PACS 2500 Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies Guy Burgess Co-Director Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado UCB 580, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO , (303) Copyright © 2014 Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess

Scientific Change warnings-about-dietary-cholesterol/

Conflict Insights: Saving Democracy

Info Graphics

Colorado Oil Production gas-wells-by-numbers

Overlay Problems: Communication Escalation Communication Relationships Collaboration Core

Communication Matrix What do we say about them? What do we say about ourselves? What do they say about themselves? What do they they about us? Source: Truman National Security Project

Political Communication Trying to play hard ball” politics and do the right thing (from their perspective)

Words, Voice, Visuals? Words Voice Visuals Source: Truman National Security Project

Projecting Strength Stand up straight Extend your arms way over your head Lower them but maintain your head and shoulder position Cultivate a military, “at ease” position (standing at attention is too stiff) Pretend you’re holding a ball (golf ball to giant pilates ball) Palms up (palms forward indicates submission) Source: Truman National Security Project

Projecting Strength Stand up straight Extend your arms way over your head Lower them but maintain your head and shoulder position Cultivate a military, “at ease” position (standing at attention is too stiff) Pretend you’re holding a ball (golf ball to giant pilates ball) Palms up (palms forward indicates submission) Source: Truman National Security Project

Projecting Warmth Focus on the smile Must be genuine Only good actors / actresses can fake it Exploits mirror neurons 70% of congressional winners can be predicted by visuals Can’t be a submissive smile Raised eyebrows Eyes must be “steely” Source: Truman National Security Project

Wesley Clarke

Tricks: Misdirection Ploy David Copperfield

Tricks: “Hobbes,” “Who Me?” Ploy Innuendo – “He’s not a Muslim, as far as I know” Surrogates Anonymous accusers – “People say …” Free lancers

Tricks: “Everybody Does It” Ploy Devise and implement a Machiavellian plan. Implement it in a big way. Find some way to accuse the other side doing something similar (even though it may be minor) Invoke the “can’t play hardball” defense Last minute variation: Act when the opponent has no time to respond (like just before the election)

Overlay Problems: Relationships Escalation Relationships Communication Collaboration Core

Guiding Principle: Compassion Karen Armstrong “That which is hurtful to you, do not do to others.”

Unrightable Wrongs

Meeker / Sand Creek Massacres

The Meeting Place Justice Punish those that committed “unrightable”, “unspeakable” wrongs Truth Acknowledge the guilt, build a common history Peace Stop the fighting and killing (even if it means letting people “get away with it”) Mercy Stop the hate with forgiveness Lederach Trade-Offs

Visioning Justice Punish those that committed “unrightable”, “unspeakable” wrongs Truth Acknowledge the guilt, build a common history Peace Stop the fighting and killing (even if it means letting people “get away with it”) Mercy Stop the hate with forgiveness Future Vision Imagining a positive future vision and a fair relationship Elise Boulding

Overlay Problems: Collaboration Escalation Relationships Communication Collaboration Core

Getting to Yes – Fisher and Ury

Interests / Positions Positions = initial demands what you want “Let me have the orange” “Drill baby drill” Interests = the real reasons behind your positions (may be unconscious) Eat the fruit, use the skin for a geometry project Continue to be able to do the things that need energy, limit pollution, preserve vitality of energy companies Interest-based framing lets you identify and pursue options for mutual gain Split orange between skin and fruit Comprehensive energy plan with conservation, alternative/conventional energy

The Position Trap

Interests? / Positions? Leaders? Grassroots citizens?

Positional Political Framing

Interest-based Strategy Park Service / Climber Negotiation

Interest-based (or Integrative) Bargaining Separate people from the problem Focus on interests Generate options Use objective criteria Based on fairness principles

Coalition Building Applications

Works within ZOPA Party A Winning Outcomes Party B Winning Outcomes ZOPA Zone of Possible Agreement

Initial Situation

Zero-Sum / Draw-Draw

Positive-Sum / Win-Win

Negative-Sum / Lose-Lose (equally)

Zero-Sum / Win-Lose

Negative-Sum / Win-Lose

Positive-Sum / Win-Lose

Positive-Sum Game (e.g. hybrid car wind energy storage) Win-WinWin-Lose Party Year 1 BdgtYear 2 Bdgt A B C D Total100120

Zero-Sum Game (e.g. steady state budget) Draw-DrawWin-Lose Party Year 1 BdgtYear 2 Bdgt A20 15 B10 C20 15 D50 60 Total100

Negative-Sum Game (e.g. Budget Cuts) Lose-LoseWin-Lose Party Year 1 BdgtYear 2 Bdgt A B 55 C D Total

Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation I SoftHardPrincipled Participants are friendsParticipants are adversaries Participants are problem-solvers The goal is agreementThe goal is victoryThe goal is a wise outcome reached efficiently and amicably Make concessions to cultivate the relationship Demand concessions as a condition of the relationship Separate the people from the problem Be soft on the people and the problem Be hard on the people and the problem Be soft on the people, hard on the problem Problem Positional Bargaining: which Game Should You Play? Solution Change the Game- Negotiate on the Merits

Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation II SoftHardPrincipled Trust othersDistrust othersProceed independent of others Change your position easily Dig into your positionFocus on interests, not positions Make offersMake threatsExplore interests Disclose your bottom line Mislead as your bottom line Avoid having a bottom line Accept one-sided losses to reach agreement Demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement Invest options for mutual gain Search for the single answer: the one they will accept Search for the single answer: the one you will accept Develop multiple options to choose from; decide later Insist on agreementInsist on your positionInsist on using objective criteria

Hard, Soft, Principled Negotiation III SoftHardPrincipled Try to avoid a contest of will Try to win a contest of will Try to reach a result based on standards of independent will Yield to pressureApply pressureReason and be open to reasons; yield to principle, not pressure Source: Getting to Yes

Distributive vs. Integrative Bargaining Trade-Offs vs. Mutual Gain Bargaining Chips

Lack of Negotiation Channels The problem:  The parties have no mechanism for exploring their respective interests and opportunities for mutually beneficial agreement Options for making things better:  Convening, facilitation, and, perhaps, mediation services  Institutionalized, standby negotiation forums

The Double Cross Problem The problem:  Unwillingness to accept mutually beneficial agreements because of the fear of being “double- crossed”  The “prisoner’s dilemma” Options for making things better:  Guarantees, verification, action-forcing mechanisms “Trust, but verify”

Illusion of “Winner-Take-All” Victory The problem:  People who see governance as a “winner-take-all” game in which the goal is to totally defeat (rather than reach an accommodation with) an adversary. Options for making things better:  Realistic assessment of transaction costs and risks of defeat  Moral challenge to “winner- take-all” mindset

The #1 “Getting to Yes” Critique  Interest-based bargainers are vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hard bargainers  Especially, those motivated by ruthless, Machiavellian ethics.

Getting Past No: Strategies for Negotiating with Difficult People  Don’t React (Don’t Contribute to Escalation)  Disarm Your Opponent (Start to De- escalate the Conflict)  Change the Game (To Interests From Positions)  Make It Easy to Say Yes (Let Opponents “Save Face” and Appear to Win Something Important)  Make It Hard to Say No (Force Opponents to Give Up something to Say No) Source: William Ury, Getting Past No: Strategies for Negotiating With Difficult People, Bantam Books, New York, 1991.

Into the Sea Rule or Die

Core Issues Distributional Moral Status Identity Overlays

Three Faces of Power Forcing Power – You do something I want her I will do something that you do not want. Exchange Power – You do something that I want and I will do something that you want. Persuasive Power – You do something that I want because it’s the right thing to do.

Persuadables Reluctant Persuadables Traders Incorrigibles Forcing Power Trading Power Persuasive Power Column Size Indicates Relative Population Size Goal: Most Powerful Power Strategy Mix Optimal Power Distribution

Power Strategy Mix Persuadables Reluctant Persuadables Traders Incorrigibles Forcing Power Trading Power Persuasive Power Column Size Indicates Relative Population Size Backlash Excessive force leads to a “Backlash Effect” which leads to continuing, intense conflict

Backlash Effect / Coefficient The number of "new enemies" created in the process of defeating an "old enemy”

"Force Works" Backlash Coefficient Backlash coefficient =.33

"Force Doesn't Work" Backlash Coef.

Carrots not Sticks

The Case of ISIS Backlash Unrightable Wrongs Force Escalation Identity Crane Brinton e-of-isis/

The Case of ISIS Iraq Population  Shia  Sunni  Kurd Saddam Hussein Nouri al'Maliki e-of-isis/

Extra Slides

Power Options / Disputing Arena I Moral arguments designed to persuade people to voluntarily change their behavior Appeals to administrative discretion Efforts to influence "rulemaking" processes Legal challenges based on alleged violations of settled law Negotiation based on the fact that it is less costly than power contests and achieves the same result

Power Options / Disputing Arena II Litigation as part of an effort to set a new legal precedent Lobbying efforts designed to change the law Electoral efforts designed to change the makeup of legislative bodies Public education programs to lay the groundwork for a electoral campaign Economic power and financial resources to take action in the private sector

Power Options / Disputing Arena III Attempt to exert illegal or unethical influence on political leaders (e.g. bribes) Defy political authorities through acts of civil disobedience or covert lawbreaking Violent resistance and intimidation State-sponsored military threats and, if necessary, action

Political Power Principles Power contests that are lower on the power hierarchy tend to be cheaper People tend to use the power option with which they have expertise Hammer’s Law – “to a hammer, all the world is a nail” The incentive is to avoid options where you are weak and pursue options where you are strong Your opponent will do the same

Constructive/Legitimate vs. Destructive/Illegitimate Power Contests Administrative Appeals Bribes (Legal/Illegal) Rights-Based Litigation Loophole Litigation “Hot Button” Propaganda” Principled Campaigns Democratic Elections Secret Police Nonviolent Action Terrorism Conquest/Invasion Military Defense Invisible Hand Invisible Fist ( Monopoly ) Legitimate Power OptionsIllegitimate Power Options

BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement On what basis do you decide whether or not to accept a negotiated agreement?

BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? Accept Agreement Administrative appeal Legal challenge Political lobbying Electoral campaigns Public persuasion Economic action Civil disobedience Military action Etc,

BATNA Limit / Ripeness Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? Accept Agreement Administrative appeal Legal challenge Political lobbying Electoral campaigns Public persuasion Economic action Civil disobedience Military action Etc,

BATNA Limit / Ripeness Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? WIN Ballot Initiative WIN Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? Power Contest Shortcut Bitter End Path Accept Agreement

BATNA Limit / Ripeness Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? WIN Ballot Initiative LOSE Conclusion of a Negotiation Process Are there any power contest alternatives that are likely to give me a better deal? Power Contest Shortcut Bitter End Path Accept Agreement