J. Blackmon

 The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Basl on Moral Status  Basl on Teleo-Interests and the Comparable Welfare Thesis  Conclusion

Could a synthetic thing be conscious?  A common intuition is: Of course not!  But the Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment might convince you otherwise.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Suppose bioengineers develop a synthetic neuron, a unit that is functionally identical to our own biological neurons.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  If one of your neurons is about to die, they can replace it with a perfect functional (although synthetic) duplicate.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Imagine that this is done for one of your neurons.  You now have a synthetic neuron doing exactly what your biological neuron had been doing.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Would there be any difference?  No one else would notice a difference in your behavior. After all, your behavior is driven by the activity of your neurons, and because this synthetic replacement is functionally equivalent, your behavior will be exactly the same.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Suppose now that another of your neurons is replaced with a functionally equivalent synthetic neuron.  And another, and another, …

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  What happens?  Do you gradually lose consciousness even though you continue to act exactly the same?  Do you reach some threshold at which consciousness just vanishes?  Or do you remain conscious, even when every single neuron has been replaced and your “brain” is entirely synthetic?

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Either you remain conscious throughout, or you lose your conscious experience at some point.  If you remain conscious throughout, then an artificial synthetic thing can be conscious.  If you lose your conscious experience at some point, then consciousness is a property that cannot be scientifically studied.

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  If, on the other hand, you lose your conscious experience at some point, then consciousness is a property that cannot be scientifically studied at the level of behavior.  After all, your body’s behavior remains exactly the same. (And “you” continue to insist that “you” feel fine and are having conscious experience.)

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Either artificial consciousness is possible or consciousness cannot be detected or investigated by examining one’s behavior!

The Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment  Either artificial consciousness is possible or consciousness cannot be detected or investigated by examining one’s behavior!  But if you think consciousness can be detected and investigated this way, then the answer to whether an artificial thing can be conscious is: Of course!

John Basl’s Account

 Something has moral status if it’s worthy of our consideration in moral deliberation.  An artifact might have certain kind of moral status just because it belongs to someone else. Or because it’s instrumental to doing something morally required.  However, a being might have a different kind of moral status: moral considerability or inherent worth.

 Something is a moral patient if it has a welfare composed of interests to be taken into account for the sake of the individual whose welfare it is.

 Humans are moral patients.  Presumably, certain non-human animals are, too.  We’re going to investigate whether certain kinds of artifacts can be moral patients.

 Something is a moral patient if it has a welfare composed of interests to be taken into account for the sake of the individual whose welfare it is.  Interests are those things which contribute to an individual’s welfare.

 Psychological Interests: those had in virtue of having certain psychological capacities and states.  Teleo-Interests: those had in virtue of being goal- directed or teleologically organized.

The Easy Case  Basl: If x has certain human capacities, then x is a moral patient.  Basl considers and rejects the following alternatives:  Appeal to Religion  Appeal to Species

The Easy Case  Appeal to Religion: If x was chosen by God to be a moral patient, then x is a moral patient.  Problems  First, how do we know whether some x was chosen by God?  Second, how can one justify this to the governed given that some of the governed are secular?

The Easy Case  Appeal to Species: If x belongs to one of the special species, then x is a moral patient.  Problems  We can imagine aliens that are moral patients in the same way we are.  A subset of humans might evolve into a new species.

The Easy Case  So Basl rejects both the Religion and Species alternatives.  Again, if x has certain human capacities, then x is a moral patient.

The Easy Case  So Basl rejects both the Religion and Species alternatives.  Again, if x has certain human capacities, then x is a moral patient.  And, recall, this is what the Turing Test is all about, even if we need to expand on some of the capacities.  And that’s what the Neuron Replacement Thought Experiment is all about, too.

The Harder Cases: Animals and Others

 Basl: The capacity for attitudes toward sensory experiences is sufficient for moral patiency.

The Harder Cases: Animals and Others  Basl: The capacity for attitudes toward sensory experiences is sufficient for moral patiency.  Note that Basl thinks simply having sensory experience is not enough.  Hitting a dog with a hammer is wrong not simply because the dog can experience pain, but because the dog has an aversive attitude to that sensory experience.

Epistemic Challenges  Problem of Other Minds: How do we truly know that other people have conscious minds like us?  Our best answer so far is that we know other humans are mentally like us because they are like us in terms of evolution, physiology, and behavior.  If x shares a common ancestor… If x is physiologically like us… If x behaves in similar ways…

Epistemic Challenges  Our best answer so far is that we know other humans are mentally like us because they are like us in terms of evolution, physiology, and behavior.  But with machines, we do not have these obvious connections.

How can non-sentient things have interests?  Basl builds from work in environmental ethics.  Why is acid bad for the maple tree, while water is good for it?  The answer cannot rely on the maple tree’s welfare unless it can be established that the tree has welfare.  However, the tree cannot suffer or be happy.

How can non-sentient things have interests?  Some people appeal to teleology.

How can non-sentient things have interests?  Some people appeal to teleology.  A maple tree has the end/goal of survival and reproduction.  But if it cannot grow leaves, then it cannot meet its ends.  So its interests/ends are frustrated.

Teleo-Interests  Non-sentient beings can have interests. Thus they can have welfare and so be moral patients.

Teleo-Interests  Non-sentient beings can have interests. Thus they can have welfare and so be moral patients.  If non-sentient beings can have interests, why can’t (non-sentient) machines have them?  Basl considers one objection, the Objection from Derivativeness.

Objection from Derivativeness:  The teleological organization of artifacts is derivative of our interests. (Not so with organisms.)  Therefore, the only sense in which mere machines can have interests is derivative.  But derivative interests are insufficient for welfare and moral considerability/patiency.

Basl’s Reply to the Objection from Derivativeness  There are two kinds of derivativeness.  Use-Derivativeness: Machines which exist only for our use because of our needs and desires may have use-derivative interests. Their very existence derives from our intentions and interests.  Explanatory Derivativeness: The ends or teleo- organization of a mere machine can only be explained by reference to the intentions or ends of conscious beings. The explanation derives from our intentions.

Basl’s Reply to the Objection from Derivativeness  Now, consider organisms such as crops or pets. Yes, these things exist because of our interest. However, they clearly have interests of their own.

Basl’s Reply to the Objection from Derivativeness  Now, consider organisms such as crops or pets. Yes, these things exist because of our interest. However, they clearly have interests of their own.  So use-derivativeness does not disqualify a thing for having interests of its own.

Basl’s Reply to the Objection from Derivativeness  Similarly, consider the case in which I play a significant role in the life and career choice of a child. That child’s preferences might not be explainable without reference to mine; however, the child still has interests of his or her own.  Thus explanatory derivativeness does not disqualify a thing for having interests of its own.

Basl’s Reply (my expansion of it)  Allow me to expand.  Physically identical things can have different origins.  Thus if naturally occurring maple trees have interests but artificially occurring maple trees do not, then by the standards of those making the Objection from Derivativeness, the first would “inherit” welfare while the second would have none.

Basl’s Reply (my expansion of it)  Moreover, if Jill 1 is born naturally, but Jill 2 is a clone of Jill 1 created out of our own interests, then Jill 2 would (according to the Objection from Derivativeness) have no interests!  But Jill 2 would be genetically identical to Jill 1.

Basl’s Reply (my expansion of it)  Moreover, if Jill 1 is born naturally, but Jill 2 is a clone of Jill 1 created out of our own interests, then Jill 2 would (according to the Objection from Derivativeness) have no interests!  But Jill 2 would be genetically identical to Jill 1.  Thus having interests (on this allegedly faulty view!) is not something that arises just from one’s genetics or physical make-up.

Basl’s Reply (my expansion of it)  Moreover, if Jill 1 is born naturally, but Jill 2 is a clone of Jill 1 created out of our own interests, then Jill 2 would (according to the Objection from Derivativeness) have no interests!  But Jill 2 would be genetically identical to Jill 1.  Thus having interests (on this allegedly faulty view!) is not something that arises just from one’s genetics or physical make-up.  The consequences are absurd.

Basl says the Objection from Derivativeness is the best objection, but it fails. His alternative is the Comparable Welfare Thesis.

Comparable Welfare Thesis (CTW): If non- sentient organisms have teleo-interests, then mere machines have teleo-interests.

Comparable Welfare Thesis (CWT): If non-sentient organisms have teleo-interests, then mere machines have teleo-interests.  Note that the CWT, of course, does not say that mere machines have teleo-interests.  It just says that if non-sentient organisms have them, then so do mere machines.  The idea is that whatever justifies acknowledging teleo-interests in organisms also justifies acknowledging them in mere machines.

Comparable Welfare Thesis (CWT): If non- sentient organisms have teleo-interests, then mere machines have teleo-interests.

But consider:  Basl has argued that derivativeness can’t rob a thing of its teleo-interests. So he has rejected the Objection from Derivativeness.  He has not refuted the position that teleo- interests must be acquired “naturally”.

Thus the environmental ethicist might take the following stance:  Agreed, an organism can’t be excluded from teleo-interests simply because someone created and molded it to suit their own ends. (The cases of the crops, pets, and child can all be accepted.)  But this doesn’t mean that mere machines have teleo-interests.

Thus the environmental ethicist might take the following stance (cont’d):  How can crops, pets, and children have teleo- interests while mere machines do not?  The environmental ethicist might try to argue that the crop, the pet, and the child are all members of natural kinds (plants, animals), while mere machines are not.

Thus the environmental ethicist might take the following stance (cont’d):  How can crops, pets, and children have teleo- interests while mere machines do not?  The environmental ethicist might try to argue that the crop, the pet, and the child are all members of natural kinds (plants, animals), while mere machines are not. This view faces a line-drawing problem. (Consider genetically modified organisms.)

Basl argues that teleo-interests are nonetheless unimportant. “You may recycle your computers with impunity.”

 So long as machines are not conscious, we may do with them largely as we please.

 But once we have something approaching artificial consciousness, we must consider whether these things are conscious and, crucially, whether they have attitudes.

 So long as machines are not conscious, we may do with them largely as we please.  But once we have something approaching artificial consciousness, we must consider whether these things are conscious and, crucially, whether they have attitudes.  We must then be careful with the epistemic uncertainties so as to avoid ignoring a possible person.

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