Leadership Struggle

Historiography: Overview Liberals: e.g. Conquest & Tucker focus on the personalities of key individuals and highlights the importance of Stalin’s own personality in defeating his opponents. Soviets: Focusses on Stalin’s personality but obviously view him in a more complementary way. Structuralists: e.g. Carr argue that the structure of the Bolsheviks allowed Stalin to rise to power. They see his role as General Secretary as crucial. Post-Glasnosts: e.g. Service & Gill believe that Stalin was a product of the system created by Lenin. Agreement: Stalin’s background is key to understanding his rise to power.

Stalin’s Background Born in Georgia; not Russia. He strove to be recognised as Russian. Lenin called him a ‘Great Russian Chauvinist’. Corin & Fiehn suggest that Stalin’s harsh upbringing was responsible for him being so dismissive of lives and developing a hatred of authority. Bullock argues that Stalin ‘absorbed’ his mother’s confidence in him and her belief that he would be someone special.

Stalin’s Background Most place importance on his time in the seminary in Tiflis, where he first encountered Marxist writings. He was, in his own words ‘apprenticed in the art of revolution.’ Bullock emphasises the oppressive nature of the Church experience in explaining his tendency to see things in absolute terms. Radvinsky highlights that Marxism enabled young men to sacrifice themselves for the poor, in accordance with religious teachings; whilst remaining in the real world and still fighting for their cause… This suggests that Stalin’s political career could be seen as an attempt to live up to this idealised self image, whilst strengthening the argument that Stalin’s rise was not entirely premeditated. As such, it is possible that at the outset, Stalin simply aimed to accumulate as much power as possible – with no particular direction.

The Bolshevik Party After leaving the seminary in 1899, Stalin rose through the Bolshevik ranks very quickly, and is described by Boobyer as a ‘high flyer’. The expansion of state apparatus following the Bolshevik seizure of power, Oct 1917, along with his role as editor of Pravda, allowed him to develop a strong power base. Structuralists highlight the importance of his position as General Secretary, granting him control of party membership in 1919 and allowing him to access the records of most party members. Figes comments on his subsequent appointment of ten thousand members in the provinces through personal recommendations, while McNeal acknowledges Stalin’s reputation for looking after his supporters.

The Bolshevik Party Stalin’s extensive bureaucratic powers also allowed him to root out opposition, in particular to replace supporters of Trotsky in congress with those loyal to himself. As such the Trotskyist school argue that Stalin’s rise was premeditated. The revisionist, Chase contends the view of the Trotskyists. He argues that the idea of achieving supreme power may not have occurred to Stalin at this early stage of his career. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1922, Stalin was in a position which made him prime candidate to be Lenin’s successor.

Lenin’s death Historians agree that following Lenin’s death in 1924, real power for Stalin became a possibility for the first time – making the start of the leadership struggle. Stalin immediately secured a strong public image through his actions at Lenin’s funeral, showing that he was best placed to continue Lenin’s work and, according to Corin & Fiehn, created the image of being ‘Lenin’s disciple’. Stalin’s opponents did have the opportunity to damage and possibly even to end, Stalin’s political career by exposing the unfavourable comments written by Lenin in his testament.

Lenin’s death Following Stalin’s intimidation of representatives from Georgia, Lenin had raised concerns that Stalin did not always know how to ‘use that power with sufficient caution’. This document was, however, never read at congress as it was also critical of other leading Bolsheviks. As Laver highlights, this could also be because Stalin’s opponents felt secure in their positions and continually underestimated him, referring to him as ‘comrade card index’ or, as the contemporary Sukhanov wrote ‘a grey blur’.

Lenin’s death It was also felt that due to Stalin’s administrative powers, he was indispensable in maintaining party unity. The 1923 Lenin Enrolement sought to increase party membership, in particular the number of proletariat members. Between , over 500,000 workers were recruited. They sought the political practicalities which Stalin seemed to offer. It is possible that Stalin’s appeal to such men was further strengthened as he was one of the only leading Bolsheviks from a true working class background, unlike the wealthy Jewish Trotsky, and they felt they could identify with him.

Trotsky Trotksy was Stalin’s closest opposition, yet Philips notes that his late conversion from the Mensheviks in 1917 was treated with suspicion and his political prestige was further damaged when he missed Lenin’s funeral – a mistake which Radzinsky claims was engineered by Stalin. Trotsky’s arrogance and belief in his own intelligence drew a poor comparison with Stalin’s apparently moderate line and saw him fail to build a support base to rival that of Stalin. According to Oxley, his control of the Red army and support from radical students was, when paralleled with events of the French Revolution, disposed to a military dictatorship. His call for world revolution was overshadowed by Stalin’s policy of ‘Socialism in one country’ which, according to Ward, appealed to the general population through its sense of nationalism and patriotism, particularly in the wake of Brest-Litovsk and the Civil War when many still mistrusted Europe.

Opposition Zinoviev had a relatively strong local power base in Leningrad Kamenev had one in Moscow. However, their fear of Trotsky and underestimation of Stalin led them to fail to provide united opposition in Stalin’s rise to power. In his defeat of the left and right, Stalin displayed both opportunism and political skill. Initially, he sided with Zinoviev and Kamenev to outvote Trotsky at the Thirteenth Congress (1924) which Corin & Fiehn describe as ‘packed with well instructed Stalin delegates’. Trotsky was unable to appeal to support due to Lenin’s 1921 ban on fractions and lost his position as War Commissar in 1925.

Opposition Lynch sees this as the end of Trotsky’s political career. With Trotsky dealt with, Stalin turned on the right, joining Bukharin in support of the NEP. Carr acknowledges that he ‘manoeuvred cunningly’. In 1926, Zinoviev and Kamenev reunited with their old rival Trotsky to form a ‘United Opposition. However, by now it was far too late and Stalin’s tight control of the party machine allowed him to have an unassailable position which resulted in all three being accused of factionalism and expelled from the party in Stalin remained in favour of the NEP until 1928, until he switched sides to share the views of the left, whom he had just defeated, and advocated fast industrialisation and use of force against the peasants.

Opposition Regardless of Bukharin’s stern defence of the NEP, considerable political influence of the more united right, he and several other right wing leaders, including Rykov and Tomsky, lost their positions to be replaced by Stalin’s supporters. By 1929, Stalin was not the undisputed leader of the USSR. The assassination of Kirov in December, 1934, by the young Communist Leonid Nikolayev which removed the threat of his final opponent. Sergi Kirov held the powerful position of Party Secretary in Leningrad was hugely popular within the Bolshevik party and a serious rival of Stalin. He received more votes than Stalin at the 17 th Party Congress.

Opposition Kirov opposed Stalin in the 5 year plans and as a result of his intervention, Stalin was unable to exile his enemy, Ryutin. There is great debate about the role (if any) that Stalin played in the murder of Kirov. Thurston writes that Nikolayev planned and perpetrated the murder alone, Radvinsky sees Stalin as the most likely candidate for the premeditation of the assassination. There is no clear evidence either way, but it was very convenient for Stalin.

To what extent was Stalin’s success in the leadership struggle due to his opponents underestimating him?