Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL Primary Hazard Screening (PHS) for ISMS Implementation and Safety Basis Classification EFCOG SAWG May 8, 2012 Mark Wong, Sandia National Labs

Presentation Outline  What is PHS?  How is it implemented?  How does it support Safety Basis and Hazard Classification?  What are the limitations? 2

What is PHS? Structured screening process that identifies: Scope of work High-level hazard identification Requirements for identified hazards and controls ― Training ― Requirements documents ― Action/Warning messages for key requirements Hazard Analysis (HA) for select hazards Safety Basis Hazard Classification ES&H Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement 3

How is PHS Used at SNL?  Initial step & foundation of SNL’s Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS)  PHS flows into Work Planning & Controls (WP&C) process:  Provides task-level detail, e.g., specific hazard and control information  Implements safe work practices & requirements  Foundation of Safety Basis Program 4

Software Implements PHS Collects information about the work process Asks questions to identify hazards and associated requirements Provides process reviews by appropriate persons Notifies authors and ES&H SMEs when hazard thresholds are exceeded or evaluations are missing Assures uniform Safety Basis Hazard Classification 5

General Information Screen 6

Question Set Screen Shot 7

PHS Also Collects  References to documents (operating procedures, permits, NEPA)  Lists of individual hazards, in tables  Notes  General for PHS  For individual questions  To address individual requirements identified by PHS 8

PHS Support of Safety Basis  Defines Scope & Safety Basis of all operations  Determines Hazard Classification  Supports Hazard Analysis for “Low” hazards  Flags major hazard interaction situations that could cause Safety Basis classification to exceed “Low”  Aggregates hazards for building or facility for hazard classification through the Hazard Aggregation Roll-up Process (HARP) 9

Hazard Classification: Industrial Facility  Office, SIH, & Low  Classification imbedded in question logic  Questions developed to identify thresholds between SIH and Low  Moderate & High  Questions identify conservative thresholds for hazards and situations that could exceed “Low”  Thresholds trigger evaluation by Safety Basis to manually determine hazard classification; classification is then entered into the software, so PHS remains definitive source for classification 10

Hazard Classification: Industrial Facility  Accelerator  Radiation Generating Devices (RGDs) that create Radiation Areas are identified in a table.  Information about the process and RGD is entered into the table, including information identifying exemptions.  Classification made based on information in the table.  Possible classifications:  Not accelerator  C(1) exempt accelerator  C(2) exempt accelerator  Accelerator  For more information, see “Implementation of DOE Order 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities” tomorrow at 9:30. 11

Hazard Classification: Nuclear  Radionuclides entered in hazard table, which automatically calculates Sum-of-Ratios (SOR).  Surrogate values (e.g., U-235 equivalent) can be used, but requires review by Nuclear Safety Basis personnel.  Automated SOR can be overridden in cases where it is inaccurate, but requires review by Nuclear Safety Basis personnel.  Segregation  Controlled, dynamic inventory  Radioactive Waste facility  Weapon storage 12

Hazard Analysis  Required for hazards classified as “Low”.  Uses modified Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA).  Documents causes, consequences, controls, and sufficiency of controls for each analyzed hazard.  Can substitute separate analysis, as long as it contains the equivalent or better information. 13

Limitations  Need good questions, which are difficult to write:  Clear & understandable;  Complete, no loopholes; and  Properly designed and scoped to identify the desired hazards and requirements.  Can’t ask enough questions to cover every situation.  Human intervention needed for complex situations.  Can’t list all requirements, so at some point need to refer user back to requirements documents to determine requirements.  Questions require periodic review and updating. 14

Summary  PHS software implements a process that identifies activity scope, hazards, requirements, and Safety Basis classification.  PHS is the foundation for ISMS implementation and Safety Basis classification.  Effectiveness is dependent on quality and design of questions.  Human intervention/judgment is needed at some point. 15

Questions? 16