Division of Household Labor between Spouses: Calculation or Values? An Empirical test on 23 European Countries. Jean-François Mignot Science Po, Paris Małgorzata Mikucka Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences Conference, June 2007, Prague, Czech Republic

Agenda Direct determinants of housework division Direct determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Other predictions Other predictions Empirical results Empirical results Conclusions Conclusions

Direct determinants of housework division (1) Two classes of causal mechanisms: Two classes of causal mechanisms: –Rational calculation  Spouses choose (un)equal division of housework because they profit from it in some sense; they consider advantages and disadvantages (costs and benefits) of each possible modification of the housework division to find an optimal one, preferred over all the others –2 mechanisms:  Specialization according to comparative advantages  Specialization according to increasing returns to scale –Values concerning gender equality  Spouses divide housework more or less equally based on their internalized values concerning appropriate gender roles and the desirable degree of equality between spouses (not the opportunities or constraints, but the desires vary across couples)

Direct determinants of housework division (2) Comparative advantage Assuming that the spouses have the same level of productivity in housework, the spouse who will devote the larger share of his or her productive time to housework will be the one who has the lower market productivity, i.e., the lower hourly wage; the share of his or her productive time devoted to housework will be all the larger since he or she has a lower hourly wage compared to that of his or her spouse. Assuming that the spouses have the same level of productivity in housework, the spouse who will devote the larger share of his or her productive time to housework will be the one who has the lower market productivity, i.e., the lower hourly wage; the share of his or her productive time devoted to housework will be all the larger since he or she has a lower hourly wage compared to that of his or her spouse.

Direct determinants of housework division (2) Comparative advantage Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by the SSHW - The higher the relative hourly wage of the housework-specialized spouse, the more equal the division of housework The higher the relative hourly wage of the housework-specialized spouse, the more he/she would work in the market AND the less would his/her spouse work in the market - + Relative education of the SSHW

Direct determinants of housework division (3) Increasing returns to scale Total amount of housework SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by the SSHW The inequality of housework division between the spouses will be all the greater since the total amount of housework done by the couple is greater + In household production just as in any other productive activity people “learn by doing,” i.e., become all the more productive (per hour worked) since they produce on a larger scale (in hours worked). Therefore, if the couple wishes to maximize its production of goods it should assign as much of the household (and market) production as is possible to one and only one of its members.

Direct determinants of housework division (4) Values concerning gender equality SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by the SSHW Gender equality values of one spouse - Spouses who have internalized gender equality conceptions may act to promote gender equality in their couple and they will do so all the more since they are more attached to the value of equality between men and women Contrary to the previous approach, this theoretical model assumes individuals aim not at maximizing their consumption but rather at attaining a situation of gender equality.

Agenda Direct determinants of housework division Direct determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Other predictions Other predictions Empirical results Empirical results Conclusions Conclusions

Indirect determinants of housework division (1) Effects of individual characteristics on time allocation For each spouse, the higher the hourly wage the higher the market value of his/her time compared to its housework value, so the more they buy market substitutes to housework which reduce their total amount of housework For each spouse, the higher the hourly wage the higher the market value of his/her time compared to its housework value, so the more they buy market substitutes to housework which reduce their total amount of housework Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW Total amount of housework SSMW Education SSHW Education - -

Indirect determinants of housework division (2) Effects of individual characteristics on time allocation For each spouse, the higher the income the more they buy of all goods, among which time-saving devices which reduce their total amount of housework For each spouse, the higher the income the more they buy of all goods, among which time-saving devices which reduce their total amount of housework Total income of SSMW Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW Total income of SSHW Total amount of housework SSMW Education SSHW Education

Indirect determinants of housework division (3) Effects of spouses’ incomes on time allocation Each spouse’s income decreases the other spouse’s incentive to work rather than do housework Each spouse’s income decreases the other spouse’s incentive to work rather than do housework Total income of SSMW Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW Total income of SSHW Total amount of housework

Indirect determinants of housework division (4) Effect of relative wage on time allocation Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW Total amount of housework SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by the SSHW Childcare Relative education of the SSHW The relative hourly wage of the spouse specializing in housework should reduce the couple’s number of children (opportunity cost of children) Children increase the total housework time and decrease market work time

“Time-availability hypothesis” Time-allocation model vs. Market work hours Housework hours Market work hours Housework hours - Productivity Relative productivity Other?

Agenda Direct determinants of housework division Direct determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Other predictions Other predictions Empirical results Empirical results Conclusions Conclusions

Other predictions (1) Higher risk of divorce Higher risk of divorce Cohabiting vs. married couples Cohabiting vs. married couples One of the risks confronting the spouse who specializes in household production is that in case of divorce she may suffer from a drop in her living standard that is sharper than the one faced by the spouse who specialized in market work. Thus, in less stable relationships people should tend to be more wary of specialization in household production One of the risks confronting the spouse who specializes in household production is that in case of divorce she may suffer from a drop in her living standard that is sharper than the one faced by the spouse who specialized in market work. Thus, in less stable relationships people should tend to be more wary of specialization in household production This is why in less stable relationships, when allocating their time between market work and housework, people should: This is why in less stable relationships, when allocating their time between market work and housework, people should: (1) try to reduce the share of their time allocated to housework and (2) to be relatively less sensitive to their spouse’s income

Other predictions (2) Another, independent prediction concerns the effect of gender equality values on the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework. Another, independent prediction concerns the effect of gender equality values on the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework. Indeed, given the decreasing marginal value of income, the effect of gender equality values on the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework should be more strongly negative in richer countries because at higher levels of income it is less costly in terms of welfare to forgo the gains of specialization Indeed, given the decreasing marginal value of income, the effect of gender equality values on the share of housework performed by the spouse specializing in housework should be more strongly negative in richer countries because at higher levels of income it is less costly in terms of welfare to forgo the gains of specialization

Agenda Direct determinants of housework division Direct determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Other predictions Other predictions Empirical results Empirical results Conclusions Conclusions

Empirical results (1) Full model – modifications to improve the fit Total income of SSMW Market work hours of SSMW Market work hours of SSHW Total income of SSHW Total amount of housework SHARE OF HOUSEWORK performed by the SSHW Gender equality values Childcare Relative education of the SSHW SSMW Education SSHW Education Correction for measurement error Correction for measurement error Correlated residuals Correlated residuals Fit acceptable according to NFI and CFI indexes (>0,90) Fit acceptable according to NFI and CFI indexes (>0,90) (non-normal data)

Empirical results (2) Direct determinants of housework division the relative education of the spouse specializing in housework tends to reduce her share of housework (supposedly because of specialization according to comparative advantages) the relative education of the spouse specializing in housework tends to reduce her share of housework (supposedly because of specialization according to comparative advantages) the total amount of housework the couple performs tends to increase her share of housework (supposedly because of increasing returns to scale in household labor) the total amount of housework the couple performs tends to increase her share of housework (supposedly because of increasing returns to scale in household labor) egalitarian gender values tend to reduce her share of housework egalitarian gender values tend to reduce her share of housework

Empirical results (3) Indirect determinants of housework division Spouses’ hourly wages and incomes moderately decrease the total amount of housework, which contributes to equality of housework division Spouses’ hourly wages and incomes moderately decrease the total amount of housework, which contributes to equality of housework division Spouses’ relative wages have only a very weak / insignificant effect on market work hours and fertility Spouses’ relative wages have only a very weak / insignificant effect on market work hours and fertility Each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s market work hours Each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s market work hours Childcare increases housework hours Childcare increases housework hours Education is only a very crude measure of market productivity

Empirical results (4) Data for the “other predictions” Married (N=6,368) vs. cohabiting couples (N=1,300) Married (N=6,368) vs. cohabiting couples (N=1,300) Groups of countries based on GDP and divorce risk: Groups of countries based on GDP and divorce risk: Group “D-GDP-”, N=1,344 Group “D-GDP-”, N=1,344 –Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Turkey Group “D+GDP-”, N=1,132 Group “D+GDP-”, N=1,132 –Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Ukraine Group “D-GDP+”, N=777 Group “D-GDP+”, N=777 –Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands Group “D+GDP+”, N=3,115 Group “D+GDP+”, N=3,115 –Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, Austria

Empirical results (5) Other predictions People in cohabiting couples and higher-divorce countries should: People in cohabiting couples and higher-divorce countries should: –Rely more on their own characteristics when allocating their time –Reduce housework more so as to avoid housework specialization This prediction is supported for cohabiting vs. married couples: each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s employment hours less strongly in cohabiting couples each spouse’s income reduces the other spouse’s employment hours less strongly in cohabiting couples only in married couples does the relative productivity influence housework division and employment hours only in married couples does the relative productivity influence housework division and employment hours This prediction receives only partial support: in cohabiting couples and high-divorce marriages spouses’ hourly wages reduce the total amount of housework more strongly in cohabiting couples and high-divorce marriages spouses’ hourly wages reduce the total amount of housework more strongly in cohabiting couples: in cohabiting couples: –Increasing returns to scale have a stronger effect –Childcare increases the amount of housework more

Empirical results (6) Discussion The main two predictions are validated: both rational calculation and values influence housework division The main two predictions are validated: both rational calculation and values influence housework division Impact of relationship stability: Impact of relationship stability: –Married (vs. cohabiting) rely more on the other spouse’s productivity and the spouses’ relative productivity –BUT higher risk of separation does not motivate partners to reduce total amount of housework Correlated residuals are substantial, which indicates that important determinants of time allocation were not included in the model Correlated residuals are substantial, which indicates that important determinants of time allocation were not included in the model

Agenda Direct determinants of housework division Direct determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Indirect determinants of housework division Other predictions Other predictions Empirical results Empirical results Conclusions Conclusions

Conclusions (1) Spouses divide housework rationally in that they take advantage of their comparative advantages and increasing returns to scale, but not as far as other questions of time allocation are concerned, and especially not as far as insuring themselves against the risks of union breakdown is concerned. Spouses divide housework rationally in that they take advantage of their comparative advantages and increasing returns to scale, but not as far as other questions of time allocation are concerned, and especially not as far as insuring themselves against the risks of union breakdown is concerned. Moreover, spouses do take into account gender equality values when dividing housework. Moreover, spouses do take into account gender equality values when dividing housework.

Conclusions (2) Rational-choice explanations are self-sufficient explanations – i.e., explanations that do not raise any additional question; however, their weakness may rely on their empirical accuracy, which is far from perfect. Rational-choice explanations are self-sufficient explanations – i.e., explanations that do not raise any additional question; however, their weakness may rely on their empirical accuracy, which is far from perfect. The weakness of the explanations related to values is that, even when they are validated empirically, they still raise a question – e.g., how come certain types of people tend to believe more (or less) in certain types of values such as gender equality values? The weakness of the explanations related to values is that, even when they are validated empirically, they still raise a question – e.g., how come certain types of people tend to believe more (or less) in certain types of values such as gender equality values? Therefore, this paper illustrates the need for both stricter empirical tests of rational-choice explanations and deeper theoretical research on the adherence to values, or “preference formation” as some researchers call it. Therefore, this paper illustrates the need for both stricter empirical tests of rational-choice explanations and deeper theoretical research on the adherence to values, or “preference formation” as some researchers call it.

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