Workshop on Software Reliability for FCS Army Basic Research …Accelerating the Pace of Transformation Workshop on Software Reliability for FCS Dr. Mark L. Swinson Director of Mathematical and Information Sciences

Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army …Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster From threat-based to capabilities-based approach To current security environment A Nation and Army at war Enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology - enemy is terrorism Conducted on homeland and across globe Violence perpetrated against innocents From the Cold War Détente(2 superpowers) - Standoff with known enemy/threat Anticipated battlefield – Fulda Gap Prepositioned heavy forces and equipment The arms race – strategic nuclear weapons

Future Force for Full Spectrum of Missions Environmental Complexity Increased strategic responsiveness High Brigade in 96 hrs; Division in 120 hrs; Five Divisions in 30 days Fight immediately upon arrival Simultaneous air and sea lift Urban Open rolling terrain Stability and Support Operations Small Scale Contingencies Low Major Theater War Spectrum of Conflict Render Previous Ways of Warfighting Obsolete

Accelerating Transformational Capabilities Pursuing Revolutionary Technologies… Smaller, Smarter, Lighter & Faster Today Future Force ~100 lb load < 40 lb effective load From Platforms to System of Systems Fully networked 70+ tons < 20 tons > 40 mph mph C-130-Like Transportability Accelerating Transformational Capabilities

Future Combat Systems (FCS) Maneuver Unit of Action (Brigade Equivalent) Mounted Combat System (MCS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (CL III/IVa) Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (CL I) Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Mortar LW FCS Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Launch System Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) - Cannon MULE & Armed Robotic Vehicle – Assault (Light) (ARV- A (L)) Network Command & Control Vehicle (C2V) Excerpts from TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 Maneuver O&O: The Army operates as part of a joint and often multi-national force. Units of Employment (UE) are tailorable (comparable to a Division composed of 3 to 6 brigades), higher level echelons that integrate and synchronize Army, Joint and Multinational forces for full spectrum operations at higher tactical and operational levels of war. The Unit of Action (UA) is the tactical warfighting echelon of the Future Force and comprises echelons at brigade and below. It will be part of the joint team. The UA is not a fixed organization. It has the capability to command and control up to six Combined Arms (CA) Battalions. A UA can serve as an Army Forces (ARFOR) component headquarters for the Joint Task Force. The UE fights battles; the UA orchestrates multiple engagements to win battles. Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Manned Systems: MCS 60 ICV 84 NLOS-Mortar 24 NLOS-Cannon 18 C2V 49 R&SV 30 Medical Vehicle 29 Unmanned Systems: UAV (CL III/IVa) 56 UAV (CL I) 54 NLOS-LS 24 MULE & ARV-A (L) 54, 27 UGS 157 SUGV 81 Recon & Surv Vehicle (R&SV) Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) Medical Vehicle Land Warrior (LW) FCS 2550

Our Problem: Major DoD acquisition projects regardless of Service are at serious risk of failure and cost overruns because of software problems

Capability Provided by Software in DoD Systems is Increasing but So are the Failures…… Development Spanning Decades and Yet No Planes in Production B-2 B-2 Software Functionality F-16 F-16 Software and Testing Delays Push Costs Above Congressional Ceiling F-15 F-15 F-111 F-111 F-4 F-4 A-7 A-7 1960 1960 1964 1964 1970 1970 1975 1975 1982 1982 1990 1990 2000 2000 Ref: Defense Systems Management College

Dead in Water – Divide by Zero Mistake Previously Unknown Global System Instability from an Low-level Operator-Interface Mistake …. and set the ship helplessly adrift at sea Crashes entire shipboard system Dead in Water – Divide by Zero Mistake Essential Problems were; System Instability Problem Interface Mismatch Operator Training Inadequate Testing USS Yorktown 1998 “The Smart Ship”

Patriot Missile System Subtle Timing Mismatch with Application Environment Lead to Unexpected Failures …. During Gulf War was blamed for the deaths of 28 US Soldiers During Iraq War was blamed for the shoot down of a UK Tornado System failures caused by: Incongruence between the timer module and the new application environment Confusion caused by multiple software configurations in development and deployment Patriot Missile System

Software Disasters Why within the three Services are there software disasters in highly visible well designed software intensive systems? More dependency on software More interconnectivity provided by software Much more complexity in systems of systems Unexpected system interdependencies More intricate project management

What about FCS? “The software task alone is five times larger than that required for Joint Strike Fighter and ten times larger than the F-22, which after two decades is finally meeting its software requirements.” Rep. Curt Weldon House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee hearing April 1, 2004

What has DoD done about this long term? Study the Problem Again and Again Make Small S&T Investments in Software

Studies of DoD Software Report the Same Problems and Little Action “Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap,” DUSD (Industrial Policy) 2003 “Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment,” Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, USD(AT&L), 2003 “Report of the Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology,” 2002 “Workshop on New Visions for Software Design and Productivity: Research and Applications,” Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and Development, 2001 “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Software,” 2000 “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Open Systems,” 1998

Modest DoD Software S&T Investment DoD was a leader in Software S&T through mid-90s Mindset that “COTS can do it all” almost eliminated DoD Software S&T Research Investment Software S&T Investments in FY04 were Services $2M DARPA $7M Mismatch: $20B spent in FY2000 on software for major acquisition programs supported by less than $10M in S&T

Why are there still problems? Convergence of Embedded Computing and Communications Fundamentally Changed All DoD Studies largely overlooked Primary Reliance on NSF for New Ideas DoD Very Small Part of Total Commercial Market Industry Demands Incentives for DoD Problems

What Might We Do in S&T for Future Systems? Prevent architecture mismatches Make System of Systems Interactions Coherent Make Consistent Abstractions Reduce Interactive Complexity Assurance & Composition High Confidence System Design Correct-by-Construction Software Design Evidence Technologies for Verification and Validation 90% of Software Problems in ACAT Projects Might Be Eliminated With such a Research Agenda

Role of the Workshop Articulate a Software Research Agenda Make Actionable Recommendations Answer the “So What?” Question

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