Political Culture and Democratization Preliminary thoughts for chapter 8 of Approaching Democracy: Research Methods in Comparative Politics Michael Coppedge
Relevant individual Attitudes: Diffuse vs. specific support, Confidence in institutions and Leaders, interpersonal trust, Tolerance, moderation
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes: Age, education, income, ethnicity, religion, party, inequality, etc.
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation: Voting, contacting, donating Petitioning, demonstrating, Striking, violence
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation Collective identities: Nationality, ethnicity Religion, tribe, class, Party…
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation Collective identities Elite orientations: Ideology, programs, Moderation, ambitions Polarization
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation Collective identities Elite orientations Policies
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation Collective identities Elite orientations Policies The regime: Level, change, longevity
Relevant individual attitudes Determinants of attitudes Individual participation Collective identities Elite orientations Policies Regime Institutions And Processes
Forms of direct action by row actor to replace column actor MilitaryMassExecutiveLegisla- ture Courts MilitaryCivil warDirty warMilitary coup MassinsurgencyCivil warElection; protest; Uprising protest ExecutiveManipula- tion of promotions Police action or repression Resigna- tion Presi- dential coup Legisla- ture Impeach- ment CourtsImpeach- ment
If this actor takes direct action Democratic outcomes Undemocratic outcomes MassFailed or repressed uprising or insurgency; constitutional succession after successful uprising; resignation Unconstitutional succession after uprising or insurgency; violence provokes excessive repression, coup, or civil war ExecutiveFailed presidential coup; constitutional dissolution; resignation Successful presidential coup; excessive repression MilitaryRepression, dirty war, military coup, back presidential coup, civil war LegislatureImpeachment, vote of no confidence CourtsActions are constitutional by definition
Democracy In principle The actual regime institutions leaders policies Complete independence executive congress courts military Government performance Mass support for…
Complete independence: no change
Connected mass attitudes
Mass attitudes converge
Connected elite positions
Elite orientations converge
Bottom-up influence
Elite orientations converge to mass average
Top-down influence
Mass converges to elite average
…or to the most influential elite actor
More bottom-up than top-down
Elites converge to mass position faster than mass converges toward elite position
More top-down than bottom-up
Mass converges to elite average faster than elites converge toward mass average
Government performance affects mass support
Mass support trends in direction of exogenous performance
Government performance affects elite orientations
Elite orientations trend in direction of exogenous performance
Positive performance exogenous, all else endogenous
Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of steady positive performance because it’s exogenous
Negative performance exogenous, all else endogenous
Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of steady negative performance because it’s exogenous
Variable performance exogenous, all else endogenous
Without a steady trend, actors that are only indirectly influenced by performance may never converge with the others
Recap We should expect no strong relationship between mass attitudes toward democracy and regimes because –Other kinds of attitudes may matter more –Attitudes don’t matter unless they are translated into action, even if indirectly –Their impact on regimes is necessarily mediated –Snapshots and cross-sections can’t capture the dynamic, endogenous relationships
Implications for research Test for associations between attitudes and more proximate outcomes on the pathways to regime change –Election of semiloyal leaders –Mass support for violent, direct action –Elite beliefs about mass reactions to moves that create, preserve, or undermine democracy. How constrained do they feel? Measure mass & elite attitudes frequently Test for convergences, controlling for exogenous factors