WHERE JUDICIAL REFORMS FITS THE BANK’S AGENDA LCR PERSPECTIVE David F. Varela, LCCVE

THE COUNTRY’S JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT CYCLE Countries started working in judicial reform well before the Bank started

Identification External criticism of the judicial authorities - Questions about their honesty or competence - Excessive formalism of the procedural rules - Deficient quality of services delivered - Excessive cost for the service users Media interest in judicial affairs Self-criticism of the judicial authorities

Preparation and Appraisal Outside pressure for judicial reforms Intervention of other State Powers Leadership of the judicial authorities Inspiration in foreign models Adoption of a reform agenda

Implementation and Evaluation Complexity of the implementation process Disagreements among the authorities responsible of implementation Unsatisfied expectations of service users Unexpected and/or uncontrollable side effects

COSTS AND RISKS OF THE COUNTRY’S JUDICIAL REFORM CYCLE Judicial reform is a long-term, time- consuming process

Costs  Political capital consumed in the consensus- building process  Scarce human resources allocated to the planning and execution of reforms instead of service delivery  Scarce budgetary resources allocated to reform financing

Risks Weakening of judicial independence Negative media coverage Possible politicization Growing confusion among court users and staff Limited or temporary impact of certain reforms

A BANK-FINANCED JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT CYCLE Where a Bank operation meets the Country’s needs and priorities

Economic Development Private sector development Poverty reduction Improved Governance Transparency and accountability Post-conflict countries: social peace, public safety Rationale for Bank involvement

Recognized by judicial authorities Political interference Low budgets Antiquated legislation Not recognized by judicial authorities Limited managerial capacities Poorly prepared human capital Access barriers –costs, jargon, distance- Sector issues

Analytical Framework (Selectivity) ESW: Diagnostic of sector issues Policy Notes Sector assessment IGR: Broad institutional and governance issues Justice section Transparency and accountability issues

Strategy Framework (Selectivity) Country’s Development Plan/PRSPs Governance section Justice section CAS: Inclusion in the Bank’s business plan Full-fledged CAS Interim Strategy Notes CAS Progress Reports: Modification of the Bank’s business plan

Preparation Activities (Selectivity) Identification of reform proposals Stakeholder consultation (Judiciary and other sector institutions, Executive, Congress) Multidisciplinary Focus (Legal, Economic, Financial, Managerial) Developing sector strategies Consistency with country’s development plan/PRSP Consensus-building Donor coordination Design of specific reform initiatives Cost-benefit analysis Beneficiary selection Monitoring and evaluation indicators

Bank internal processes Task Budgets (Norms) Preparation Supervision Task Teams (CMU and SMU dialogue) Legal expertise Non-legal expertise

Typical Objectives Strengthen the institutional capacity of the Judiciary to coordinate the implementation of reform programs Achieve concrete improvements in the quality and efficiency of justice services Support independence, transparency and integrity of judicial authorities Encourage the access to justice of marginal groups

Typical Components Provision of justice services Planning, management and evaluation Court and case management Professional development of judicial human resources Human resources management Legal and non-legal training Cultural change Integrity Administrative systems Disciplinary systems Access to justice Access to justice services for the poor Information and communications Project management, monitoring and evaluation

Project units Staffed by consultants Attached to highest judicial authorities Advisory panels Prominent individuals selected on the basis of their expertise on judicial reform issues Provide advice on specific issues Task forces Small teams within the Judiciary's structure Coordinate implementation activities Maintain regular communication with donors and stakeholders Implementation Arrangements

Continuous consensus-building process Preparation and implementation of legal and regulatory reform packages (project- related or not) Communication activities Internal (Judiciary and other sector institutions) External (Legal profession, users, citizenry) Implementation Activities

Goods, works, training consultants services, and operating costs required for: - Building construction - Office equipment (software, hardware); E-justice? - Diagnostic studies - Workshops, seminars and conferences - Training programs Following Bank procurement and financial management guidelines Country systems Harmonization Eligible Expenditures

Best practices Ensure commitment of highest country authorities Reorient resources towards small and med- sized operations Develop multi-annual plans to achieve systemic changes Prepared by independent experts Coordinated with other donors

CONCLUSION Judicial Reform: A Gordian Knot of a Trojan Horse?

The Gordian Knot: Complexity Political economy of reform Authorities Stakeholders Project design and implementation Partner institutions Targeted groups Monitoring and evaluation Process and product indicators Perception and hard-core data

The Trojan Horse: Opportunities Democracy-building Effective separation of powers Checks and balances Barriers to abuse or misuse of power Rule of law Recognition and enforcement of individual and group rights Legitimacy of State institutions Fight against corruption Enforcement of anti-corruption laws