THE EVIDENTIAL CHALLENGE: FLEW’S A-THEISM PHIL/RS 335

FLEW, “THE PRESUMPTION” Flew begins with a distinction fundamental to his understanding of the stakes. It’s a distinction in different senses of atheism. Positive Atheism: denies that there is anything like God. Negative Atheism: a-theist (where the a- is privative, like asexual). This sense is synonymous with “not a theist.”

A-THEISM IS NOT AGNOSTICISM It’s important to recognize that negative atheism is not the same as agnosticism. Agnosticism starts with the possibility of God and then just shrugs. A-theist takes up a logically prior position, that is prior to assertions of the possibility, impossibility or necessity of God (152c2). This distinction emphasizes that the a-theist position is ultimately a position on the question of the status of claims about the theistic God.

WHO HAS THE BURDEN? Flew insists that a-theism reveals that the burden of proof is on the theist to: Articulate and defend a concept of God. Provide “sufficient reason” for believing that the concept refers to something. As Flew immediately emphasizes, the first task is by no means easy or obvious. There are many different conceptions of “God.” Problem of divine attributes. Ineffability (153c1).

THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE Flew then attempts to justify his insistence that the burden of proof lies with the “God-Talkers” by drawing an analogy to the presumption of innocence. What would count as proof of guilt is not limited to “demonstratively valid arguments” but any variety of sufficient reason (Prime Principle of Confirmation?) Both outcomes (innocent or guilty) are defeasible rather than dogmatic outcomes. The P of I establishes a starting point, but does not prefigure the outcome (155c1). Presumptions are not trivial. Imagine a criminal justice system that started with a presumption of guilt. The defeat of the presupposition doesn’t invalidate the procedural commitments.

SHOULD WE ACCEPT THE PRESUMPTION? Usually, the burden of proof is understood to be on the positive/assertive side, but as Flew notes, it might be possible to gloss a-theism as a positive assertion. A more sophisticated read of the situation would be that the question of God’s existence, if it is to be engaged, requires a ground for the engagement. There needs to be something to debate, and as the God-Talkers want to debate the existence of God, they have to establish that ground.

WHAT’S THE POLICY? What any ground of engagement reveals is a policy (in the case of criminal justice, different policies lead to different presumptions). Flew acknowledges this and is explicit about the policy motivating his a-theistic position. Given that the issue is the capacity to articulate a concept of God and provide sufficient reasons for believing that it refers to something, Flew locates his policy in the epistemological questions that underlie these tasks: the capacity to have knowledge about these matters. In contrast to merely believing them, even if the beliefs are true. Thus, (157c1-2).

EVALUATING THE PRESUMPTION OF A- THEISM (PT. 1) Given the difficulties of identifying justifying grounds for the articulation of the concept of God and asserting its reference, Flew insists that we should adopt A-theism. He does acknowledge a number of objections to this position which he tries to address. Context: everyone (or almost everyone) believes, but Flew insists that the issue is not biographical, but epistemological. We have to begin with some beliefs; the only issue is the rationality of maintaining them. Flew responds that there is an important distinction between rational and founded. For him the question is not, “What is rational given a certain starting point?” (Hick) but “What is the appropriate starting point?”

EVALUATING THE PRESUMPTION OF A- THEISM (PT. 2) Another common rejoinder to a-theism is to reject the whole project of rational theological inquiry and to insist that God is not available to reason, but only to faith. Flew’s response is that even in the face of absolute indeterminacy, we are not free to believe anything we want, but only what it makes sense to believe, “Faith, surely, should not be a leap in the dark, but al leap toward the light” (159c1). What about Pascal’s wager? Flew points out that Pascal is focusing on motivating reasons, but founding reasons are a wholly different thing. It’s also the case that Pascal artificially frames the wager as if there were only two options, but surely there are more (agnosticism, a-theism) which changes the wager significantly.

WHAT ABOUT AQUINAS? To bring his discussion to a close, Flew considers the force of Aquinas’s insistence that, “…the existence of God…can be demonstrated” (160c2). In reference to the 5 ways, Flew notes that one of the objections to which they respond is the presumption of (Aristotelian) scientific naturalism grounded in the principle of economy (the simplest explanations are the best). This reveals that even Aquinas did not understand a- theism as merely a competing assumption but as a question of a wholly different order.