Web Logic Vulnerability By Eric Jizba and Yan Chen With slides from Fangqi Sun and Giancarlo Pellegrino.

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Presentation transcript:

Web Logic Vulnerability By Eric Jizba and Yan Chen With slides from Fangqi Sun and Giancarlo Pellegrino

Outline  Background and Motivation  Related Work  Whitebox approach  Detecting Logic Vulnerabilities in E-Commerce Applications  Fangqi Sun, Liang Xu, Zhendong Su  Blackbox approach  Toward Black-box Detection of Logic Flaws in Web Applications  Giancarlo Pellegrino, Davide Balzarotti

Background and motivation

Design Verification BrowserID SSO Analysis  Daniel Fett, Ralf Ku ̈ sters, and Guido Schmitz created expressive model for web infrastructure  Manual analysis: more comprehensive and accurate  Discovered logic vulnerability in BrowserID  Allows attacker to sign-in to any service that supports BrowserID using the address of any user without know their credentials  Proposed fix adopted by Mozilla simply involves verifying the address is correct

Blackbox Approach InteGuard: Web Service Integration Security  Third party APIs are more and more popular  SSO, Cashier Services, Maps, Search, etc.  Key Insight: most web APIs require small number of simple input parameters that are usually set by the user  InteGuard looks at web traffic between the app and third part service to analyze invariants (e.g. orderID, price)  Does not require source code  Mostly automatic  Cannot handle more complex invariant relations (such as the relation between signed content and its signature)

Blackbox Approach Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities  Related to Logic Vulnerabilities  Generally does not analyze logic flow, just parameters in isolation  NoTamper detects insufficient server-side validations where the server fails to replicate validations on the client side  PAPAS uses a blackbox scanning technique for vulnerable parameters

Related Work

Whitebox Approach Basic Problem

Whitebox Approach Main Ideas

Whitebox Approach Evaluation and Results

Open Issues  Cannot identify all logic vulnerabilities  Does not support JavaScript analysis  Limited analysis of dynamic language features

Questions?

Blackbox Approach Basic Problem

Blackbox Approach Main Ideas

Blackbox Approach Evaluation and Results

Open Issues  Only tests attacks through data flow and workflow  E.g. does not test unauthorized access to resources  Automation favors efficiency over coverage

Questions?