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Recap of the housing crisis, and review of a few subprime myths and facts Quick look at the current state of the housing markets Review the macroeconomic backdrop to housing Primer on recent Federal Reserve actions
The subprime population is too high risk, and should not get mortgages Historical default rates for subprime about 2% in US Subprime mortgages are “exotic”: Option-ARMs, Neg- Ams, IO, etc.—we should stay away from such predatory products NO: In fact, VERY FEW of subprimes were this type of mortgage Almost all were 2/28 or 3/27 ARMS OK, but that’s why they defaulted—the ARM resets! NO: Little or no evidence of any reset effect (In fact, many reset to lower interest rates) Securitization was a bad idea—Subprime MBS securities all lost huge amounts, and were a dumb idea NO: In fact, losses on AAA “vanilla” MBS < 10%
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, Haver Analytics Normal times: subprime rates are higher, but manageable Crisis times: Everyone is in a mess
No link between reset date and default Defaults increased in 2007/8—because house prices fell, unemployment rose Thus the rapid increase in prime defaults as well (not shown) Source: Foote and Willen (2012)
Losses less than 10% on AAA Why: Credit protection worked Losses much worse on CDOs Foote and Willen (2012) Private label RMBS
Better—permits are rising, inventories are lean Source: Census Bureau, Haver Analytics
Prices are flattening or turning up modestly Source: FHFA, Core Logic, Haver Analytics
Vacancies have improved nationwide (less so in VT, NH) Still a lot of REO/property held off the market Source: Census Bureau, Haver Analytics
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics
Recession ends Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics
Recession ends Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics
Consumer spending has been fair to middling, given overall strength And you know about housing! Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics
Source: Census Bureau, Michigan Survey Research Center, Federal Reserve Board, Haver Analytics
Household wealth has improved a bit (housing values, stock market) The “fiscal cliff” matters less to households? But it matters to businesses The global slowdown affects export- dependent businesses, consumers less so
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics
“Fiscal Cliff” risks CategoryMagnitude “Bush Tax Cuts” (income, estate, AMT) $221B Payroll Tax cut expiration$95B Sequestration spending cuts$65B Expiration of unemp. benefits$26B Other changes (war drawdown, discretionary spending cuts, deprec. allowance) $303B TOTAL$710B=4.6% of GDP Overall effect on GDP growth~2.5 pctg. points Source: Congressional Budget Office, author’s calculations Source: Wall Street Journal, Haver Analytics
Price stability (low and stable inflation) Maximum sustainable employment Congressionally-mandated goals (Dual Mandate) Federal Funds rate (overnight bank rate) Primary policy instrument QE “Forward Guidance” Alternative Policy Instruments X Long-term interest rates, stock prices, exchange rate
We buy long- term assets Removes them from circulation in private markets But private agents still want them So they’re willing to accept them for a lower yield Bottom line: we’re trying to reduce long-term rates Fed’s Securities Private Markets’ Securities
The recovery has been frustratingly slow Our tools to address weakness are somewhat limited But we are doing what we can Recently, we have paid particular attention to employment shortfalls Not because we don’t care about inflation But because the gap between the goal for employment is so large