] IEC considers that Zero risk can never be reached Safety must be considered from the beginning Non-tolerable risks must be reduced (ALARP principle) IEC usually tends to reduce the likelihood of an event.

19 Quality assurance for EIS (2) AMMW - CERN Written procedure EIS status change & check The group in charge of the ASS and the Beams-Department Safety Officer have a constant clear view of the EIS status. Any change of an EIS status (other than from the Beam-Operation group) has to be requested to and approved by the BE-DSO. Any by-pass of an EIS status from a safety chain has to be requested to and approved by the BE-DSO and the ASS-group (GS-ASE). After functional verification, the BE-DSO validates the system.