Modeling Reasoning in Strategic Situations Avi Pfeffer MURI Review Monday, December 17 th, 2007.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
An Introduction to Game Theory Part V: Extensive Games with Perfect Information Bernhard Nebel.
Advertisements

Nash’s Theorem Theorem (Nash, 1951): Every finite game (finite number of players, finite number of pure strategies) has at least one mixed-strategy Nash.
ECON 100 Tutorial: Week 9 office: LUMS C85.
This Segment: Computational game theory Lecture 1: Game representations, solution concepts and complexity Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie.
3. Basic Topics in Game Theory. Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ Outline 3.1 What is a Game ? The elements of a Game The Rules of the.
6-1 LECTURE 6: MULTIAGENT INTERACTIONS An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems
1 Chapter 14 – Game Theory 14.1 Nash Equilibrium 14.2 Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 14.3 Sequential-Move Games and Strategic Moves.
The basics of Game Theory Understanding strategic behaviour.
Game Theory and Computer Networks: a useful combination? Christos Samaras, COMNET Group, DUTH.
An Introduction to... Evolutionary Game Theory
Game-theoretic analysis tools Necessary for building nonmanipulable automated negotiation systems.
Chapter 11 Game Theory and the Tools of Strategic Business Analysis.
Games What is ‘Game Theory’? There are several tools and techniques used by applied modelers to generate testable hypotheses Modeling techniques widely.
Economics 202: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory 1.HW #6 on website. Due Thursday. 2.No new reading for Thursday, should be done with Ch 8, up to page.
GAME THEORY By Ben Cutting & Rohit Venkat. Game Theory: General Definition  Mathematical decision making tool  Used to analyze a competitive situation.
A camper awakens to the growl of a hungry bear and sees his friend putting on a pair of running shoes, “You can’t outrun a bear,” scoffs the camper. His.
Oligopoly The challenge of analyzing interdependent strategic decisions.
Chapter 11 Game Theory and Asymmetric Information
Objectives © Pearson Education, 2005 Oligopoly LUBS1940: Topic 7.
An Introduction to Game Theory Part IV: Games with Imperfect Information Bernhard Nebel.
Query Incentive Networks Jon Kleinberg and Prabhakar Raghavan - Presented by: Nishith Pathak.
An introduction to game theory Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium.
APEC 8205: Applied Game Theory Fall 2007
An introduction to game theory Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium.
Extensive Game with Imperfect Information Part I: Strategy and Nash equilibrium.
Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore June 28, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Game Theory, Games, and CMC.
EC941 - Game Theory Francesco Squintani Lecture 3 1.
UNIT III: COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
UNIT II: The Basic Theory Zero-sum Games Nonzero-sum Games Nash Equilibrium: Properties and Problems Bargaining Games Bargaining and Negotiation Review.
An introduction to game theory Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium.
Strategic Game Theory for Managers. Explain What is the Game Theory Explain the Basic Elements of a Game Explain the Importance of Game Theory Explain.
Thinking Like a Modern Economist 6 Economics is what economists do. — Jacob Viner CHAPTER 6 Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights.
Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics 11 Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics All men can see the.
Introduction: Thinking Like an Economist 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 12 Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics All men can see the tactics.
Chapter 12 Choices Involving Strategy Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written.
Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward Induction and Subgame perfection - Repeated Games -
Game Theory is Evolving MIT , Fall Our Topics in the Course  Classical Topics Choice under uncertainty Cooperative games  Values  2-player.
Standard and Extended Form Games A Lesson in Multiagent System Based on Jose Vidal’s book Fundamentals of Multiagent Systems Henry Hexmoor, SIUC.
Experimental Economics and Neuroeconomics. An Illustration: Rules.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright  2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. GAME THEORY, STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS.
Lecture 4 Strategic Interaction Game Theory Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive markets.
Dynamic Games & The Extensive Form
Game-theoretic analysis tools Tuomas Sandholm Professor Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University.
Chapters 29 and 30 Game Theory and Applications. Game Theory 0 Game theory applied to economics by John Von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern 0 Game theory.
Chapters 29, 30 Game Theory A good time to talk about game theory since we have actually seen some types of equilibria last time. Game theory is concerned.
Lecture 7 Course Summary The tools of strategy provide guiding principles that that should help determine the extent and nature of your professional interactions.
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
Topic 3 Games in Extensive Form 1. A. Perfect Information Games in Extensive Form. 1 RaiseFold Raise (0,0) (-1,1) Raise (1,-1) (-1,1)(2,-2) 2.
Ásbjörn H Kristbjörnsson1 The complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria Ásbjörn H Kristbjörnsson Algorithms, Logic and Complexity.
University of Cagliari, Faculty of Economics, a.a Business Strategy and Policy A course within the II level degree in Managerial Economics year.
ECO290E: Game Theory Lecture 13 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information.
2008/01/30Lecture 11 Game Theory. 2008/01/30Lecture 12 What is Game Theory? Game theory is a field of Mathematics, analyzing strategically inter-dependent.
Modeling Agents’ Reasoning in Strategic Situations Avi Pfeffer Sevan Ficici Kobi Gal.
Algorithmic, Game-theoretic and Logical Foundations
1 What is Game Theory About? r Analysis of situations where conflict of interests is present r Goal is to prescribe how conflicts can be resolved 2 2 r.
How to Analyse Social Network? : Part 2 Game Theory Thank you for all referred contexts and figures.
Chapters 29 and 30 Game Theory and Applications. Game Theory 0 Game theory applied to economics by John Von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern 0 Game theory.
Strategic Game Theory for Managers. Explain What is the Game Theory Explain the Basic Elements of a Game Explain the Importance of Game Theory Explain.
Incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Intermediate Microeconomics Game Theory. So far we have only studied situations that were not “strategic”. The optimal behavior of any given individual.
Oligopoly CHAPTER 13B. Oligopoly IRL In some markets there are only two firms. Computer chips are an example. The chips that drive most PCs are made by.
On the Difficulty of Achieving Equilibrium in Interactive POMDPs Prashant Doshi Dept. of Computer Science University of Georgia Athens, GA Twenty.
Dynamic Game Theory and the Stackelberg Model. Dynamic Game Theory So far we have focused on static games. However, for many important economic applications.
전략적 선택모델: 게임이론 동시적 게임 죄수의 딜레마 비겁자 게임 전개형(순차적) 게임 농부와 호랑이 오사카 성의 해자
Game Theory By Ben Cutting & Rohit Venkat.
Game theory Chapter 28 and 29
Game theory basics A Game describes situations of strategic interaction, where the payoff for one agent depends on its own actions as well as on the actions.
Introduction to Game Theory
Game theory Chapter 28 and 29
Computer-Mediated Communication
Presentation transcript:

Modeling Reasoning in Strategic Situations Avi Pfeffer MURI Review Monday, December 17 th, 2007

Strategic Situations Scenarios involving multiple agents, all of which make decisions, and receive rewards based on their decisions May be competitive, cooperative, or anything in between May have interesting structure May be extended over time

Strategic Situations Abound Countering terrorist threats Robotic soccer Disaster response Diplomatic relations Auctions Trading

A Key Question Can we model how agents reason in strategic situations?

Why this Question is Important Modeling how agents reason will allow us to: predict their behavior develop counter-strategies develop computer systems that help people in their strategic decision making analyze situations to determine optimal strategies allow people to explain their reasoning

Possible Approaches Classical game theory Opponent modeling Behavioral economics Psychological theories

Our Approach Identify the basic reasoning patterns that can be used to justify decisions underlies sophisticated behavior such as sacrificing, retaliation and tempting Model and learn the factors underlying decision-making in particular games Use the models to develop strategies that work well

Characterizing Reasoning Patterns Informally, a reasoning pattern is a form of argument that leads to a decision We characterize reasoning patterns as structures in a graph describing a strategic situation the reasoning patterns capture the way information is used and manipulated

Reasoning Pattern #1: Direct Effect An agent takes a decision because of its direct effect on its utility without being mediated by other agents’ actions Drill Profit

Reasoning Pattern #2: Manipulation Child knows about parent’s action Parent does not care about reading, but wants child to brush teeth Child dislikes brushing teeth but likes being read to  Parent can manipulate child Offer to Read Parent Brush Teeth Child

Reasoning Pattern #3: Signaling A communicates something that she knows to B, thus influencing B’s behavior Recommendation Alice Choice Bob Better Restaurant

Reasoning Pattern #4: Revealing/Denying Driller cares about oil Tester receives fee if driller drills Tester causes driller to find out (or not) about information tester herself does not know Seismic Structure Oil Test Result Drill Test Tester’s ProfitDriller’s Profit

A Question For each reasoning pattern, we provide a graphical criterion to determine if the pattern holds Intuitively, a node is motivated if the agent owning the node cares about its decision If a node is motivated, does the graphical criterion characterizing one of the reasoning patterns necessarily hold?

Answering the question Answer: it depends what strategies we allow for other agents If we allow arbitrary strategies, any directed path from a decision node to a utility causes the node to be motivated But if we restrict attention to a “highly justifiable” class of strategies, we get a more interesting answer

Well-Distinguishing (WD) Strategies: Intuition A strategy is well-distinguishing if all distinctions that it makes really make a difference whenever the strategy distinguishes between two states of parents, the agent should receive different utility in the different states

Completeness Result Theorem: If other agents are playing WD strategies, then a node is motivated only if at least one of the reasoning patterns holds i.e., the four patterns of reasoning are sufficient to characterize all cases in which an agent cares about a decision

Relationship with Game Theory Theorem: The set of WD strategies always includes a Nash equilibrium We can view WD equilibrium as refinement of Nash Completeness theorem holds for all WD strategies, not just equilibria different assumption from rationality WDWD equilibriaNash

Modeling Key Situations An imam exhorts his students to commit terrorist acts. Can we model his strategic reasoning? manipulation? signalling? probably a combination of both can we capture how each argument contributes to the actions?

Learning how People Reason Reasoning patterns give us a theoretical basis for what arguments a person might make Can we learn what people actually do in particular games? Can we use what we learn to develop automatic strategies that perform well?

Learning How to Negotiate Can we learn how people trade off factors such as self-interest, altruism, etc. in negotiations? Yes we developed a computer agent using learned models it performed much better than game- theoretic agents, and also better than people

Learning Reciprocal Reasoning Do people use reciprocal reasoning in repeated interactions? retrospective reasoning prospective reasoning Yes models that factor in reciprocal reasoning perform better than those that don’t but prospective may not be as important as retrospective

Reasoning Under Uncertainty When people have uncertainty about other players, do they use models of the other players? Yes modeling people as reasoning about the potential actions of others leads to better performance but recursive modeling has diminishing returns

Distinguishing Beliefs from Preferences A person’s behavior may be influenced by both beliefs and preferences can we distinguish between them? Yes we have created models that are uniquely identifiable in this scenario, people have almost correct beliefs

Next Steps Algorithms and analysis tools for identifying relevant arguments in particular situations Analyze arguments for key behaviors recruitment to terrorism diplomatic relations, e.g. North Korea

Questions?