AN INSIDE LOOK AT BOTNETS Barford, Paul and Yegneswaran Advances in Information Security, Springer, 2006 Kishore Padma Raju.

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AN INSIDE LOOK AT BOTNETS Barford, Paul and Yegneswaran Advances in Information Security, Springer, 2006 Kishore Padma Raju

INTRODUCTION Attacks for financial gain Proactive methods Understanding of malicious software readily available 4 IRC botnet codebases along 7 dimensions

ARCHITECTURE AGOBOT (Phatbot) – Found in october 2002 – Sophisticated and best written source code – 20,000 lines of c/c++ – High level components IRC based command and control mechanism Large collection of target exploits DOS attacks Harvest the local host

SDBOT – October 2002 – Simple code in C, 2000 lines – IRC based command and control system – Easy to extend and so many patches available(DOS attacks, information harvesting routines) – Motivation for patch dissemination is diffusion of accountability

SPYBOT – 3000 lines of C code – April 2003 – Evolved from SDBOT No diffusion accountability – Includes scanning capability and launching flooding attacks – Efficient

GTBOT(global threat)(Aristotles) – Based on functions of mIRC(writes event handlers for remote nodes) – Capabilities are Port scanning DOS attacks – Stored in file mirc.ini – Remote execution BNC(proxy system), psexec.exe Implications

BOTNET CONTROL MECHANISMS Communication Command language and control protocols Based onIRC Commands – Deny service – spam – Phish

Agobot – Command language contain Standad IRC and specific commands of this bot – Bot commands, perform specific function Bot.open Cvar.set Ddos_max_threads

Sdbot NICK_USER PONG USERHOST JOIN EST ACTIONRESETREJOIN NICK PING 302 KICK353 PART/QUIT PREVMSG/ NOTICE/ TOPIC 001/005

SPYBOT – Command language simple – Commands are login, passwords, disconnect, reconnect, uninstall, spy, loadclones,killclones GTBOT – Simplest – Varies across versions – Commands are !ver, !scan, !portscan, !clone.*,!update IMPLICATIONS – Now simple – Future, encrypted communication – Finger printing methods

HOST CONTROL MECHANISMS Manipulate victim host AGOBOT Commands to harvest sensitive information(harvest.cdkeys, harvest. s, registry, windowskeys) List and kill processes(pctrl.list, kill, killpid) Add or delete autostart entries(inst.asadd, asdel) SDBOT Remote execution commands and gather local information Patches Host control commands (download, killthread, update)

SPYBOT – Control commands for file manipulation, key logging, remote command execution – Commands are delete, execute, makedir, startkeylogger, stopkilllogger, reboot, update. GTBOT – Gathering local system information – Run or delete local files IMPLICATIONS – Underscore the need to patch – Stronger protection boundaries – Gathering sensitive information

PROPAGATION MECHANISMS Search for new host systems Horizontal and vertical scan AGOBOT – IP address within network ranges – Scan.addnetrange, scan.delnetrange, scan.enable SDBOT – Same as agobot – NETBIOS scanner Starting and end IP adresses

SPYBOT – Command interface Command Scan Example Scan netbios portscan.txt GTBOT – Horizontal and vertical scanning IMPLICATIONS – Simple scanning methods – Source code examination

EXPLOITS AND ATTACK MECHANISMS Attack known vulnerabilities on target systems AGOBOT – Broadening set of exploits – Generic DDOS module Enables seven types of service attacks Ddos.udpflood, synflood, httpflood, phatsyn, phaticmp,Phatwonk, targa3, stop. SDBOT – UDP and ICMP packets, flooding attacks – udp and ping

SPYBOT AND GTBOT – Same as sdbot IMPLICATIONS – Multiple exploits

MALWARE DELIVERY MECHANISMS GT/SD/SPY bots deliver exploit and encoded malware in single package Agobot – Exploit vulnerability and open a shell on remote host – Encoded binary is then sent using HTTP or FTP. IMPLICATIONS

OBFUSCATION MECHANISMS Hide the details Polymorphism AGOBOT – POLY_TYPE_XOR – POLY_TYPE_SWAP – POLY_TYPE_ROR – POLY_TYPE_ROL IMPLICATIONS

CONCLUSIONS Expanded the knowledge base for security research Lethal classes of internet threats Functional components of botnets

WEAKNESSES Study only IRC No Preventive mechanisms No dynamic profiling of botnet executables Insufficient analysis

IMPROVEMENTS Dynamic profiling can be executed using some tools Botnet monitoring mechanism can be explained Analysis for peer to peer infrastructure