DVD Versus VHS 1.A Quandary for Movie Studios 2.Changes in Movie Pricing 1.VHS Tape: two-tier pricing & revenue sharing 2.DVD: one mass-market pricing ($14.99) 3.Marketing Channel Changes 1.From Blockbuster to Wal-Mart 2.Who has more power over movie studios? 3. Power struggle between W-B and Blockbuster 4. Timing between rental and sale: Different interests

DVD versus VHS 4. Buyer Behavior for Movies 1. When would you “ buy ” instead of “ rent ” ? 2. How much are you willing pay to buy? 3. When would you “ rent ” instead of “ buy ” ? 4. Where would you go to “ buy ” or “ rent ” ? 5. “ People can be conditioned to buy just about any movie they want to see if it is priced low enough. ”  Do you agree?

DVD Versus VHS (Part II) 1.A Problem for Blockbuster 2.Changes in Movie Pricing 1.Past: revenue sharing ($65  $25 + royalty) 2.DVD: one mass-market pricing ($14.99) 3.Marketing Channel changes 1.Power shift from Blockbuster to Wal-Mart 2.Power struggle between W-B and Blockbuster 4. Pros and Cons of selling DVD for BB - Pros: - Cons: Margin

DVD versus VHS (Part II) 5. Can BB compete against Wal-Mart in selling DVDs? 6. New Competition: - Mail Order: Netflix and Wal-Mart*  Hybrid Strategy by BB - TiVo

DVD Versus Cable (Part III) 1.Traditional Way of Movie Distribution 2.Major Change 3.Driving Forces for Simultaneous Release 1.Generic Competition 2.Capitalize on Buzz 3.Efficiency of Cable 4.Detractors for Simultaneous Release 1.Fear of Cannibalization 2.Channel Power issue 3.Piracy Issue 5.What Studios are doing: Test Market*

Blue-ray Versus Online Streaming 1.Latest Development: Multi-purpose machine: Blue-ray Player + Internet Video Streaming 2.Latest Trend: DVD sales down; Blue-ray sales up; Internet streaming surges 3.Trade-off: Instant gratification versus picture quality 4.Potential Winners and Losers 1.Winners: Netflix and Amazon; Samsung and LG 2.Losers: Blockbuster; Movie Studios; SONY

Trust in Markets Sherman Act (1890): To outlaw anticompetitive trusts and certain predatory tactics  political motives  Being “ big ” is bad If high market share  merger proposals were rejected By 1960 ’ s: “ The dangers of a vertical merger were grossly exaggerated ” (Robert Bork)

Trust in Markets Recent changes: – Government: Visible hand  Invisible hand – Focus: Political motives  Microeconomic outcomes (products and prices) – 30,000 Ft view  30 ft view – Enforcement: blocking merger  negotiation between parties

Sales Incentives (FT article) 1.Two different types of incentives 2.What is the problem with Chrysler ’ s incentive scheme? 3.Stretch Goals: Pros and Cons 4.Mike Jensen: Linear Compensation Scheme based on  Performance: past sales and profits  Current Market Conditions 5. Reeducate CFOs!

Minimum Retail Pricing (WSJ) 1.Old Rule: Per Se Illegal (since 1911) 2. New Rule: Rule of Reason (5 to 4 decision) “It is not automatically unlawful for manufacturers and distributors to agree on minimum retail prices.” 3. Key consideration: effect of retail price maintenance on (fair) competition

Minimum Retail Pricing (WSJ) 4. Likely Effect of Change on Channel Players Manufacturers: (+) Distributors: (+) to or (-) to Consumers: (+) because of or (-) because of 5. Justice Kennedy “RPM agreements can promote competition”  What type of competition?

Vendor-Retailer Relationships at Reebok Sales Organization for Reebok – Customer-based – Region-based Account Management at Reebok – Headquarter-level effort: sell in – Field-level effort: sell through Key for successful relationship: Trust and confidence Channel function issue: sales and negotiation (Push)  face to face