Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 1 Safety Systems for LHC experiments Baseline specifications – Additional needs – Actions taken.

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Presentation transcript:

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 1 Safety Systems for LHC experiments Baseline specifications – Additional needs – Actions taken

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 2 CSAM Baseline & Implementation  CSAM is a L3 alarm handling system  Possibility to take actions foreseen in the baseline Status: Up and running. Action matrix  Does not trigger any automatic action when receives L3 alarms.  Eventual automatic action to be decided with SC  LHCb may take action to protect equipment through DCS providing that L3 alarms are published to a DIP server Needs  LHCb would like to get alarms and warnings (L1,L2) via mobile phone and DIP This feature would be appreciated already during the ongoing installation-commissioning. Most of the L3 could be avoided by a quick fix

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 3 RAMSES Baseline & Implementation  Radiation/environmental survey, can generate interlocks Status: Installation Action Matrix  Generates green/yellow/red warnings if radiation level too high behind the shielding wall (accessible area). Needs  LHCb would like to have RAMSES validated to interlock the LACS/LASS, to eventually avoid the human intervention of a qualified RP officer to get access. Is it planned?

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 4 LASS/LACS Baseline & Implementation  Protect against radiation hazards in the experimental area Status: PM85 equipped, PZ85 equipped in June Action Matrix  No action on experiment, interacts with machine only: beam dump if access forced. Needs  Possibility to lock the access and generate interlocks (lock the HCAL radioactive source in garage position during access or immediately send it back home if the access is forced ). To be decided with SC  Would like to have in real time list of people in the UX85 (not clear yet if it will be available in the experiment control room)  Safety Information Display at the top of PZ, to warn about safety conditions downstairs (radiation level, fire alarm …). This system should not necessarily be part of the LASS/LACS, but located close to PAD. + Possibility to broadcast messages from CR to detector.

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 5 SNIFFER Baseline & Implementation  Smoke detection (no ODH, flammable gas …) - 15 channels Status: Installed and tested. Action Matrix  Switch off power of detectors (DSS)  L3 alarms to FB and CCC (CSAM) Needs  No change required regarding the original specifications.  System should be flexible w.r.t. to changes of configuration (eg. Number of branches/line), to adapt to ‘as built’ detector needs.

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 6 Fire Detection Baseline & Implementation  Sniffer system of variable granularity: RB86, RB84, and Ceiling on each side of the shielding wall + barracks Status: up and running.  CO2 flush system in cavern/barrack racks Status: ongoing installation. Action Matrix  No automatic action: FB, CCC (CSAM).  LHCb can only take actions through DCS to protect equipments (eg fire detected in the barracks, cut of rack power only, not the ‘service generaux’)  C02/racks : release of C02 and cut power ( action taken by DSS)

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 7 ODH Baseline & Implementation  Protect against Oxygen Deficiency Hazards in the UX85.  Extension of the tunnel ODH system Status: Three ODH sensors in the ceiling to protect against He release from AT/ACR equipment in ‘our’ area (system validated by SC, operational) + Two sensors in the Bunker region (confined space below RICH2, 100m3 CF4). Action Matrix  1 sensor below 18%: Flash lights, Ventilation set to Maximum, Level3 alarm  2 sensors below 18%: same + evacuation alarm

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 8 AUG Baseline & Implemenatation Status: up and running. Action Matrix  Power off, Level3 alarm, cavern evacuation alarm Needs  Improved communication and docs: LHCb as experienced some unwanted effects in the past (couplings of surface CAST buildings to UX85, defect switches). Would like to have a clear scheme of the action matrix (=electrical scheme) and results of yearly tests. This information is probably exists somewhere on the web

Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 9 Conclusions LHCb is fine with the baseline specifications. Objective: Complete the installation, get the systems working and keep the action matrix as diagonal (=simple) as possible. Some specific issues (use of radioactive source, CSAM actions) will be clarified in due time with SC on a case by case basis. Would like to get information via DIP from ALL systems, and if possible also warnings and analog values, not only L3 alarms Open issues:  Safety Condition Display around access gate, with CSAM+RAMSES summary (OK/NOT)  Sonorous communication system, from CR to detector area.