Sony Pictures Confidential Watermarking in AACS

Sony Pictures Confidential SPE Forensic Watermarking Goals Goals: – Identify the device that was compromised – Establish framework that allows multiple watermarking vendors to be supported in a variety of devices without requiring the device makers to include any vendor specific components Assumptions: no collusion, pristine content – Identify watermark payload from 5 minute clip Assumptions: pristine content – Identify 2 to 5 colluders from 20min ~ entire film – Cover both TV shows (~40min) and feature film (90min~) to be protected Assumptions: content degraded below HD quality – Subjective threshold to be established at which recovery of watermark is not required – Such quality content has little value in extracting watermark as such copy may not come from Consumer Device compromise 2

Sony Pictures Confidential Typical Capabilities of Watermark Solutions Bit density: 5+ bpm, 48+ bits per 10 min, 480+ bits in typical film Increases size of content by 1% to 10% Payloads from 16 to 48 bits Mark embedding in the encrypted domain Embedding requires little CPU or memory Marks robust to severe degradation of video Sony Pictures Confidential 3

keys rip detect embed preprocess metadata Stages of Forensic Watermarking original video marked encrypted encrypted marked Device ID Vendor Unique Element key sequence also encodes the watermark Sony Pictures Confidential 4

Forensic watermarking by programmable code Content Metadata Security Modules Consumer Device Program Media Pipeline WM provider Device Info Mark Info Marked Stream Instantiate Stream keys Encrypted Content metadata -Programmable code modifies encrypted stream file using metadata. (marking) - Marked stream to be sent to media pipeline. - Marking process is faster than max drive data transfer speed. - Stream/Marked stream overhead is small. - Only the Keys required for playback of marked stream (unique for the IDs associated for that device/model) to be provided. Sony Pictures Confidential WM provider can provide Mark info at external server, or include logic inside security modules to perform embedding offline. 5

Sony Pictures Confidential Forensic watermarking without programmable code Content Metadata Consumer Device Marking Process Media Pipeline Marked Stream Stream keys Encrypted Content metadata - Metadata need to have standardized instruction sets. - Marking process will perform instruction sets provided for each content - Marking process is faster than max drive data transfer speed. - Stream/Marked stream overhead is small. - Only the Keys required for playback of marked stream (unique for the IDs associated for that device/model) to be provided. Sony Pictures Confidential 6

Security Module

Unfulfilled Requirements Hack One, Only Hack One Software Diversity Systems relying on software that is potentially subject to attack shall be implemented in diverse ways so that an attack is unlikely to be portable. This diversity shall vary by version of the system, by platform and by individual installation. Copy & Title Diversity The content protection system shall provide capabilities so that in the event of a breach on one title or version of a title, additional work is needed to breach the content protection on the next title or another version. (N.B., simply using different content keys is not sufficient to satisfy this practice.) All Blu-ray players will rely on software unless implemented only in gate arrays. Embedded software From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Embedded software is computer software, written to control machines or devices that are not typically thought of as computers. It is typically specialized for the particular hardware that it runs on and has time and memory constraints. This term is sometimes used interchangeably with firmware, although firmware can also be applied to ROM-based code on a computer, on top of which the OS runs, whereas embedded software is typically the only software on the device in question. Critical requirement. No proposal discussed in AACS.

Choices to Fulfill Requirements 1.Assume content providers don’t care and ignore the requirements 2.Satisfy the requirements in AACS specifications 3.Build framework in AACS to support external code loaded with content 4.Other options?

Option 3 – Security Module Security Module (SM) is code supplied by a 3 rd party to the content provider, is delivered on the disc and plugs into the Security Module Holder Content Provider Security Module (CPSM), not AACS, meets the two diversity requirements Default Security Module (DSM) is part of the player and could be a simple pass- through function AACS specification for SM interfaces simpler than designing robust solution to diversity requirements DSM function is AACS’s choice, CPSM function is content providers’ choice within SM specification Player Platform Disc AACS DecryptDemuxDecode HDCP Re-encrypt SM Holder CPSM DSM

Compliance and Robustness Rules

Sony Pictures Confidential Updating the Compliance and Robustness Rules 12 1.Definition of SW and HW – is hardware only relevant for products built entirely using gate arrays. 2.Is there any different requirements for SW and HW from security stand point? 3.How renewability is defined for the system? 4.Need to make sure there is no outdated descriptions (as we are trying to refine 10~20 years old document) 5.Consider advancements in the circumvention tools Sony Pictures Confidential