Place Identity Theory Correlation: Causation vs. Identity Token vs. Type Identity Phenomenological Fallacy Empirical Hypothesis Contingent Identity

What is the Mind? Substance DualismPhilosophical Behaviorism Materialism Descartes Ryle

The Legacy of Descartes’ Dualism The Mind is a Mystery A Ghost in a Machine The Genie in the Lantern

Identity Theory Minds are Brains Mental=Physical Mental States=Physical States Mental Events=Physical Events Mental Properties=Physical Properties???

Occam’s Razor

William of Ockham ( ) A principle of parsimony and economy ‘Shave’ any unnecessary assumptions Don’t multiply entities beyond necessity Newton ( ) “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearance.” Bertrand Russell ( ) “Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities.”

Strict Identity Not Exact Similarity

Correlation Physical Event/State Mental Event/State Either C or A Delta fibers firingExperience of Pain l Correlation between events/states in the brain & x’s reports of x’s mental state, event or experience Given this correlation Possibility 1: causal: c fibers cause the exp. of pain Possibility 2: identity: c fibers=pain [this is a much stronger claim]

Causal Gravitational pull of Moon and Sun, Earth’s movement [inertial force] => The Tides

Clouds & Lightning Cloud = mass of tiny particles/condensed frozen crystals Lightning = Motion of Electric Charges Empirical: something we discovered via observation Contingent Fact: it could have been otherwise Clouds could have been something else Lightening could have been something else Mind could have been something else (i.e. not the brain)

Neural Processes/States/Events = Conscious Processes/States/Events Pain=C Fibers Firing Love=Love Cocktail: Oxytocin+Dopamine +Norepinephrine Color=Ratio between signals from different types of cones

Type vs. Token Identity Pain = C Fibers Firing Water = H2O

Phenomenological Fallacy The experience itselfthe conscious experience If Ms are Ps, doesn’t it then follow that every property of an M must be a property of a P (and vice versa)?

Does it follow from the fact that x=y is an empirical [a posteriori] discovery that we make, that that identity is then contingent?

Hesperus is Hesperus Hesperus=Hesperus True or False?

Phosphorus is Phosphorus Phosphorus=Phosphorus True or False?

Hesperus is Phosphorus Hesperus=Phosphorus

Venus

Epistemology/Metaphysics A priori A posteriori Empirical Discovery Necessary Contingent

Contingent Identity? In what sense is it possible that Hesperus could have turned out not to be Phosphorus?

Contingent Identity? In what sense is it possible that Heisenberg could have turned out not to be Walter White? In what sense is it possible that Walter White could have turned out not to be Heisenberg?

Empirical Hypothesis Not one of Meaning: Not claiming that talk of thoughts/pains can be translated into talk of brains

The Autistic Neurophysicist Metaphysics/Epistemology: facts are one thing, knowledge of facts another Even if “brain” and “mind” are not synonymous, if brain=mind, the fact that “brain” and “mind” are not synonymous, doesn’t make it the case that it could have turned out that brain doesn’t = mind