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Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Supervisor? Stefan Brenner

Philosophy of the Social Sciences [1] Part of HPS …

Philosophy of the Social Sciences [1] Part of HPS … [2] Much of H(P)S is a social science …

Philosophy of the Social Sciences [1] Part of HPS … [2] Much of H(P)S is a social science … [3] Important philosophers of science write on philosophy of natural and social science (Popper, Nagel, Hacking …)

[4] Many concepts central to general philosophy of science originate here.

[5] In turn PSS relies heavily on general philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.

Topic 1: Collective Intentionality

-“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at, or about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world.

- If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; …

-“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at, or about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world. - If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; … … if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; …

-“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at, or about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world. - If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; … … if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; … if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; …

-“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at, or about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world. - If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; … … if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; … if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; … if I have an intention, it must be an intention to do something.” (Searle, Intentionality)

-“First … only some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional. …

-“First … only some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional. … -Second, Intentionality is not the same as conscious- ness. …

-“First … only some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional. … -Second, Intentionality is not the same as conscious- ness. … - Third, intending and intentions are just one form of Intentionality among others, they have no special status.”

Central cases: Belief, Desire, Intention … Three (problematic) characteristics: - Direction - Content - Conditions of satisfaction

The problem of collective intentionality is then whether groups can have beliefs, desires, intentions and other intentional states.

§1. Introduction “Fictionalism” or “Instrumentalism”: “The government intends to do …” … is metaphorical talk.

§1. Introduction “Fictionalism” or “Instrumentalism”: “The government intends to do …” … is metaphorical talk. No! We hold the government literally responsible. And we can predict and explain. (Tollefsen 2004)

“Summative Account” for belief (Quinton 1976): [a] “Simple”: Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members believe that p.

“Summative Account” for belief (Quinton 1976): [a] “Simple”: Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members believe that p. Wrong! All teachers in HPS might believe that p without the department believing that p. (Nobody tells the others – but even if they did the case is not clear.)

[b] “Complex”: A group G believes that p iff (1) most of the members of G believe that p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1).

[b] “Complex”: A group G believes that p iff (1) most of the members of G believe that p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1). It is common knowledge in G that p iff (a) p; (b) everyone in G knows that p; (c) everyone in G knows that (b), and so on, …

[b] “Complex”: A group G believes that p iff (1) most of the members of G believe that p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1). It is common knowledge in G that p iff (a) p; (b) everyone in G knows that p; (c) everyone in G knows that (b), and so on, … Wrong! Coextensive groups (committees) might have different beliefs.

The Summative Account is also false for intentions (e.g. Searle 1990): -Cf. people running away from the rain with the intention to take cover, and a group of actors doing so – as a group. - In the latter case we have “we intend” which is primary relative to the “I intend”. - Or cf. the joint painting of a house (Bratman 1993).

§2. Searle’s Non-Summative Account [1] “It must be consistent with the fact that society consists of nothing but individuals....

§2. Searle’s Non-Summative Account [1] “It must be consistent with the fact that society consists of nothing but individuals.... [2] It must be consistent with the fact that the structure of any individual’s intentionality has to be indepen- dent of the fact of whether or not he is getting things right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about what is actually occurring. And this constraint applies as much to collective intentionality as it does to individual intentionality.

… One way to put this constraint is to say that the account must be consistent with the fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual, could be had by a brain in a vat or by a set of brains in vats...” (1990: 96)

Having a collective belief must not imply that certain of my beliefs (e.g. beliefs about other humans) are true.

… One way to put this constraint is to say that the account must be consistent with the fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual, could be had by a brain in a vat or by a set of brains in vats...” (1990: 96) Having a collective belief must not imply that certain of my beliefs (e.g. beliefs about other humans) are true. Thus a single person can have the intention “we intend to do x”.

[3] Collective intentions are biologically primitive. They “presuppose a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative agency; that is, it presupposes a sense of others as … actual or potential members of a cooperative activity....”

Problems: [a] Searle relies on an internalist and individualist notion of content … (Tollefsen 2004).

Problems: [a] Searle relies on an internalist and individualist notion of content … (Tollefsen 2004). [b] He fails to capture normative relations.

Problems: [a] Searle relies on an internalist and individualist notion of content … (Tollefsen 2004). [b] He fails to capture normative relations. [c] Where is the necessary interdependence of collective intentions when two people act together?

§3. Bratman’s Non-Summative Account (1993) “Our shared intention... performs at least three interrelated jobs: - it helps coordinate our intentional actions; - it helps coordinate our planning; - and it can structure relevant bargaining....” (1993: 99)

“We intend to J if and only if 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.

“We intend to J if and only if 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; …

“We intend to J if and only if 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b.

“We intend to J if and only if 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b. 3.1 and 2 are common knowledge between us.” (1993: 106)

Problems: - Intentions concern things under my control. But not here,... (Velleman 1997) - Normativity remains a problem. (Gilbert 2003)

§4. Gilbert’s Non-Summative Account - The concept of joint commitment must be central in acting together, and forming a “social atom”: or a “plural subject”.

§4. Gilbert’s Non-Summative Account - The concept of joint commitment must be central in acting together, and forming a “social atom”: or a “plural subject”. - Withdrawing from joint activity calls for the others’ permission (“The Permission Point”).

§4. Gilbert’s Non-Summative Account - The concept of joint commitment must be central in acting together, and forming a “social atom”: or a “plural subject”. - Withdrawing from joint activity calls for the others’ permission (“The Permission Point”). - “Collective Intention: Persons A and B collectively intend to do X if and only if A and B are jointly committed to intend as a body to do X.” (2003: 46)

Key Features: 1. Holism … a commitment by two or more people. 1a. Answerability, obligations, and rights.... 1b. Creation.... requires the participation of all … 1c. Rescission. … not rescindable by either party unilaterally …

1d i. Dependent “individual” commitments. When there is a joint commitment, each of the parties is committed through it.... – 1d ii. Dependent commitments not personal. Given their existence through the joint commitment, these “individual commitments” are not personal commitments... – 1d iii. Interdependence of dependent commitments... 1d iv. Simultaneity of dependent commitments.... come into being simultaneously...

1e. Content. Joint commitments are always commitments to “act as a body” in a specified way, where “acting” is taken in a broad sense.” (49-51)

Problems: Is it circular? – “Acting as a body” … doesn’t this already presuppose collective intentionality?

§5. Velleman’s Improved Gilbertian Account (1997) Searle on intention: “... an effective intention is a mental representation that causes behaviour by representing itself as causing it.” (1997: 36) Velleman: But it need not be mental!

Excursus: Searle on Self-referential Causation

Mental causation (either cause or effect is mental state or event) Intentional m.c. (… is intentional mental …) Self-referential i.m.c. (e.g. intentions)

Assume I have the intention to drink now: INTENTION [that I drink now and that this INTENTION causes that I drink now]

Velleman: “When one agent says, “I will if you will,” and the other says, “Well, I will if you will”,... Speaking only roughly, I would say that these two utterances combine to form a verbal representation that’s equivalent in content to “We will”. If this representation plays the right causal role, by prompting the behaviour that it represents, and if it also represents itself as playing that role, then it will just be an intention...” (38)