Cracow Grid Workshop October 16, 2006 Economic Virtualization of ICT Infrastructures Jochen Stoesser, Arun Anandasivam, Nikolay Borissov, Dirk Neumann Institute of Information Systems and Management (IISM) University of Karlsruhe, Germany

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Agenda Requirements for efficient resource allocation in the Grid Drawbacks of current approaches to pricing and scheduling Towards market-based resource allocation: combinatorial double auctions

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Requirements for efficient resource allocation in the Grid Basic requirements: Demand for and supply of resources highly dynamic: Users (providers) require (offer) combinations of resources: {memory, compute}, {memory, compute, application}, … If demand higher than supply of resources: award resources to requesters who value these resources the most. … t q

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Current approaches to scheduling and pricing Subscription model – buyers pay a flat rate on a periodic basis to use a resource – inflexible Metered model – “Pay as you go”, e.g. Amazon’s Compute Cloud, SUN – users are charged on the basis of actual usage – prices are (temporarily) determined by providers only  inflexible Central scheduling – “who shares with whom at what time” – if demand exceeds supply, allocation of resources becomes inefficient service level actual demand/supply t q

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Objective – market-based resource allocation Dynamic and efficient allocation of scarce resources  Typical application domain of markets [Buyya et al. 2003] Objective: Development of an Open Grid Market that is flexible and dynamic, provides economic incentives for resource provision and achieves an efficient allocation of resources. Grid research projects at the IISM: Billing the Grid SESAM

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Market-based resource allocation: “Conventional” auction mechanisms resource provider 1: memory, compute resource provider 2: application resource requester: memory, compute, application “Conventional” single-sided auctions (cf. eBay) and double auctions (cf. stock exchanges) not efficient – Split of supply and demand across multiple markets – Exposure risk: requester might only obtain a subset of the required resources DealNo deal

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Market-based resource allocation: Combinatorial double auction single bid for a combination of resources in an aggregated market actors can bid for bundles of resources, e.g. memory and compute logical links between bids, e.g. XOR bids [Bapna et al., forthcoming; de Vries et al. 2003; Schnizler et al. forthcoming] … m resource providers n resource requesters … {memory, compute, application}

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Problems: Combinatorial assignment problem – hard to model – computationally extremely demanding can be reduced to multi-dimensional knapsack problem  NP-hard Trade-off between economic requirements required [Parkes et al., 2001] – Incentive compatible – Efficient allocation – Budget balanced – … Need for additional attributes: SLAs, location, time constraints, … Market-based resource allocation: Combinatorial double auction (cont’d)

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Contribution Discussion of related approaches Parameterisation of the design space  derivation of use cases  market engineering approach ParameterPossible expressions Reservation pricesNo reservation prices, one common reservation price or different reservation prices for each resource Budget constraintsNo constraints, absolute (rejection/kill) or relative (hibernation) Execution of the allocation Continuously or periodically AllocationStatic or dynamic (reallocation) ……

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Contribution (cont‘d) Formalization of the bidding language and the winner determination problem for sample use cases … Efficiency criterion Constraints encode the use case

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Thank you for your attention! Jochen Stoesser IISM – Information & Market Engineering Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Englerstr. 14, Karlsruhe, Germany Contact Information

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, References Rajkumar Buyya, David Abramson, & Srikumar Venugopal. The Grid Economy. Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 93, No. 3, March David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, & Marta Eso. Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges. In IJCAI, pp , Ravi Bapna, Sanjunkta Das, Robert Garfinkel, & Jan Stallaert. A market design for grid computing. INFORMS Journal of Computing, forthcoming. Sven de Vries, Rakesh V. Vohra. Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey. INFORMS Journal on Computing, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp , Summer Björn Schnizler, Dirk Neumann, Daniel Veit, & Christof Weinhardt. Trading Grid Services – A Multi-attribute Combinatorial Approach. European Journal of Operations Research, forthcoming.

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Combinatorial double auction: Formalisation Winner determination problem (WDP):

Cracow Grid Workshop, October 16, Parametrization of the design space ParameterPossible expressions Specificity of resourcesAll resources are homogenous or differ regarding processing power and/or storage (heterogeneous) Reservation pricesNo reservation prices, one common reservation price or different reservation prices for each resource Time constraints on the demand side Timeframe or timeframe and runtime CompensationNo compensation, compensation proportional to status of execution, full compensation, additional sanctions Budget constraintsNo constraints, absolute (rejection/kill) or relative (hibernation) Execution of the allocation Continuously or periodically Handling of unallocated jobs Reject or retain AllocationStatic or dynamic (reallocation)