EOA 16: ESCALATION IN VIETNAM ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART, MACV Timeline: Vietnam August Gulf 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Incident 02 March 1965: Operation ROLLING THUNDER commences 01 April 1965: NSAM 328 approves increase of U.S. military personnel and equipment 27 June 1965: U.S. forces conduct first major ground combat operations 28 July 1965: President Johnson announces a 125,00 troop increase ISO ARVN 17 August 1965: In Washington D.C anti-war protest begins November 1965: Ia Drang Valley Battle 25 December 1965: President Johnson authorizes halt in bombing (ROLLING THUNDER) 31 January 1966: Operation ROLLING THUNDER resumes July 1966: Increase bombing of Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos 31 December 1966: 385,300 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam January 1967: Operation CEDAR FALLS commences 31 December 1967: 486,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam End state: Democratic South Vietnam capable of protecting its own borders and maintaining internal security. Conditions (P/M): ARVN able to defend South Vietnam (P/M) *COG: Enemy- Sanctuaries (S); North Vietnamese Army, NVA (O). Friendly - American People (S); U.S. ground forces (O). *OP Approach (I/D): Indirect and direct approaches. Strategic bombing to buy time and set conditions for for U.S. and ARVN troop build-up (indirect). Conventional forces to attack to seize key terrain or destroy units (direct). Decisive Points: Neutralization of the Vietcong while another was the destruction of an x number of NVA troops and equipment. Misunderstanding of the OE and fallacy of the strategy resulted in a failure to reach this decisive point. Basing: Japan, Korea, South Vietnam *LOO/LOE: The U.S. utilized interior lines, but never developed a capability to utilize them throughout the battlefield, and instead relied on short duration attacks and the ARVN relied on static defense. OP Reach: Operational Reach was limited by the U.S. mainly to population centers and the coast. When operating in the mountains and boarder areas of Vietnam, aerial resupply allowed U.S. forces and ARVN to extended their operational reach. Tempo (S/O/T): Maintain tempo with strategic bombing (S) which facilitated the deliberate build-up of U.S. personnel and training of ARVN. * Arranging Operations (Simultaneity and Depth): Strategic bombing coupled with joint patrols Phasing/Transitions: Deployment and offensive operations consisted of four phases. PHI- protection of U.S. installations. PHII- conduct offensive operations. PHIII-IV move inland and repeat phase II. The transition from OPLAN 32 to Cheng Thang Plan to pacification (aka Vietnamization). Culmination. U.S. operations culminated at the end of long range patrols in the mountains of South Vietnam and would then head back to refit. Risk (S/O/T): The primary risk for the U.S. was that the American people would grow tired of a protracted conflict with no recognizable gain or threat to the U.S. Thus requiring/demanding a withdrawal of personnel from Vietnam (S/O) Theorist Assessment: Strategic bombing (Mitchell/Douhet), Concept of strategy, emergent vs. deliberate (Mintzberg)

EOA 16: ESCALATION IN VIETNAM ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART, NVA Timeline: Vietnam August Gulf 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Incident 02 March 1965: Operation ROLLING THUNDER commences 01 April 1965: NSAM 328 approves increase of U.S. military personnel and equipment 27 June 1965: U.S. forces conduct first major ground combat operations 28 July 1965: President Johnson announces a 125,00 troop increase ISO ARVN 17 August 1965: In Washington D.C anti-war protest begins November 1965: Ia Drang Valley Battle 25 December 1965: President Johnson authorizes halt in bombing (ROLLING THUNDER) 31 January 1966: Operation ROLLING THUNDER resumes July 1966: Increase bombing of Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos 31 December 1966: 385,300 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam January 1967: Operation CEDAR FALLS commences 31 December 1967: 486,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam End state: A united communist Vietnam. Conditions (P/M): Recognition of united and sovereign Vietnam (P). COG: Enemy- South Vietnamese Government (S); ARVN and U.S. ground forces (O) Friendly- Viet Cong (S); LOCs and sanctuaries (O) OP Approach (I/D): Indirect and direct approaches. Unconventional forces in attempts to gain the support of the people and control territory (indirect). Conventional forces to attack to seize key terrain or destroy units (direct). Decisive Points: Collapse of the South Vietnamese Government Basing: Borders of Laos and Cambodia, North Vietnam *LOO/LOE: The NVA utilized exterior lines, but due to American constraints, these lines were not effectively interdicted. OP Reach: The NVA operated within a short distance of Vietnam’s borders because of their inability to supply a force in contact with necessary supplies. As the war progressed, they utilized a system of depots that led further into South Vietnam. Tempo (S/O/T): The NVA controlled the tempo of the fight because they generally chose when they would cross the border into South Vietnam and when they would retrograde. In addition, successful infiltrations enabled the NVA to control tempo and initiative at lower levels. * Arranging Operations (Simultaneity and Depth): NVA conducted attacks across broad fronts in multiple areas at once. The NVA were able to utilize partisan attacks (Viet Cong) across the AO. Thereafter, depth could only be achieved by successfully infiltrating. Strategic depth provided by Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam ultimately were enough. Phasing/Transitions: Simultaneous partisans (insurgency) and conventional warfare throughout South Vietnam. Culmination. Unable to achieve desire effects fighting a conventional force; weather Risk (S/O/T): The primary risk for the North Vietnamese was engaging in a conventional war with the U.S. and ARVN that resulted in a less restrictions and constraints (O). Theorist Assessment: Deep operations (Isserson), phase of a revolution (Mao), Concept of strategy (Mintzberg), and a plan for continuing the war or peace (Dolman).