Office of Aviation Safety Response to Stick Shaker and Stall Human Performance presentation.

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Presentation transcript:

Office of Aviation Safety Response to Stick Shaker and Stall Human Performance presentation

2 Crew Duties During Approach Heightened vigilance required during approach As flying pilot, captain’s primary responsibility to monitor instruments As monitoring pilot, first officer to provide backup and corrective input

3 Cues of Slowing Airspeed Airspeed information on primary flight displays Primary Flight Display

4 Cues of Slowing Airspeed Airspeed information on primary flight displays Pilots must ensure airspeed remains above low-speed cue Airspeed Display Indicated airspeed Low-speed cue Trend arrow

5 Low-Speed Cue Missed Neither pilot remarked or took action as airspeed slowed to low-speed cue Cue position should have elicited prompt corrective action from pilots Adequate time to initiate corrective action before stick shaker

6 Crew Activities Captain should have seen cue during instrument scan – No evidence explained why it was missed First officer should have detected captain’s error – Duties when cue was visible directed her attention away from primary flight display Missed cue reflects breakdown in monitoring and workload management

7 Preventing Monitoring Failures Methods to improve pilot monitoring behavior NTSB asked for training for monitoring skills – Safety Recommendation A-07-13

8 Response to Stick Shaker Captain’s aft control column inputs led to stall Power advanced but not to rating detent Neither pilot made callouts or commands associated with stall recovery

9 Actions During Stall Event Simulator observations showed recovery procedures did not require exceptional inputs Control column was not pushed forward to prevent or recover from stall Captain’s actions inconsistent with trained recovery procedures

10 Actions During Stall Event Captain’s actions did not indicate well-learned habit pattern Improper inputs consistent with startle and confusion History of training failures may have played role

11 Actions During Stall Event First officer’s uncommanded raising of flaps and suggestion to raise gear not consistent with recovery procedures Reasons for first officer’s actions could not be determined

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