NATO Defense College Presentation Ambassador Sameh Aboul-Enein Adjunct Professor for International Security and Disarmament, School of Global Affairs, American University in Cairo (AUC) 12 October, 2012 Rome, Italy

Introduction The topic of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction is of utmost importance given the transformative changes underway in the political landscape of the region. I intend to discuss five main issues: first, I will discuss the current situation as it is now, second, I will discuss progress made in the implementation of the ME plan of action & the challenges faced, third, I will reflect some views on the Way Forward to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, fourth, I will reflect on some past experiences like the South African dismantlement experience as a model, and fifth, I will provide some concluding remarks.

First: The Current Situation The “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing fundamental dynamics and has had significant implications on the political and security settings in the Middle East. Public opinion is already playing a much more significant and prominent role in Arab societies and will have a fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security issues. The establishment of a zone can positively contribute to regional and international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts as well as improving the overall security environment in the Middle East.

The Current Situation (cont.) It would be beneficial then to reflect on the treaties of other regional nuclear weapon free zones such as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual differences between these zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can provide us with guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone. Furthermore, it could be useful, in our attempt to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, to explore how the Euroatom experience could be applicable in the Middle East, particularly when it comes to the technical dimension. The Euratom was initially created to coordinate the research programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of nuclear energy. It ensures the security of atomic energy supply within the framework of a centralized monitoring system and acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, including research, the drawing-up of safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Current Situation (cont.) The relationship attained by Brazil and Argentine, in connection with the signature- in July of the Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy is also important to mention. While recognizing the sovereign right of every nation to have access to nuclear technology for the scientific, technological, economic and social development of their people, both these countries created their Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). The Agreement implied a clear and definite compromise for the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities submitted to their jurisdictions or control exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was within this context that they created the Brazilian Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials- ABACC- in order to manage and apply the SCCC. The ABACC is a regional organization that should be examined to derive lessons for the Middle East. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear weapons and solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course. The IAEA Forum on "Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East" held in Vienna by the IAEA November of last year was useful in this regard. Several constructive proposals could be taken into consideration such as taking stock of the importance of declaratory policy, in particular, declarations of good intentions, and identifying specific and practical confidence building measures.

The Current Situation (cont.) The Vienna Forum on the Middle East To study the lessons of other regions in terms of the context that prevailed there before a NWFZ was considered; To review existing, multilaterally agreed principles for establishing such zones; To review the theory and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZs; Discussing the experience of representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing such zones; and Discussing the region of the Middle East in this context.

The Current Situation (cont.) Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:  Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.  The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region.  The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear- weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty, through which they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty.  A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties.

Second: Progress of Implementation of the ME Plan of Action & Challenges Faced Achieved: Selecting the facilitator Determining the host government Launching initial consultations by the Facilitator with regional countries and the 3 co-sponsors. Mandate of Facilitator As refered to in Para (7b) of the Middle East Action Plan, the facilitator of the 2012 Conference, appointed by the Secretary- General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, has a mandate to: Support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertake preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. Assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 conference. Report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings in 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Progress of Implementation of the ME Plan of Action & Challenges Faced (cont.) Facilitator to take stock of the following: NPT Documents Text of the NPT 1995 Review Conference Principles and Objective for Nonproliferation and Disarmament 1995 Resolution on the Middle East 2000 Review Conference Final Document 2010 Review Conference Final Document 2010 Review Conference Action Plan on the Implementation of the 1995 Resolution GA Resolutions on a NWFZ in the ME Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East, Selected Resolutions from IAEA Resolutions Modalities of Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East, 1989 Application of IAEA safeguards in the ME, Reports by Director General, Free Zones Models Treaty of Tlatelolco Treaty of Rarotonga Treaty of Bangkok Treaty of Pelindaba Treaty of Central Asia

Third: The Way Forward; the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East It is imperative following the constructive report of the facilitator at the first session of the Prepcom, that he and his team intensify consultations with participating states in order to finalize the agenda, modalities and rules of procedure of the conference. Furthermore, there should be an announcement of the dates of the conference, in order to enable appropriate preparation by participating States, finalize the Conference's structure, and prepare the necessary background documentation. The Conference should launch a sustained and serious process leading to the establishment of the Zone, and involving concrete steps and measures to be taken within specific time- frames, and linked to the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty.

The Way Forward; the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East (cont.) There is a need to enter directly into a phase of substantive and procedural preparation for the 2012 Conference. There is a need to form a mechanism for substantive and procedural preparation for the 2012 Conference and follow-up of progress. There should be preparation for how the issues of the agenda, modalities, rules of procedure, verification and compliance should be addressed. The conference should cover the different properties of the Zone such as geographical area, prohibitions, and entry into force. The free zone in the Middle East could contain the following technical provisions:

The Way Forward; the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East (cont.) Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities, facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms. Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous development and activities related to nuclear weapons. Prohibiting stationing of any nuclear explosive devices on the zone. Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone. Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only. Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to uphold such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and address the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant organizations within such a zone.

The Way Forward; the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East (cont.) Given the rapid advances and developments in the field of biological science, it will be pertinent for the Conference to consider measures that could strengthen the effectiveness of the Conventions (BWC and CWC). Recent advances in science and technology such as in the fields of synthetic biology, systems biology, delivery technology, nanotechnology, and neuroscience require measures to ensure that such scientific advances would not be misused. There is a need to promote international cooperation, assistance, and exchange in the field of biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article X of the BWC Convention. Egypt has played a visible role in the negotiation of the CTBT and we were among the first states to sign the Treaty in Egypt’s support for the Treaty has been associated with the fact that, as stipulated in the CTBT preamble itself, CTBT is a complementary reinforcement to the NPT system, and was motivated by the adoption of the NPT 1995 review/extension package that included the essential 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, in clear recognition that the nuclear situation in this region threatens its stability in an unprecedented manner.

The Way Forward; the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East (cont.) Egypt has recently participated in several workshops aimed at capacity building and analyst training as well as improving the Egyptian National Data Center, which recently received approval for new equipment to be donated to the center as part of the preparatory Commission’s technical assistance to States Signatories, in order to increase the capability of the NDC to receive, process and report on International Monitoring System data and International Data Center products. The participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive. The conference should include Israel, Iran, and the members of the League of Arab States, as well as the nuclear weapon states and other relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW, BTWC, CTBTO, as well as the representative of the NPT. The Conference and the follow on steps should be inclusive to allow a more genuine, candid, and necessary interaction about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, transparency, accountability, and verification. The 2010 Action Plan recognized the important role played by civil society in contributing to implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

Fourth: Past Experiences: South African Dismantlement Experience as a Model In all these efforts, the example of South Africa, the first country to voluntarily abandon a fully developed nuclear weapons program should serve as a model. It took 5 years to build the country’s first nuclear device and a total of 16 years to construct its 6 weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the program and all the facilities, however, took less than 24 months. South Africa’s decision to become a non nuclear weapon state shows that it is possible in principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing its guidelines.

South African Dismantlement Experience as a Model (cont.) Technical Steps Dismantled the six completed gun type devices at Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd (ARMSCOR) under controlled and safe conditions; Melted and recast the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from these six devices as well as the partially completed seventh device and return it to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe keeping; Decontamination of the ARMSCOR facilities fully and to return severely contaminated equipment to the AEC (such as a melting furnace); Conversion of the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon and non-weapon commercial activities; Destroyed all hardware components of the devices as well as technical design and manufacturing information; The Government joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and submitted of a full and complete national initial inventory of nuclear material and facilities, as required by the Safeguards Agreement; and the first IAEA team came in Nov Completing the termination of the Pelindaba Y Plant at the earliest moment.

Fifth: Conclusion I believe that the 2012 Conference process should be inclusive to include a more genuine and candid interaction about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll back, transparency, accountability, and verification. There has not been such an interaction for many years and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should be utilized. Key successes in abolishing nuclear weapon programs included not only South Africa's historic decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the nonproliferation treaty; but also decisions by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programs and create a bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after they seceded from the Soviet Union. Egypt has taken steps within the framework of the Arab League towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 fourth Action Plan, including meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials from MFA’s and the Secretariat to prepare for the participation of all Arab States in the Conference.

Fifth: Conclusion (cont.) The importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. It is essential also for Iran and the IAEA to intensify their dialogue aiming at an urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding the outstanding issues. It is imperative for all countries concerned to realize how dramatically the regional context has changed. This in turn, requires modifications in the behavior and approach of many. There is a special responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States, especially the Depositary States that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution, to implement the Resolution. The implementation of the 2010 fourth Action Plan is a collective responsibility. Representatives of civil society and academic institutes, who can inject valuable information and perspectives as well as build bridges between our communities, should be invited to help foster trust and better understanding in the build up to this process.

Fifth: Conclusion (cont.) Achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East will help achieve the international objective of reaching global nuclear disarmament. It will help in achieving the international initiative of “global zero” as well as Article VI of the NPT. The fundamental role of the NPT must also be reinforced in order to achieve nuclear disarmament in the Middle East. Nuclear weapon states cannot expect non-nuclear weapon states to indefinitely tolerate a situation where they are threatened with nuclear weapons, either by NPT states or by those outside the treaty. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should also take place within the efforts made to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Achieving the universality of the NPT, and other conventions and banning weapons of mass destruction, and the CTBT are central and essential in the process of building the Zone. The sequence and complementarity of this is to be established as part of the legally binding treaty that the members of the region will negotiate and sign.

Fifth: Conclusion (cont.) Regional Challenges and Obstacles: A continuing perceived utility of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Deep enmity and distrust among States whose participation in bringing a zone into force is essential. Uncertainty due to internal transitions in key Middle Eastern States. Complex, de facto linkages between issues in need of resolution to bring a zone into force. No existing regional institutions for verification and WMD dismantlement Process.

Fourth: WMD Regional Perspective CTBTCWCBWCNPTGeneva Protocol SignatoryNon-MemberSignatoryRatificationParty Without Reservation Egypt Signatory Non-memberNon-MemberParty Without Reservation Israel SignatoryRatification Party Without Reservation Iran Non-MemberRatification AccessionParty Without Reservation Saudi Arabia Accession Ratification Party Without Reservation Jordan Non-Member SignatoryRatificationParty Without Reservation Syria

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