L esson 1 Course Introduction

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Overview Course Administrivia Info Assurance Review Incident Response

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response IS3523 Intrusion Detection and Incident Response 5:30-6:45 PM M/W Robert Kaufman –Background –Contact information Syllabus and Class Schedule Student Background Information –

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Student Information Name Reliable address to

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Text Books Course Text: –Incident Response and Computer Forensics Mandia, Kevin and Prosise, Chris, Osborne/McGraw Hill Publishing, ISBN X Additional References: –Principles of Computer Security, Conklin, White, Cothren, Williams, and Davis –Hacking Exposed, by McClure, Scambray, Kurtz –Cyber crime Investigator’s Field Guide, by Bruce Middleton

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Grading Grades –2 Tests –Final –Many Projects/Labs

A Sampling of Malicious Activity March EBay gets hacked March Melissa virus hits Internet April Chernobyl Virus hits May Hackers shut down web sites of FBI, Senate, and DOE June Worm.Explore.Zip virus hits July Cult of the Dead Cow (CDC) releases Back Orifice Sept Hacker pleads guilty to attacking NATO and Gore web sites Oct Teenage hacker admits to breaking into AOL Nov BubbleBoy virus hits Dec Babylonia virus spreads Feb Several sites experience DOS attacks Feb Alaska Airlines site hacked May Love Bug virus ravages net July2001 – Code Red Runs Rampant Sept 2001 – Nimda Explodes Jan 2003 – Slammer Worm

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response You have to have security, or else… 2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey –538 security “practitioners” in the U.S. 91% reported computer security breaches within the previous 12 months 70% reported their Internet connection as a frequent point of attack (up from 59% in 2000) 64% suffered financial losses due to breaches, 35% could quantify this loss. Losses due to computer security breaches totaled (for the 186 respondents reporting a loss) $377,828,700 Average loss $2,031,337 –Source: Computer Security Institute

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response And the hits just keep coming… 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime & Security Survey –503 security “practitioners” in the U.S. 90% detected computer security breaches 40% detected penetrations from the outside 80% acknowledged financial losses due to breaches $455,848,000 in losses due to computer security breaches totaled (for the 223 respondents reporting a loss) 26 reported theft of proprietary info ($170,827,000) 25 reported financial fraud ($115,753,000) 34% reported intrusions to law enforcement 78% detected employee abuse of internet access privileges, i.e. pornography and inappropriate use –Source: Computer Security Institute

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response And coming A 2003 FBI/CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey revealed the following: –60% had a security breach in the last year. –78% detected employee abuse of internet privileges. –85% admitted to being infected by a computer virus. –Average loss from insider access was $300,000 –Average loss due to virus attack $283,000 –Average loss from Telecom eavesdropping is $1,205,000 –Average loss from outsider penetration was $226,000 –The average reported loss from net abuse was $536,000 –Source: Computer Security Institute

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Internet Security Software Market $7.4 Billion est $4.2 Billion $3.1 Billion $2 Billion ’97 & ’98 figures based on a study released by market research firm International Data Corp. in Framingham, Mass. ’99 & ’02 figures from IDC study based on a survey of 300 companies with more than $100 million in annual revenues

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response DISA VAAP Results PROTECTIONPROTECTION DETECTIONDETECTION REACTIONREACTION 38,000 Attacks 24,700 Succeed 13,300 Blocked 988 Detected 23,712 Undetected 267 Reported 721 Not Reported

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Computer Security The Prevention and/or detection of unauthorized actions by users of a computer system. In the beginning, this meant ensuring privacy on shared systems. Today, interesting aspect of security is in enabling different access levels.

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response What are our goals in Security? The “CIA” of security –Confidentiality –Integrity Data integrity Software Integrity –Availability Accessible and usable on demand –(authentication) –(nonrepudiation)

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response The “root” of the problem Most security problems can be grouped into one of the following categories: –Network and host misconfigurations Lack of qualified people in the field –Operating system and application flaws Deficiencies in vendor quality assurance efforts Lack of qualified people in the field Lack of understanding of/concern for security

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Computer Security Operational Model Protection = Prevention+ (Detection + Response) Access Controls Encryption Firewalls Intrusion Detection Incident Handling

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Proactive –vs- Reactive Models “Most organizations only react to security threats, and, often times, those reactions come after the damage has already been done.” “The key to a successful information security program resides in taking a pro-active stance towards security threats, and attempting to eliminate vulnerability points before they can be used against you.”

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response So What Happens When Computer Security Fails? Incident Response Methodology--7 Step Process –Preparation: Proactive Computer Security –Detection of Incidents –Initial Response –Formulate Response Strategy –Investigate the Incident –Reporting –Resolution

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response 7 Components of Incident Response Pre-Incident Preparation Detection of Incidents Initial Response Formulate Response Strategy Data Collection Data Analysis Reporting Investigate the Incident Resolution Recovery Implement Security Measures Page 15, Fig 2-1, Mandia 2nd Edition

Pre-Incident Preparation Detection of Incidents Incident Response Team FormedNotification Checklist Completed Initial Response Formulate Response Strategy Is it really an Incident? Yes No Follow-Up Pursue and accumulate evidence and/or secure system Secure System Reporting Implement Security Measures Forensic Duplication Investigation Forensic duplication? Accumulate Evidence Yes No Perform Network Monitoring Isolate and Contain Can Pursue Both Paths Simultaneously Page 18, Fig 2-1, Mandia 1 st Edition

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Resources in the Fight SANS CERT CC FIRST DOE CIAC CERIAS NIST

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response SANS System Administration, Networking, and Security (SANS) Institute Global Incident Analysis Center Security Alerts, Updates, & Education NewsBites, Security Digest, Windows Digest Certification

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Carnegie Mellon CERT CC Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center Started by DARPA Alerts & Response Services Training and CERT Standup Clearing House

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams Established 1988 Govt & Private Sector Membership Over 70 Members Coordinate Global Response

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response DOE CIAC Computer Incident Advisory Capability Established 1989 Part of Lawrence Livermore Lab Awareness training and education Trend, threat, vulnerability data collection and analysis

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response CERIAS Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security Home of Gene Spafford A "University Center" InfoSec Research & Education Members: Academia, Govt, & Industry

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response NIST National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Operares Computer Security Resource Clearinghouse (CSRC) Raising Awarenss Multiple Disciplines Main Source of Fed Govt Standards

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response So How Many Vulnerabilties Are Out? Lets See What the CERT CC Says.

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response

History Lesson The Art of War, Sun Tzu Lesson for you Know the enemy Know yourself…and in a 100 battles you will never be defeated If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself you are certain in every battle to be in peril

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response History Lesson The Art of War, Sun Tzu Lesson for the Hacker Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill One able to gain victory by modifying his tactics IAW with enemy situation may be said to be divine

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Hacker Attacks Intent is for you to know your enemy Not intended to make you a hacker Need to know defensive techniques Need to know where to start recovery process Need to assess extent of investigative environment

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Anatomy of a Hack FOOTPRINTINGSCANNINGENUMERATION GAINING ACCESS ESCALATING PRIVILEGE PILFERING COVERING TRACKS CREATING BACKDOORS DENIAL OF SERVICE Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Footprinting Objective Target Address Range Acquire Namespace Information Gathering Surgical Attack Don’t Miss Details Technique Open Source Search whois Web Interface to whois ARIN whois DNS Zone Transfer Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Scanning Objective Bulk target assessment Determine Listening Services Focus attack vector Technique Ping Sweep TCP/UDP Scan OS Detection Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Enumeration Objective Intrusive Probing Commences Identify valid accounts Identify poorly protected shares Technique List user accounts List file shares Identify applications Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Gaining Access Objective Informed attempt to access target Typically User level access Technique Password sniffing File share brute forcing Password file grab Buffer overflows Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Escalating Privilege Objective Gain Root level access Technique Password cracking Known exploits Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Pilfering Objective Info gathering to access trusted systems Technique Evaluate trusts Search for cleartext passwords Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Cover Tracks Objective Ensure highest access Hide access from system administrator or owner Technique Clear logs Hide tools Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Creating Back Doors Objective Deploy trap doors Ensure easy return access Technique Create rogue user accounts Schedule batch jobs Infect startup files Plant remote control services Install monitors Trojanize Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Denial of Service Objective If unable to escalate privilege then kill Build DDOS network Technique SYN Flood ICMP Attacks Identical src/dst SYN requests Out of bounds TCP options DDOS Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Hacker Exploits per SANS RECONNAISSANCESCANNING EXPLOIT SYSTEMS KEEPING ACCESS COVER TRACKS Source: SANs Institute

UTSA IS 3523 ID & Incident Response Hacking Summary Threat: Hacking on the rise Security posture usually reactive Losses increasing 7 Step Process Hacker Techniques