Security Chapter 9 Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Presentation transcript:

Security Chapter 9 Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Security Environment Threats Figure 9-1. Security goals and threats. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Can We Build Secure Systems? Two questions concerning security: 1. Is it possible to build a secure computer system? 2. If so, why is it not done? Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Trusted Computing Base Figure 9-2. A reference monitor. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Protection Domains (1) Figure 9-3. Three protection domains. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Protection Domains (2) Figure 9-4. A protection matrix. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Protection Domains (3) Figure 9-5. A protection matrix with domains as objects. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Access Control Lists (1) Figure 9-6. Use of access control lists to manage file access. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Access Control Lists (2) Figure 9-7. Two access control lists. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Capabilities (1) Figure 9-8. When capabilities are used, each process has a capability list. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Capabilities (2) Figure 9-9. A cryptographically protected capability. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Capabilities (3) Examples of generic rights: 1. Copy capability: create new capability for same object. 2. Copy object: create duplicate object with new capability. 3. Remove capability: delete entry from C-list; object unaffected. 4. Destroy object: permanently remove object and capability. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Formal Models of Secure Systems Figure (a) An authorized state. (b) An unauthorized state. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Multilevel Security Bell-LaPadula Model Bell-LaPadula Model rules for information flow: 1. The simple security property –Process running at security level k can read only objects at its level or lower 2. The * property –Process running at security level k can write only objects at its level or higher Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Bell-LaPadula Model Figure The Bell-LaPadula multilevel security model. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Biba Model To guarantee the integrity of the data: 1. The simple integrity principle –process running at security level k can write only objects at its level or lower (no write up). 2. The integrity * property –process running at security level k can read only objects at its level or higher (no read down). Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Covert Channels (1) Figure (a) The client, server, and collaborator processes. (b) The encapsulated server can still leak to the collaborator via covert channels. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Covert Channels (2) Figure A covert channel using file locking. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Steganography Figure (a) Three zebras and a tree. (b) Three zebras, a tree, and the complete text of five plays by William Shakespeare. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Basics of Cryptography Figure Relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Secret-Key Cryptography An encryption algorithm in which each letter is replaced by a different letter. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Digital Signatures Figure (a) Computing a signature block. (b) What the receiver gets. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Authentication (1) Methods of authenticating users when they attempt to log in based on one of three general principles: 1. Something the user knows. 2. Something the user has. 3. Something the user is. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Authentication (2) Figure (a) A successful login. (b) Login rejected after name is entered. (c) Login rejected after name and password are typed. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

UNIX Password Security Figure The use of salt to defeat precomputation of encrypted passwords. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Challenge-Response Authentication Questions should be chosen so that the user does not need to write them down. Examples: 1. Who is Marjolein’s sister? 2. On what street was your elementary school? 3. What did Mrs. Ellis teach? Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Authentication Using a Physical Object Figure Use of a smart card for authentication. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Authentication Using Biometrics Figure A device for measuring finger length. Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.