Reference and Description

Language Intentionality Intentionality Words are about things Words are about things Brentano pointed out this characteristic was mysterious Brentano pointed out this characteristic was mysterious How is that even possible? How is that even possible?

Mill The meaning of a name is just the thing that it names The meaning of ‘Everest’ is the mountain itself The meaning of ‘Fido’ is that dog

Puzzles of Reference Identity statements Hesperus is Venus Phosphorus is Venus Should mean the same thing if The meaning of a sentence is compositionally determined by the meaning of its parts, & The meanings of the terms are the objects they name

Puzzles of Reference Talking about non-existents Pegasus lives on Mount Helicon Should mean nothing if there is no object for ‘Pegasus’ to mean

Puzzles of Reference Denying existence Pegasus doesn’t exist Should mean nothing if there is no object for ‘Pegasus’ to mean But it’s true!

Frege’s Theory Meanings are what are grasped when terms are understood Consider Hesperus is Venus Phosphorus is Venus Something other than objects must be ‘grasped’ Call that sense, and the objects reference

Frege’s Theory Sense A ‘mode of presentation’ for the referent Determines the reference of a term Senses are to referents as routes to a destination Many routes are possible to each destination The route to Venus was via Roman mythology, classic teachers, etc. The route to the Evening Star was via walks at night, talks with friends, etc.

Frege’s Theory Sense: Problems? Is there any unique sense? (is there a unique route to every destination?) Everyone here may have a different mode of presentation of ‘Brisbane’ Is there a difference between a sense and the set of all things that we know about a thing? If not then senses can’t give us objective meanings Only personal/subjective meanings

Frege’s Theory Sense: Problems? Is sense necessary for reference? I can talk about Moses even though everything I know about Moses is wrong I can talk to Bob about Moses even though our sets of knowledge about Moses don’t overlap Bob: Moses received the Ten Commandments Me: Moses delivered his people from Egypt

Frege’s Theory Sense: Talking about non-existents Sense is the mode of presentation ‘Pegasus’ is presented by a description ‘the winged horse’ ‘wing’ and ‘horse’ have senses (and they exist) So ‘Pegasus’ has a derived sense – but no referent

Frege’s Theory Sense: Talking about existence ‘Pegasus doesn’t exist’ Same solution

Russell’s Theory Frege’s solution ok, but what are senses? They need to be part of the recognisable world The sense of a term is the definite description that the term satisfies This solves the puzzles of reference in the same way as Frege’s senses

Russell’s Problems Indeterminacy of descriptions What description do I have in mind when I talk of Walter Scott? Depends on purpose Only Russell’s theory would make me claim that I always have the same idea of Scott in mind Maybe names are just ‘placeholders’ for content There may be no fact of the matter about what description conveys what I mean by ‘Scott’ in any use

Russell’s Problems Diversity of descriptions Do all users of ‘Scott’ have the same description in mind? For me ‘Scott’ is ‘A & B & author of Waverley’ For you ‘Scott’ is ‘A & B & soldier of Orange’ Then you and I mean different things when we say ‘Scott’

Russell’s Problems Diversity of descriptions It’s possible that our descriptions don’t even overlap For me ‘Moses’ is ‘He who received Law from God’ For you ‘Moses’ is ‘He who led the Exodus’ If I say ‘Moses wore sandals’ and you say ‘Moses did not wear sandals,’ we are not contradicting each other

Searle’s Theory The sense of a term is a cluster of definitions The referent must satisfy some number of these descriptions Solves the two previous problems easily But wait, there’s more

More Problems The Modal Argument ‘Nixon could have lost the 1968 election’ True? Suppose ‘Nixon’ abbreviates ‘He who won the 1968 election’ Then ‘He who won the 1968 election could have lost the 1968 election True? This is a problem for both Russell and Searle

More Problems False Descriptions Descriptions can refer even when they are false Pythagoras means ‘The man who proved the P. T.’ But if Schmidt actually did it then ‘the man who proved the P. T.’ is only satisfied by Schmidt But ‘Pythagoras’ still refers to Pythagoras and not to Schmidt