NORDIC AND OTHER SUB-REGIONAL GROUPINGS: THEIR ROLES IN THE ARCTIC Remarks by Alyson JK Bailes, Háskóli Íslands (based on a joint research paper with Kristmundur Þór Ólafsson) Nordic House, 16 October 2012

The Arctic full of institutions… The Arctic Council UNLOSC, IMO, other global frameworks (Potential) roles of Europe-wide bodies: EU OTHER (SUB-)REGIONAL GROUPS +FRAMEWORKS: - Nordic Cooperation (West Nordic, Nordic/ Baltic) - Barents Euro-Arctic Council - EU’s Northern Dimension

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUB- REGIONAL GROUPS: Do they help at all in Arctic governance - by direct impact? - in policy and decision making(e.g. by forming joint positions among members)? If not, why not? Should they do better? Or is it wiser not to try?

General Limitations Typical features of local/sub-regional groupings in Europe: WEAKNESSES: lack of legal force, funds, political salience; complexity and overlap; avoidance of ‘hard’ inter-state issues (‘intra- domestic’, ‘de-securitized’) STRENGTHS: inclusive (inc. across dividing lines), modest + non-threatening, ‘subsidiarity’, room for non-state involvement/ownership

But how ‘inclusive’ are these bodies? All Nordics are in all of them Separate Faroes+Greenland seats only in WNC and NC Baltic States not in anything except EU’s Northern Dimension – where they have no special ‘regional’ status – and the Council of Baltic Sea States, which doesn’t address the Arctic THUS: at first sight, hard to use existing bodies for a broad ‘Western’ or ‘small states’ front

Individual roles: EU’s Northern Dimension Renewed in 2006 with higher propfile for Iceland, Norway, Russia Includes ‘Arctic window’ + relationship with Greenland; relevant aims + projects; EU cash But project-based rather than policy platform More basically, the 5 Nordics don’t agree on how EU’s general role in Arctic should develop: so unlikely to use this for a ‘common front’

BARENTS EURO-ARCTIC COUNCIL Direct, tangible impact on conditions in European High North (funds) - Including better atmospherics with Russia; reduced tension, local stability/development + soft-security cooperation Strong sub-governmental/non-state-actor roles EU involvement No direct link to Arctic Council (tho’ project interface), no attempt to create common policy fronts – of course, not easy with Russia there!

NORDIC + WEST NORDIC COOPERATION Nordic states’ coordinated Arctic Council Presidencies + reform efforts Joint Arctic research programme (cash) Link with Stoltenberg def. coop. process Pressure from Nordic Council for ‘joint strategy’, ditto from West Nordic Council Parliamentary+political dialogue with Baltics BUT Intra-Nordic strategy differences; reluctance to address/reconcile ‘hard’ national interests

To do more, or not to try? Respect inherent limitations of such groups: must preserve ‘process’ effects + trust Tackling hard issues divisive – and ineffective Foolish to undermine AC, which struggles with its own limitations Better to aim at complementarity, spread of best practice, and more project coordination Also a less controversial ‘back door’ for EU involvement, in a framework fixed by Nordics and maybe Baltics – if they know what they want!

Next Steps… Doors seem most open in Nordic, West Nordic and Nordic-Baltic frameworks Time for a Nordic initiative: if not joint strategy, perhaps common Arctic values, joint risk assessment, shared ‘situational awareness’, or…? Scope for West Nordic coordination eg on SAR + other civil security issues, oil/gas angle, also education and research (including ‘small state’ aspect) Explore Nordic/Baltic ‘soft coordination’ through parliamentary impact on Nordic and Baltic governments, influencing lines taken in bigger groupings (focus on EU for the present)