Forensic DNA Databanks in the USA Michael T. Risher.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Offender Databases and Familial Searches: Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues Mary Terrell White, PhD Department of Community Health Boonshoft School of.
Advertisements

Civil Liberties (Rights to Life, Liberty and Property) Chapter 16.
STATE AND NATIONAL DNA DATABASES: CODIS Division Scientific Services CT Forensic Science Laboratory Dr. Michael Bourke
DNA & CRIME ARRESTEE DNA DATABASES Presented by Lisa Hurst Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs Atlanta, Georgia August 14, 2013 National Conference.
Personal genetics in policy and social issues: Crime and forensics Personal genetics in policy and social issues: Crime and forensics.
Suspects Rights Amendments 4, 5 and 6. 4 th Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable.
DNA Databases Ethical Issues and Legal Implications.
Criminal Justice Process: the investigation – Chp 12 Arrest – Suspect taken into custody 4 th Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their.
THEFT BURGLARY THEFT VIOLENT CRIME THEFT CAR THEFT THEFT BURGLARY THEFT.
Law enforcement officers conduct searches every day in an effort to find evidence that can be seized and used in court to prosecute people who have violated.
The Basics of CODIS Combined DNA Index System
Privacy & Personal Information -- Why do we care or do we?
Chapter 4 The Rule Of law Criminal Justice Presentation
Legal Aspects of Criminal Investigation: Arrest, Search and Seizure
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
DNA, crime and law enforcement Personal Genetics Education Project (pgEd) Harvard Medical School - Wu Laboratory
By, Tierra, Bailey, Jenna N, and Danielle.  In the United States, each state independently decides whether DNA can be sampled from arrestees or convicts.
1 CRIMINAL LAW (FORENSIC PROCEDURES) AMENDMENT BILL [B ]: ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 6 October 2009 Sueanne S. Isaac.
4th Amendment.
Rights of Suspects The Fourth Amendment The Fifth Amendment.
Unit Five Lesson 31 How do the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Protect Against Unreasonable Law Enforcement Procedures.
California vs. Acevedo By: Caroline Correa & Raul Perez.
Our Court System Terms, procedures, and ideas you need to know.
Stephen Gresko Senior Criminalist Nevada State CODIS Administrator WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE FORENSIC SCIENCE DIVISION.
The Fourth Amendment What are Your Rights? Search and Seizure:
DNA and CODIS CSI UMMC From
PROCEDURES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 8 th ed. Roberson, Wallace, and Stuckey PRENTICE HALL ©2007 Pearson Education, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ
Psychology of Homicide Unit II
Chapter 2 Legal Aspects of Investigation © 2009 McGraw-Hill Higher Education. All rights reserved. LEARNING OBJECTIVES Explain the historical evolution.
DO NOW – Friday, December 6 What do you think “unreasonable” means? A man is seen walking into an apartment with a grey duffel bag. He is then seen coming.
Law & Justice Chapter 12 Criminal Investigations.
The Bill of Rights The First Fundamental Changes of the Constitution.
THE 4 TH AMENDMENT The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall.
 What is the exclusionary rule  Explain stop and frisk  What is the plain view doctrine  What did Miranda v Arizona require police to do  What happens.
Legal Stumbling Blocks When Rescue and Law Enforcement Collide Gillian Deegan Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney Botetourt County VA.
How do we use DNA in law enforcement and forensics? How do we use DNA in law enforcement and forensics? Personal Genetics Education Project Harvard Medical.
3.2 Notes Crime Scene Reconstruction, Forensic Databases.
The Fourth Amendment and the Home By Laura Zajac.
DNA, crime and law enforcement Personal Genetics Education Project (pgEd) Harvard Medical School
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;
Chapter 22: The DNA Databases.  Developed to assist in solving violent crimes by creating a network for the exchange of information  Compare DNA profiles.
Homework: Read/OL 14.3 for Monday FrontPage: Have 3 worksheets on your desk.
THEFT BURGLARY THEFT VIOLENT CRIME THEFT CAR THEFT THEFT BURGLARY THEFT.
Forensics (DNA Technology). What is DNA? DNA is the carrier of genetic information and provides a structural plan for proteins. It consists of linear.
DNA, crime and law enforcement Personal Genetics Education Project (pgEd) Harvard Medical School
AP U.S. GOVERNMENT & POLITICS – Civil Liberties Civil Liberties part 3.
Legal Studies * Mr. Marinello ARRESTS AND WARRANTS.
Rights of the Accused. 1. Arrest With a warrant: a) based on probable cause b) warrant obtained from a judge presented with probable cause With a warrant:
Fourth Amendment And Probable Cause. By the end of this presentation you should be able to understand; ◦Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ◦How.
4 th Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not.
Criminal Investigation: Laws of Arrest, Search and Seizure Chapter 12 Law and Government.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS: THE INVESTIGATION Chapter 12.
Arrest and Detainment How do you know you’ve been arrested?
DNA, crime and law enforcement Personal Genetics Education Project (pgEd) Harvard Medical School
4th Amendment "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall.
CRJ 201 Course Experience Tradition / crj201.com
Limiting the Right of Search
Evidence Collection at the Crime Scene and Constitutional Law
Criminal Investigation and the Law
Forensics Science and the Law
The Fourth Amendment and the Home
Intro to American Law.
Fourth Amendment And Probable Cause.
Bell Work (Think of your response and be prepared to share)
Aim: How is genetics used in law enforcement?
4th amendment By: KEila Aguilar.
Search & Seizure The act of taking possession of this property.
Search & Seizure in Schools:
Arrest.
Ch. 3-1 Criminal Procedure and the Constitution
Presentation transcript:

Forensic DNA Databanks in the USA Michael T. Risher

DNA databanks are computer databases containing the results of DNA analysis (DNA profiles), used to link evidence from a crime scene to a previously unknown suspect or to another crime scene

CODIS Combined DNA Index System Local (LDIS) State (SDIS) National (NDIS)

CODIS-NDIS Convicted Offender Index Arrestee Index Forensic (Crime Scene) Index (Missing Person Index) (Missing Person Reference Index) (Population Index)

What’s In a CODIS Entry? DNA Profile – the “genetic fingerprint” Specimen Identifier Agency that submitted the profile Name of lab tech who analyzed sample

Each DNA profile consists of information taken from 26 sites on the subject’s DNA –13 paired pieces of information

How is CODIS expanding and Why?

CODIS is Growing Fast June 2011 Offender Profiles 460,365 5,070,473 7,833,009 9,878,881 Forensic Profiles 22, , , ,702

Recent California Stats.

CODIS Creep Convicted of sex offenses or homicide (Cal. 1989) Convicted of violent felonies Convicted of any felony (Prop. 69: Nov. 2004) Convicted of misdemeanor Arrested for sex offenses and homicide Arrested for violent felonies Arrested for any felony (Prop. 69: Jan. 1, 2009) Detained Immigrants (2009) Arrested for anything (federal 2009) Universal databank?

The Fourth Amendment “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions.” –Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)

DNA Sampling is a Search Intrudes into the body. Intrudes into informational privacy. Each separate analysis of sample reveals more information and is a separate search.

Whose DNA is being Collected? In 2006, of 534,460 felony arrests reported (includes multiple-offense arrests): Violent offenses accounted for 23.6 percent (126,342). Property offenses accounted for 27.1 percent (144,781). Drug offenses accounted for 28.9 percent (154,468). All other offenses accounted for 20.4 percent (108,869).

Challenges to Arrestee Testing (post-conviction testing settled) Minn. Ct. of Appeals – struck down Va. Supreme Court – upheld USA v. Mitchell – just upheld USA v. Pool – upheld, rehearing pending Haskell v. Brown – appeal pending

Cal. Population and Arrests by Race/Ethnicity (2006/2007) GroupIn General PopulationPersons Arrested for Felony African American6.7%21.5% Hispanic36.2%40.6% Non-Hisp. Caucasian42.7%32.4%

Familial Searching Effectively expands databank to include family members – guilt by bloodline DNA databank is used to identify people who are by definition not the culprits Leads to investigation and potential harassment of previously convicted people who are no longer committing crimes, and their families

Familial Searching– Treat like a wiretap Should be governed by public, enforceable rules made by legislature, not informal guidelines developed by law enforcement Only in very serious cases where other investigatory techniques have been exhausted Court order or warrant Reporting requirements – how many applications, orders, to what effect

So What?

A Lifetime of Genetic Surveilance Hard to get removed, even if proved innocent Being in the databank makes you more likely to be arrested in the future –You’ll get caught for the crimes you do commit, while people not the databank won’t –Maybe get accused of crimes you didn’t commit –Familial Searching

DNA contains personal information –Ancestry/Family Secrets –Predisposition to physical disease –Predisposition to mental illness? –Predisposition to alcoholism/addiction? –Sexual orientation? –Predictor of personality traits? –Predisposition to criminality?? XYY Even if these are baseless, DNA analysis may be wrongly used to predict behavior.

DNA Dragnets Police seek samples from large numbers of people who live or work in the vicinity of the crime scene or fit a loose profile of the perpetrator. Individuals are asked to “voluntarily” provide a DNA sample. 19 known dragnets in U.S. ~7,000 people

Mistakes have occurred… Lazaro Soto Lusson faced life in jail and was incarcerated for over a year before it was discovered that the Las Vegas police crime lab had switched his DNA sample with that of his cellmate. Josiah Sutton spent nearly five years in jail for a rape he did not commit. His conviction rested almost entirely on a DNA test performed and erroneously interpreted and reported by a Houston Crime Lab analyst.

Possible Exceptions Search Incident to Arrest –Must relate to officer/jail security or preservation of evidence

Possible Exceptions Special Needs –Primary Purpose must be something other than law enforcement. –Still requires balancing of special needs against privacy interests.

Possible Exceptions General Balancing –Never applied to searches of persons other than persons convicted of felonies. –If police can take the genetic profile of people who are presumed innocent, simply based on arrest by single officer, what can’t they do? –Costs and benefits --

Does Expansion to Arrestees Encourage pretextual arrests? Aggravate racial disparities? Aggravate testing backlogs? Invade genetic privacy? Invade bodily integrity? Solve crimes? Prevent crimes? Affect innocent people?

Does Arrestee Testing Solve Crimes? Everybody arrested will soon either be convicted (and give a sample) or not be convicted (in which case what’s the government’s interest in taking DNA from an innocent person?).

The California Experience

1 Total number of CAL-DNA hits (as of 11/30/09) (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5)10,893 2 Number of hits involving samples originally submitted from arrestees (includes those later convicted) (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5) Total number of hits involving samples originally submitted from convicted persons (line 1minus line 2) 10,440 4 Annual number of people arrested for a felony in California (2007 statistics) (rounded) (Meier Dec. Ex. C (Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Crime in California 2007at 147, Table 37)) 332,000 5 Annual number of California felony arrestees who were eventually convicted of a crime based on this arrest (2007) (rounded) (id.) 231,000 6 Annual number of California felony arrestees who were not convicted of a crime (line 4 minus line 5) 101,000 7 Percentage of felony arrestees who are eventually convicted (line 5 divided by line 4) 69.6% 8 Percentage of felony arrestees not eventually convicted (line 6 divided by line 4, or 100% minus line 7) 30.4% 9 Total number of individual profiles in the CA-DNA database (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5) 1,480, Total number of arrestees in database (includes those subsequently convicted and those never convicted) (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5; see Konzak Dec. ¶ 34 (arrestee samples remain in arrestee database even after conviction) 134, Estimated number of persons in arrestee database who have not been, and will not be, convicted (line 8 times line 10) 40, Total number of convicted-person profiles excluding felony arrestees not convicted (line 9 minus line 11) 1,439, Hit rate for database containing convicted individuals (line 3 divided by line 12) 0.725% 14 Expected number of hits from the arrestee database if hit rate for all arrestee profiles uploaded to database (including profiles from persons later convicted and from those not later convicted) is the same as the hit rate for convicted profiles (line 13 times line 10) Expected number of hits from the arrestee database if the hit rate for persons subsequently convicted is the same as hit rate for the convicted-person database (as it should be) and the hit rate for persons arrested but not subsequently convicted is 0% (line 14 times line 7) Actual total number of hits obtained from arrestee database (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5) 453 Analysis of Gov’t Numbers in Haskell v. Brown,

15Expected number of hits from the arrestee database if the hit rate for persons subsequently convicted is the same as hit rate for the convicted-person database (as it should be) and the hit rate for persons arrested but not subsequently convicted is 0% (line 14 times line 7) Actual total number of hits obtained from arrestee database (Supp. Konzak Dec. ¶ 5) 453