Settlements Wouter Wils * BIICL, 15 May 2008 * All views expressed are strictly personal.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment
Advertisements

RESTRICITVE PRACTICES AND LENIENCY Zuzana Šimeková European Union – Opportunities and Challenges June 2009, Dubrovnik.
Rehabilitation in Practice Janet Tilley Colemans CTTS.
The fundamentals of EC competition law
John W. McReynolds Assistant Chief, New York Field Office Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice Judicial Training Program Moscow, Russia July.
Enforcement pluralism Regulation of market conduct –EU Commission General surveillance of compliance with the Treaty “Trustbuster”: DG Comp –National Competition.
EC Competition law – sanctions & procedure
1 Support for the coherent development of policies This document is purely provisional, and only reflects preliminary options from Commission services.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN GREECE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK & THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL GUARANTEES/ INSURANCE PRODUCTS TO COVER OPERATORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER.
Young Competition Lawyers Initiative of the Canadian Bar Association’s National Competition Law Section Presents: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND.
The Law of the European Union Information and Communication.
Introduction to EU Law Cont.d. ECJ – TFI (Arts ) “The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure.
1 Putting the Settlement Procedure into Practice: the DRAMs Decision Kris Dekeyser Head of Unit DG Comp, Cartels, G6 - Settlements.
7 December 2010 Procedural rights of suspects and accused in the EU The Roadmap and its implementation Adrienne Boerwinkel Senior Legal Adviser Dutch Ministry.
Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement WHAT MAKES COMPETITION POLICY WORK? Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law.
Development of Competition Enforcement in Poland – 2009 Commitment Decisions Morvan Le Berre Competition Enforcement in.
LUMSA – International Commercial Law 24 October 2014 Prof. Avv. Roberto Pirozzi
Enforcement pluralism Regulation of market conduct –EU Commission General surveillance of compliance with the Treaty “Trustbuster”: DG Comp –National Competition.
Barbara Schulze Bundeskartellamt International Competition Matters ICN Cartel Workshop Cape Town Mini Plenary IV – Information Sharing: Barriers, Waives.
European Commission, DG Competition Fifth Annual Conference on Competition Enforcement in the CCE Member States 21 February 2014, Bratislava 1 Due Process.
The Portuguese Competition Authority’s Experience with the ICN Recommended Practices and Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual Abel M. Mateus President Autoridade.
Mini Plenary 3: Cartel Enforcement and Leniency in Developing Agencies Leniency Programme in Turkey Gülçin DERE Competition Expert Turkish Competition.
Case COMP/ – ENI (Abuse of Dominant Position) International Competition Law Dushanka Dovichinska 24 Nov 2010.
Small claims procedure Regulation (EC) No 861/2007of European Parlament and of the Council of 11 July establishing a European Small Claims Procedure (OJ.
Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St.
1 6 th ICN CONFERENCE CALL ''Problems, pitfalls and recurring issues“ Leniency and International cooperation. Rafael Coloma, Deputy Director of International.
Implementation of EU Electronic Communication Directives.
Interface between Leniency, Direct Settlement and Criminal Sanctions – A UK perspective European Competition Day, Brno Philip Collins Chairman Office of.
European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Interface Between Leniency and Settlements in European Commission proceedings Sari Suurnäkki,
To Enforce and Comply Inside the Antitrust Agency - Two Perverse Effects of Leniency Programmes - Martijn Snoep 5 March 2009.
European Cartel Enforcement and Investigations ABA Antitrust 51st Annual Spring Meeting Alec Burnside April 2003.
Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Relevant changes to the amount of fine. Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating.
SEVEN YEARS OF SETTLEMENT DECISIONS: AN APPRAISAL AFTER THE TIMAB JUDGMENT 76TH LUNCH TALK OF THE GCLC, 29 June 2015 Flavio Laina Head of Unit - Cartel.
C RIMINALIZATION OF C ARTELS Andreas Richter Bundeskartellamt Brno, 11 November 2008 The following presentation merely expresses the speakers own thoughts.
© Hogan & Hartson LLP. All rights reserved. Cartels Fines, Leniency, Settlement John Pheasant November 28, 2007 Brussels.
Access to File – An Effective Right of Defence? Martin Bechtold 27 June 2005.
An overview of EC Regulation 1/2003 as the new implementing regulation for the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty Matthew.
1 Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine Guidelines on setting fines imposed for violations of the law on protection of economic competition GENERAL APPROACHES.
European Commission, DG Competition, A, A-4 ECN The ECN, coherency and the review of decisions of the Commission and the National Competition Authorities.
Lost in Translations – An Examination of the Legal & Practical Problems Associated with the Implementation (or Non-Implementation) of Directive 2010/64/EU.
Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law Cooperative compliance at the crossroad of different legal frameworks – Cooperative.
SMEs and private enforcement of competition law Rachel Burgess Ph:
HAVER & MAILÄNDER 1 Procedure in the light of the modernisation package -Regulation 17/62Regulation 1/2003 -Notification and exemptionautomatic derogation.
competition rules in inland transport
Enhancing international cooperation in the investigation of cross-border competition cases
EU Competition Rules for Technology Transfer Agreements
Competition Law and its Application: European Union
Key Elements to a Successful Anti-Cartel Program
The Finnish leniency system - experiences and challenges
Competition and Antitrust Compliance Programs for Business
EU law and the legislative procedure of European Union
Adaption of antitrust compliance program
ANTITRUST DAMAGES CLAIMS UNDER EU AND NATIONAL LAW A TRANSPORTATION SECTOR FOCUS Pedro Callol.
Competition Law Enforcement in the E.U. - Dawn Raids -
Impact of private enforcement on public anti-cartel enforcement
Rights of Complainants in Competition Law Proceedings
Calculated risk between the leniency benefits and class actions in Colombia Gabriel Ibarra Pardo - Ibarra Abogados December 2015.
The EU Competition Law Fining System European Parliament Committee on economic and monetary affairs Working group on competition policy Antoine Winckler.
Discovery / disclosure issues in EU cartel enforcement
European Commission's fining policy 10 February 2015
ICN | The interplay between private enforcement and leniency policy
ICN Cartel Working Group SG-1
Commissioner’s Legal Advisor - Italian Competition Authority
The interaction between public and private enforcement of EU competition rules Helena Penovski European Competition Network and Private Enforcement Unit.
ICN CWG SG1 webinar on ‘”Parental liability”
due process and EU and ECHR jurisprudence
Interplay of public and private enforcement – cartel sanctioning and deterrence ICN Cartel Working Group SG 1 call series 15 September 2015 Marc Braithwaite,
The Finnish leniency system - experiences and challenges
EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP
Calculated risk between the leniency benefits and class actions in Colombia Gabriel Ibarra Pardo - Ibarra Abogados December 2015.
Presentation transcript:

Settlements Wouter Wils * BIICL, 15 May 2008 * All views expressed are strictly personal.

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May Definition: settlement = disposal by a competition authority of a case of suspected antitrust infringement through a specific procedure, or in application of a policy, under which some benefit is granted to the defendant in recognition of the defendant’s admission or non-contestation of the infringement and/or offer or acceptance of remedies and/or penalties

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May Definition (II): settlement =  distinct from leniency (remission or reduction of a penalty in recognition of the defendant’s voluntary provision of intelligence and evidence of the infringement)  US plea-bargaining = combination of leniency (for not-first-in) and settlement

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May European Commission experience with settlements  exemption decisions with conditions and obligations Article 8(1) of Regulation 17  informal settlements e.g. IBM case 1984  commitment decisions Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003  proposed new settlement procedure in cartel cases public consultation Oct.-Dec. 2007

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May proposed new settlement procedure in cartel cases proposed new Article 10a of Regulation 773/2004 and Notice on settlement procedure in cartel cases optional alternative procedure leading to (stream-lined) decision based on Articles 7 and 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (finding of infringement and imposition of fine)

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May proposed new settlement procedure in cartel cases (II) no negotiation on question of the existence of the infringement and the appropriate fine but defendants are heard on the potential objections and on the range of likely fines (in the light of the Guidelines on fines and Leniency Notice) during settlement discussions (exercise of rights of defence)

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May proposed new settlement procedure in cartel cases (III) defendants must acknowledge the infringement and their liability, accept the likely fines and waive some procedural rights (further access to the file and oral hearing after the statement of objections, separate counsel for companies within same undertaking, language), but not the right to appeal to the EU Courts fixed percentage reduction of the fine (below the normal fine under the Guidelines on fines and Leniency Notice)

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May balance of enforcement gains and losses if fines are reduced by 10 % (33 %), and all cases are settled, deterrence increases if (and only if) the increase in the number of cartels detected and fined, resulting from the saved resources, exceeds 11 % (50 %)

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May settlements and fundamental rights of the defence question: are the self-incrimination and waiver of procedural rights by settlement candidates, and the encouragement thereof through settlement rewards compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination and other fundamental rights of the defence ?

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May settlements and fundamental rights of the defence (II) answer: yes, if the self-incrimination and waiver of procedural rights are voluntary, implying both adequate knowledge and absence of improper compulsion

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May settlements and fundamental rights of the defence (III)  a settlement does not become involuntary merely because a penalty reduction below the normal penalty level is offered, provided that the reduction is not too large cf. European Court of Human Rights, Borghi v Italy (20 June 2002) & Deweer v Belgium (27 Febr. 1980)

Wouter WilsBIICL, 15 May more in writing … paper « The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles » soon available at bsByAuth.cfm?per_id=456087