Why Safety Culture? Historical & Conceptual Issues Kathryn Mearns

‘It is a testament to our naïveté about culture that we think that we can change it by simply declaring new values. Such declarations usually produce only cynicism’. Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (1994)

History What is it? Why are organizations focused on it? Can we measure it? Can we manage it? Safety Culture

characteristics and attitudes priority “…that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which established that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” Chernobyl (IAEA, 1986)

Piper Alpha ‘It is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or culture in which safety is understood to be and is accepted as, the number one priority”.’ (Cullen, 1990, p300)

UK Health & Safety Executive, 1999 “Reducing error and influencing behaviour” Companies should measure safety culture

‘ The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management’ Advisory Committee for Safety on Nuclear Installations (HSC, 1993, p. 23) Definition of safety culture

Disentangle this.. Individuals Groups Values Attitudes Competencies Patterns of Behaviour Commitment Style Proficiency Health and Safety Management

Something the organization has? –Imposed on the organization (top down) –Can be measured and managed –Functional approach –Assumes culture can be changed through management interventions Something the organization is? –Emerges from interactions between organizational members –Has a life of its own? –Interpretative approach –Assumes the culture is a pattern of underlying meanings and symbols that are not easily changed Is safety culture…

Model of Safety Culture VISIBLE BEHAVIOUR (what people do) ESPOUSED VALUES (what is said) BASIC ASSUMPTIONS (what is believed) Adapted from Schein (1992)

Organizational layers Management Supervisors Operations Technicians Organizational Level:

What is believed What is said What is done Safety performance Safety performance Safety Culture in a Nutshell Eurocontrol model

ECONOMIC, NATIONAL & REGULATORY INFLUENCES Safety Climate Safety Management Practices Attitudes and feelings Behaviour Organisational Safety H&S policy Organising for H&S Communication H&S auditing H&S training/promotion Risk-taking Unsafe acts Violations Citizenship Reporting Learning Accidents Incidents Near-misses SOCIETAL CULTURE Organisational Culture Values Beliefs Norms Assumptions Expectations Work/production pressure Supervisor commitment Management commitment Satisfaction with safety Attitudes to reporting Risk perception Involvement MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE Set by Leaders? Set by Leaders? Enacted by Leaders Enacted by Leaders

Values Attitudes Norms Assumptions Expectations Extent to which these are ‘shared’ by members of the organization & across different groups Safety culture should measure:

Measuring Safety Culture: Methodological Approaches Kathryn Mearns

Validity –Face –Construct Content Discriminant –Predictive Reliability –Consistent –Robust Measures should have:

Robustness –Strength of Evidence SMS Coherence –SMS compatible (not competing) Diagnosticity –Showing how to improve Usability –Not too demanding of organization’s resources Some Initial Requirements

Safety Culture Maturity Enablers/Disablers Interviews Questionnaires/Rating Scales Stories Possible Approaches

Safety Culture Maturity Why do we need to waste our time on risk management and safety issues? We take risk seriously and do something every time we have an incident We are always on the alert thinking about the risks that might arise Risk management is an integral part of everything we do We have systems in place to manage all likely risks Pathological Generative Proactive Calculative Reactive Increasing maturity (Parker & Hudson, 2001)

Safety Culture Enablers & Disablers Just, Reporting & Learning Culture –Enablers: Management believe that it is human to make errors We learn from incidents in a way that people don’t feel they will be punished –Disablers: Some people don’t report incidents because they believe they might get blamed There is a lack of consistency in the organization regarding discipline and re- training

Enablers/Disablers Enablers: Operators stay in position during handover until incoming operator is comfortable with job Agree  Disagree  Disablers: Operators sometimes have to deviate from the procedures to get their job done Agree  Disagree 

Safety Culture Story: Developing trust ManagementOperations What was DONE Management do not punish those who report, instead they are supported and the report is addressed The ATCO reports the incident to the supervisor, they discuss the incident What was BELIEVED Both controllers and management believe they should submit reports of all occurrences Both controllers and management believe human errors exist and reports are an important basis for learning and improving safety OUTCOMEControllers and management trust each other and a just culture exists where occurrences are reported

Questionnaire Rating Scales Management believe that it is human to make errors We learn from incidents in a way that people don’t feel punished Strongly AgreeDisagree Strongly AgreeDisagree employees are motivated for safety by doing interesting tasks employees are bound to safety by strict control

Scenarios Scenario AScenario B Operator has low competency Operator has average competency Average supervision and team decision making Excellent supervision and team decision making Capacity pressure Company has an excellent ‘safety culture’ Company has average ‘safety culture’ Possible error for the operator is higher in: Scenario A  Scenario B  No difference  Don’t know 

Number of reports –1 person reports –2 people report –3 people report –4+ people report Type of evidence –Hearsay –Internal evidence –Public evidence –Change request Collecting Evidence during semi-structured interviews Can provide evidence of how widely spread this view is held Can provide evidence of how trustworthy the evidence is (or important)

Evidence / stories can provide a detailed assessment of how widely spread the issue is believed, and how important it is can identify level of shared views between management and controllers can identify specific areas where improvements could be targeted –aimed either at a specific group or in general

Questionnaire to determine what people perceive Workshops to determine why people perceive things as they do and how to bring about change – workforce involvement Scenarios used to develop questionnaire but not applied to safety culture measurement – used in ‘Safety Intelligence’ measurement Eurocontrol approach