EUGridPMA status and updates David Groep, GGF18

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Items  EUGridPMA latest overview  New CAs and issues emanating from them  Classic AP Update proposals

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Coverage of the EUGridPMA Green: Countries with an accredited CA  23 of 25 EU member states (all except LU, MT)  + AM,CH,HR,IL,IS,NO,PK,RU,TR,“SEE-catch-all” Other Accredited CAs:  DoEGrids (.us)  GridCanada (.ca)  CERN find-your-CA clickable map at

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – New applicants and updates Recently approved CAs:  SRCE Croatia  traditional classic CA Almost there  CERN-IS Upcoming:  Romania (ROSA) CA  EAGIS (Serbia)  ACAD.BG (Bulgaria) Modifications:  General trend: move to on-line CA with an off-line root  UKeScience CA  HellasGrid CA  AustrianGrid CA

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – CERN-IS CA Accreditation discussion  The CERN-IS CA is a stretch for the Classic Profile, but with appropriate interpretation of “should”s still ‘kind-of’ fits  issues long-term certs & host certs, so does not make SLCS either  new MICS profile seems a good fit  see Tony’s upcoming presentation  technical changes have been implemented to make the process secure and auditable  highly protected online-CA architecture was a hard requirement:  either a dedicated link between web front-end and HSM hosting system  or on the same but, but behind a two-layered firewall with a (monitored!) IDS on the segment  aim was to make sure that, in case of compromise, at least a list of ‘bad’ certs can be made in a reasonably tamper-proof way  specifics proposed in new draft of the Classic Profile  the EUGridPMA agreed in its F2F not to stall the accreditation of this particular CA while we are discussing new profiles

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Proposed Changes to the Classic AP  clarify process needed for violating a ‘ SHOULD ’  FQDN ownership  add the need to describe how subscriber status changes are communicated to CA/RA  time-separated identity-vetting info. protection/use **  list approve on-line CA architectures  the ‘tamper-proof log’ may be still impossible to implement, but a near-tamper proof log may be possible  refer to cert profile guidelines  clarify due-diligence for end-entities  take a string password  initiating revocation in a timely fashion see for the drafts

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: SHOULD  Latest proposed text (1 Introduction)

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: FQDN ownership  Latest proposed text (3.1 Identity Vetting)  Move the burden of description to the CP/CPS  per-CA implementation should be reviewed for adequacy by the PMA at accreditation time

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: subscriber status changes  Latest proposed text (3.1 Identity Vetting)  Intended to address periodic (yearly) checking by the RA whether the subscriber data are still correct. In case of SLCS or MICS this is likely done anyway, but in the classic case, contact between subscriber and CA/RA may be scarce  Leave precise definition out, but require description of the process in the CP/CPS  e.g. asking the RA at the yearly re-keying time whether he/she still knows about the subscriber…

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: identity magament systems for time-shifted vetting operation **  Latest proposed text (3.1 Identity Vetting)  text may be (more!) relevant to the proposed MICS profile  key element: IdM should be a highly trusted one at the organisation, and appropriately managed and kept up-to- date  face-to-face requirement is there, and for a reason! MOVE TO MICS

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: CSR linkage  Latest proposed text (3.1 Identity Vetting)  this text might have prevent the repeated discussion regarding ‘weakly-linked’ CSRs, where no shared data links the electronic CSR to the actual identity vetting

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: CA Architectures  Latest proposed text (4 Operational Requirements)  distinguish clearly between on- and off-line CAs, and make clear that both are allowed, definition of terms  needed to then describe pre-validated on-line architectures …

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: on-line CAs  Latest proposed text (4 Operational Requirements)  HSM FIPS level 3 operation (but certification statement accompanying the HSM may be level-2)  make clear that the highly-monitored environment must be reviewed and approved by the PMA  two pre-selected environments mentioned explicitly

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: on-line CA architectures  Latest proposed text (4 Operational Requirements)  Model A: HSM on a separate machine, not the (web) front- end, linked via a dedicated monitored network that only carries the signing requests (NIIF, CERN-IS)  Model B: HSM on the front-end, but the front-end isolated from the non-exclusive network by two firewalls, and the intermediate network link actively monitored with IDS capability (DoEGrids)  or come up with a new architecture, but you have some convincing of a PMA to do for the coming time …

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: tamper-proof log?  Latest proposed text (4 Operational Requirements)  intent of this proposal  there may (and likely will be) a compromise  if you log directly from the HSM to paper or WORM, at least you know which of the issued EE certs were involved in the compromise  this is also the reason for the complicated on-line architectures  (invisible) monitoring of the link between web front-end and signing system with HSM, capturing all signing requests sent across accomplished the same thing (i.e. using a fibre splitter at layer-1 and capturing all traffic)  that’s why the signing box should not be directly on a user- accessible network

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: Certificate Profile  Latest proposed text (4.3 Certificate and CRL Profile)  as we learned more about certs and our middleware, we now know better what to do and what to avoid  making ‘useless’ EE certs  does no good to no-one  causes problems in the CA distribution  overloads the support channels for both (grid) projects and the PMAs  guidance document draft available (target audience: IGTF and CAOPS-WG)

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Classic AP Update: Subscribers  Latest proposed text (9.1 Due diligence for EE)  incorporates some text moved from 4.4 (Revocation)  is not enforcible, but it’s also a pity to loose this guidance text

EUGridPMA Status Update, TAGPMA Ottawa David Groep – Profile Cleanup  Classic  MICS  SLCS  Aesthetically, a ‘matrix’ of 1.identity vetting requirements 2.physical

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