US Army Combined Arms Center IPB in Counterinsurgency (Part II Environment’s Effects)

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Presentation transcript:

US Army Combined Arms Center IPB in Counterinsurgency (Part II Environment’s Effects)

Determine Threat Courses of Action Define the Operational Environment Evaluate the Threat Describe the Environment's Effects 2 1 IPB 2 Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I Visualize the specific groups that defines the limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay). Identify each specific community or group.

US Army Combined Arms Center Define the Operational Environment Describe the Environment's Effects 2 1 IPB 2 The PEOPLE Their ISSUES 2 1

US Army Combined Arms Center IPB The PEOPLE Their ISSUES 2 1 Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2. Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes 3 x Root Causes

US Army Combined Arms Center Environment’s Effects “So what” factor of Operational Environment = Root Causes Counterguerrilla : Countering Insurgents (e.g. Counter IED) - Short term - Reactive - Tactical - Military : Eliminating Root Causes and thus denying enemy passive/active support of the population to lay in IEDs. - Medium and long term - Proactive - Tactical (with cumulative) - Military and political Counterinsurgency Versus

US Army Combined Arms Center Environment’s Effects Why are Root Causes so important? CG simply regenerates insurgents if no effort to eliminate Root Cause. Perspective: Mindset of a counterinsurgent: Is there an insurgency? Mindset of insurgent/population: Are the 3 root causes present? Reactive: Deal with the insurgency Proactive: Prevent the insurgency

Insurgent People Counter- Insurgent

Counter- Insurgent People Insurgent People Insurgent Counter- Insurgent People Insurgent Root Causes Using all civil-military means Physically and psychologically separate the insurgency from the population Deny enemy passive / active support of the population Eliminate Root Causes? Credibility of the population for the legitimacy of the government Identify true root causes based on the local population (Grievance and Underlying Issues)

People Insurgent Counter- Insurgent People Insurgent Root Causes Credibility of the population for the legitimacy of the government Identify true root causes based on the local population (Grievance and Underlying Issues) Addressing Root Causes?Eliminate Root Causes?

US Army Combined Arms Center Three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can occur. 1)Vulnerable population. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit political, economic, or social dissatisfaction with the current government. 2) Leadership available for direction. A leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent strategy. 3) Lack of government control. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true. The government is non responsive or overly oppressive. Other conditions include:Popular supportUnity of effort Will to resistLeadership Discipline IPB II – Effects (Root Causes)

Hole or Vacuum Hole or Vacuum Hole or Vacuum 3 x Root Causes from the perspective of the Population 1st – Vulnerable Population 2nd – Lack of Leadership 3rd – Ineffective Government 3 x Prerequisites of Insurgency based on the 3 x Root Causes 1st – Exploiting and/or addressing the Population’s Vulnerability 2nd – Providing Leadership for Direction (Insurgent leadership and/or an ideal/goal to focus and mobilize the people) 3rd – Providing Governance, political wing, or alternate state Understanding address the 3 x Root Causes from the perspective of the Population 1st – Identify and addressing that makes the Population Vulnerable 2nd – Providing Leadership for Direction (HN government with local community leaders) 3rd – Identifying what the Population expects of the government and supporting it through the HN’s government Insurgency Population Counterinsurgency Active Support Passive Support Active Support Passive Support

US Army Combined Arms Center Vulnerable population Leadership available for direction Lack of government control IPB II – Effects (Root Causes) (Prerequisites of Insurgency) Root Causes of Insurgency ConditionsAnalysis of Conditions “Prerequisites of Counterinsurgency” Why is the Population Vulnerable? Why no other leaderships? What they look for in leader? What do people consider effective government?

US Army Combined Arms Center Three requirements that must exist before an insurgency will and/or stay defeated. How is the population vulnerable? Do all those in your AO/AI have the same vulnerability? e.g. Food, electricity, honor, religion, a political voice, insurgent propaganda, etc. How do we determine each groups VULNERABILITIES? - Host Nation unit - Dismount and get to know the people - Receive intel from higher Vulnerable Population X - In COIN intel moves up. Unit on the ground is closest to local HN unit and population (4 x corner war)

US Army Combined Arms Center “Classic” versus “Muslim/fundamentalism” Myth All InsurgenciesSpecific Insurgency El Salvador Land Reform Founding Fathers Political Voice Iraqi Shi’a Theocracy Kurds Autonomy Vulnerable Populations What makes them vulnerable Vulnerable Population

US Army Combined Arms Center - What do the people look for in a leader? - Why are they without leadership? - Were their local leaders arrested, disrespected, killed, displaced, or non existent. - Who is best suited to provide leadership by the group? - What are some of the defining characteristics of the community? - Government leaders provides some leadership as does religious, social, cultural, family, tribal, academic, peasant, labor, ethnic leaders as well as other respected members of the community. (Where are the gaps?) Lack of Leadership

US Army Combined Arms Center Is this leadership a person or ideal? Person: How does leader control the people (by group) - Charismatic - Coercion - Lack of better option - Tribal/Family/famous namesake - Religious - Ethnic - Appointed by higher level insurgent or external state/non state leader Three requirements that must exist before an insurgency will and/or stay defeated. Lack of Leadership

US Army Combined Arms Center What is an effective government? - Non-responsive government to group(s) - Overly harsh government to group(s) What does the population expect of their government? - Justice (by government or government supports tribal justice) - Security - Basic needs (electricity, water, infrastructure) - Religious freedom or strict religious direction - Grazing rights Ineffective Government Three requirements that must exist before an insurgency will and/or stay defeated.

US Army Combined Arms Center ‘Hearts and Minds’ = Buying into system of government Mind = Short term (what they need now) Heart = Long term (better way of life) Hint: Capability in ASCOPE identifies who is responsible to this root cause. “What do the people expect of their government.” Three requirements that must exist before an insurgency will and/or stay defeated. Ineffective Government

US Army Combined Arms Center “Insurgents rely heavily on the support of local residents for their ability to endure and succeed. Local inhabitants provide food, shelter, volunteers, money, and intelligence without which the insurgents would be unable to carry out their operations. Such civilian support can be attained in any of the following ways. A. Volunteering B. Force C. Extortion D. Terrorism” ~ From Captured Official Manual 208 Iraqi Counter-insurgency Warfare How to Gain Support

US Army Combined Arms Center How to Gain Support - Governance - Basic needs - Loyalty to cause - Coercion Insurgents and Counterinsurgents need the people. The people are “Key Terrain” and Center of Gravity.

US Army Combined Arms Center Root Causes Root Causes V ulnerable Population L eadership G overnment VLGVLG VLGVLG VLGVLG Environment’s Effects VLGVLG VLGVLG VLGVLG

US Army Combined Arms Center

Root Causes Collection Plan Form IPB II - Effects of the Operational Environment by each group, community, neighborhood (AKA Center of Influence) Step IIIStep IIStep I – Start Here3 x Root Causes Ask: “Why?” What is the root or underlying issue for the answer in Step II? Ask: “Why?” - What is the reason or cause for the answer in Step I Grievances, complaints, and problems common to local group or community Collection based on Political, Military, Social, and Economic categories within each root cause to cover the basic systems common to all groups Vulnerable Population Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic Leadership for Direction Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic Ineffective Government Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic

Root Causes Collection Plan Form IPB II - Effects of the Operational Environment by each group, community, neighborhood (AKA Center of Influence) Step IIIStep IIStep I – Start Here3 x Root Causes Ask: “Why?” What is the root or underlying issue for the answer in Step II? Ask: “Why?” - What is the reason or cause for the answer in Step I Grievances, complaints, and problems common to local group or community Collection based on Political, Military, Social, and Economic categories within each root cause to cover the basic systems common to all groups Vulnerable Population No representationNo way to air grievancesGovernment doesn’t care Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic Leadership for Direction Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic Ineffective Government Political Military (SWEAT-MS)Social Economic

Root Causes (IBP II - Effects of the OE) Insurgents Addressing the Root Causes based on the four methods of influencing the population (Consider each) Counterinsurgents Addressing the Root Causes based on the four methods of influencing the population (Consider each) Input from Root Cause Collection Plan Form (Roll-up of Steps I-III) Provide Governance Basic Needs Loyalty to Cause Coercion/ Security Provide Governance Basic Needs Loyalty to Cause Coercion/ Security Vulnerable Population Political Military Social SWEAT-MS Economic Lack of Leadership Political Military Social SWEAT-MS Economic Ineffective Government Political Military Social SWEAT-MS Economic

Input from Root Cause Collection Plan Form (Roll-up of Steps I-III) Counterinsurgents - Addressing the Root Causes based on the four methods of influencing the population – Consider each Provide Governance Basic Needs Loyalty to Cause Coercion/ Security Vulnerable Population Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic Lack of Leadership Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic Ineffective Government Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic

Input from Root Cause Collection Plan Form (Roll-up of Steps I-III) Insurgents - Addressing the Root Causes based on the four methods of influencing the population – Consider each Provide Governance Basic Needs Loyalty to Cause Coercion/ Security Vulnerable Population Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic Lack of Leadership Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic Ineffective Government Political Military Social (SWEAT-MS) Economic

US Army Combined Arms Center

Questions?